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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S CONTRIBUTION TO SECULARISM AND SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE

Y. V. Satyanarayana*

Abstract

The concept of secularism is based on certain principles and values, and without those principles and values, secularism loses its significance. Secularism, as a philosophy of life, is not only concerned with the nature and functions of the state but also applicable to all aspects of human life. Nehru was an ardent lover of democracy, socialism and secularism. His faith and commitment to secularism remained unshakable till his last day. A secular state, for Nehru, does not mean indifferent or hostile to religion. It means equal respect for all faiths and providing equal opportunities to all creeds without attaching to one religion. Nehru's approach to the problems of human life was more or less scientific. A tradition-bound, caste-ridden and authoritarian society cannot provide a nourishing soil for secularism to strike its roots. The source of Indian life and thought was the caste system, and it was preventing the growth of secular values in India. Nehru, like his political teacher Gandhi, did not succeed in his attempt to build a secular India. Nevertheless, Nehru honestly and earnestly tried to lay the foundation for a secular state in India.

Key words: secularism, secular state, scientific knowledge, religious tolerance, communalism.

Introduction:

Secularism, as we understand it, is a product of the West. The doctrinal basis for secularism was found in the declaration of Christ: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's". The struggle between the Church and the

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state in the medieval period was a crucial factor in the emergence of secularism in the West. The secular spirit was the gift of the scientific revolution, which separated politics from the church. George Jacob Holyoake, a British journalist and a social reformer, is the father of secularism, who coined the term secularism in 1851.

Secularism is a philosophical thought that refers to the separation of religion from the affairs of the state. It claims that the state and the religion are related to different spheres of human life, and they should not interfere in each other's affairs. Secularism provides equal respect and recognition to all religions. It ensures and protects freedom for all people to practice, profess and propagate the religion of their choice. The state does not hold or support any one religion. Although some theorists equated secularism with atheism, secularism does not impose atheism on any individual. To clarify the meaning of secularism, let us refer to the Chambers dictionary. It states: "secularism is the belief that the state, morals, education, etc. should be independent of religion".

The philosophy of secularism is based on certain principles and values, and devoid of those principles and values, secularism loses its significance. Some thinkers consider secularism merely a political concept applicable to the nature and functions of the state. However, secularism as a philosophy of life can be applied to all aspects of human life. The practice and application of secular values, secular attitude and secular approach not only enrich people's understanding of socio-political and economic problems in their day-to-day social activity, but also provide proper guidance to them to think and act in a morally justified manner. Furthermore, the practice of secular values by the members of a social system immensely contributes to an ideal social life.

Secularism, as it is understood and practiced in the West, is alien to India. Similar to many other political and social concepts, such as democracy, socialism, equality, etc., secularism has come to India from the West. Although secularism was not in practice either in ancient or in medieval India, for many centuries, "religious tolerance" was in practice in Indian society. The spirit of religious tolerance is one of the distinctive attributes of Indian civilization.

The spirit of religious tolerance fostered by Indian society for many centuries appears to be the foundation of a secular state in India.

The Western system of education and the use of the English language enabled the first generation of Indian intellectuals to get acquainted with secularism and the Western system of liberal thought. The need for secularism and the relevance of a secular state has been recognized by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru when they assumed the leadership of the freedom movement under the banner of the Indian National Congress. They have realized the fact, rightly so, that in a pluralistic society like that of India, the policy and practice of secular principles and values must be an essential aspect to preserve and protect the age-old composite culture of the society. The rise and growth of Muslim and Hindu communalism during the independence movement compelled the leaders of the Indian National Congress to adopt the policy of secularism. Consequently, the Indian National Congress, at its Karachi session in 1931, adopted a resolution which stated that "the state shall observe neutrality regarding all religions". Thus, the Gandhi-Nehru model of secular state in India was grounded on the essential requirement of certain values and aspirations of people.

At the time of framing the new constitution, one of the important considerations before the Constituent Assembly was whether the Indian polity should be secular or otherwise. However, by and large, the consensus was in favor of a secular state, which alone can allay the fears of the minorities and reassure them of the security of their cultural and religious identity. Constitutional safeguards were provided to minority religious communities concerning religious, cultural and educational rights to enable them to live with dignity. However, the word "secular" finds its place in the preamble along with "sovereign democratic republic" only after the adoption of the 42nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution, which came into operation on the 1st September 1976.

Nehru was an ardent lover of democracy, socialism and secularism. His faith and commitment to secularism remained unshakable till his last day. Even his severe critics never doubted his commitment to secularism. The family environment in which he

was brought up, his educational training at Harrow, Cambridge and London, his exposure to the new horizons of sciences, all contributed to shaping his approach and outlook towards life. Secularism and scientific attitude are closely associated with one another. Here, the word "scientific" means the spirit of free inquiry and looking at things objectively, freedom from admiration for the past and expressing a modest attitude towards our own history. Nehru's aversion to religion and religious dogmas influenced him to move towards rationalism and a scientific approach, which are based on an open-minded approach to understanding problems and an effort to attain truth by experimentation. As a rationalist, he viewed all human problems with an open mind, examined and analyzed the situations systematically and objectively and found a remedy or a solution which appeared best to him.

A living philosophy, for Nehru, must answer the contemporary problems of individual and social life. Nehru believed that Philosophy avoided many pitfalls of religion and encouraged thought and enquiry. However, philosophy lived in its ivory tower, cut off from social life and its day-to-day problems. He felt that philosophy concentrates more on the ultimate purposes of human life and fails to link them with the practical life of man.

Religion, in the form of a set of dogmatic beliefs and supernatural influences, did not appeal much to him. Explaining his discomfort towards religion, Nehru observed:

"Religion, as I saw it practiced and accepted even by thinking minds, whether it was Hinduism or Islam or Buddhism or Christianity, did not attract me. It seemed to be closely associated with superstitious practices and dogmatic beliefs and behind it by a method of approach to life's problems which was certainly not that of science."[1]

Even though Nehru was quite aware of the influence of religion on the Indian masses, he was totally against making use of religion for political purposes. He was critical of those political leaders who exploit religion as a means to achieve their political ends. He equally denounced the communalist policies and approach of the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha to achieve their

political goals. Nehru's non-religious approach to politics may be distinguished from that of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's approach to politics through the Islamic religion. Ever since he joined the freedom movement, Nehru sought to make Indian politics as secular and rational as possible. He fought against communalism, the communalism of both the minority as well as majority. He put a larger responsibility on the majority community and said:

"… it is the dominant community and it is its responsibility not to use its position in any way which might prejudice our secular ideal."[2]

Nehru thought that caste-ism was as dangerous as communalism. He was highly critical of caste-ism and the role and influence of caste in Indian politics. "A caste-ridden society", for Nehru, "is not properly secular."[3] He felt that divisions based on caste were bound to affect the social structure of state. The caste divisions, which were based on a hierarchical order in the society, prevent people from realizing the idea of social equality.

A secular state, for Nehru, does not mean indifferent or hostile to religion. It means equal respect for all faiths and providing equal opportunities to all creeds without attaching to one faith or religion. In other words, the state can remain independent of any particular religion. Thus, Nehru's model of secular state does not mean exclusion of religion, but putting religion on a different plane from that of usual political and social life.

Indian society is a pluralistic society, and Indian culture is a composite culture. People belonging to different religious, cultural and caste groups live side by side in the same state, and are governed by the same laws. A pluralistic society like India has no other option but to be a secular state. Indian secularism is not a negative materialistic secularism but a positive secularism sympathetic to the phenomenon of religion. Explaining the notion of Indian secularism, Dr. Radhakrishnan, a distinguished philosopher and a statesman, asserts:

"Secularism does not mean opposition to religion. It does not mean disrespect to religion. It only means that the state as such is

not identified with any particular religion, but tolerates every religion, appreciates every religion, respects all religions…"[4]

Nehru's approach to the problems of human life was more or less scientific. He believes that the scientific outlook discloses the right direction for man to fulfill his desires and achieve his goals. It was his firm opinion that the application of science is inevitable for the modern man. Hence, he felt that a scientific approach and scientific temper must be a way of life, a process of thinking and a method of acting for every person living on the earth. He was very much impressed by the achievements of science and technology and observed that the technical capacity of science made it possible to transform an economy of scarcity into an economy of abundance. It lessened the drudgery of man, and life became easier for millions.

Nehru had an inordinate confidence in science and the scientific method. He asserts that science has brought many changes in the life of humans, and the most vital change that it has brought has been the development of the scientific outlook in man. He believes that the scientific method alone offers hope to mankind and provides solutions to the agony of the world. He was critical of those people who still live mentally in the pre-scientific age and betray a scientific approach in their thoughts and actions. The findings of science may change from time to time, but the method of science does not change, and it is to that one must adhere in their thoughts and activities.

Nehru was an agnostic and a humanist. He was more concerned with human life related to this world rather than life after death. Thus, he wrote:

"I am afraid the next world does not interest me. My mind is full of what I should do in this world and if I see my way clearly here, I am content. If my duty here is clear to me, I do not trouble myself about any other world."[5]

Referring to the imaginary aspect of the human mind, Nehru agreed with the famous saying of Voltaire, a French writer and philosopher, who says that "even if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him". He thought that too much dependence on

supernatural factors might lead to a loss of self-reliance in man and deaden his capacity and creative ability. He asserts:

"…as knowledge advances, the domain of religion, in the narrow sense of the word, shrinks. The more we understand life and nature the less we look for supernatural causes."[6]

As a matter of religious faith, Nehru did not believe in a supernatural agency or a life after death or karma theory of cause and effect or other worldly results. He was basically concerned and interested in this world and in this life, rather than in some other world or a life after death. Religious beliefs and dogmas, as Nehru grasped them, drift a person away from thinking rationally and scientifically and take refuge in irrationalism, superstition and unreasonable and inequitable social prejudices and practices. He expressed the view that many of the social evils, which are capable of removal, are attributed to the original sin, or to the unalterable human nature, or to the social structure, or to the inevitable legacy of previous births.

Nehru's aversion to religious dogmas, irrationalism, and superstitions, etc. on the one hand and his fascination with rationalism and scientific outlook on the other, attracted him towards Marxist philosophy. He developed a great respect for the insight of the Marxist thought, but he did not subscribe uncritically to any of its dogmas. In general, he accepted the philosophical outlook of Marxism. He was very much impressed by its monism or non-duality of mind and matter, the dynamics of matter and the dialectic of continuous change through thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The practical achievements of the Soviet Union exerted a great influence on his mind and helped him "to see history and current affairs in a new light."[7] He was greatly inspired by the achievements of the Soviet Revolution in the advancement of human society and the foundations it had laid for a new civilization in the world.

Nehru recognized and acknowledged the positive contribution of different religions in the development of humanity by laying down certain values, standards and principles for the guidance of human life. However, he was very much displeased with the

attitude of religions, which imprison truth in set forms and dogmas and encourage ceremonials and practices. He complained that instead of encouraging curiosity and thought, the religions preach a philosophy of submission to nature, to the established churches, to the prevailing social order, and to everything that is in practice. The followers of religion are supposed to accept various dogmas attached to it without doubt or questioning. Thus, for a religious man, the reason is replaced by faith.

The method of religion, as Nehru conceives it, is the very opposite of science, because it relies on emotion and intuition. A close study of the history of religions reveals that they are full of dogmatism, intolerance, fanaticism, bloodshed and many unspeakable horrors and cruelty. The people belonging to each religion make absolute and exclusive claims about the truth of their own religion and condemn those of others as false and dangerous, deserving to be eliminated. Hence, conflict and opposition arise, resulting in communal riots, bloodshed and wars and attendant suffering and sorrow. Organized religion, according to Nehru, has always helped the exploiters against the exploited by preaching that poverty and suffering are inevitable in this world. It tends to close and limit the mind of man and produce the temper of a dependent person. Every religion promises its followers a happy life in heaven or paradise, not in this world and not in this life, but in the other world and in the next life. Therefore, man must die with all hardships in this world in order to get happiness in the next world.

Nehru's rational approach was quite evident in his attitude to religion and science. He looked upon science as a great step ahead from barbarism to civilization. He was convinced that proper use of science and technology could liberate man from eternal misery and could give greater meaning to human life. Scientific knowledge in general liberates one from the shackles of dogmatism, fanaticism and intolerance and makes it possible to understand and assess things rationally and objectively.

Critical Analysis:

For an objective and impartial assessment of Nehru's contribution to secularism and scientific outlook, one needs to get satisfactory answers to the following questions:

1. Does a secular state operate in a non-secular society?
2. Is the Indian tradition conducive to working in a secular state?
3. Why was the word "Secular" not included in the preamble of the Indian Constitution till 1976?
4. What has gone wrong with Nehru's dream of building a secular India?
5. Why did the process of secularization initiated by Nehru not go ahead to its logical conclusion?

A tradition - bound, caste-ridden and authoritarian society cannot provide a nourishing soil for secularism to strike its roots. As long as we remain past-oriented, secularism cannot make any headway in India. The caste system, which is basic to Indian life and thought, is a major factor which is preventing the growth of secular values in India. Indian democracy is working on a skillful manipulation of caste and communal interests. In India, the caste system is highly organized, rigid and philosophically justified, which led to social discrimination and inequality. Caste-ism has been increasingly distorting the secular values and the socio-political and economic goals of our social system.

The "caste-based theory of social justice" resulted in the consolidation and strengthening of a kind of caste-based fundamentalism in our society, which is serving the interests of the caste politics of some political parties. The practice of "caste-oriented theory of social justice" not only causes the creation of more and more caste consciousness among the members of the society, but also results in polarization of castes into opposing groups in society.

The policy of the Indian Government identifying "backwardness" of the people with caste and sub-caste is fundamentally anti-secular. So far, no genuine attempt has been

made by the Indian Government to find out who are really backward and who really need a helping hand, irrespective of whether they belong to this caste or that caste or other socio-religious groups. The presence of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, ill-health, etc, is to be found in every community. Our government's assumption that a man must be well off because he belongs to a particular community or that another must be badly off because he belongs to the Government-designated backward community is unrealistic, unscientific and irrational. Indeed, there are well-to-do Harijans, and there are poverty-stricken Brahmins in our society. Thus, there is a profound contradiction between the Government's objective of a casteless society and its policy and method of elevating backwardness on a caste basis.

For centuries together, the Indian social system has been working on the principle of "mutual co-existence" and a "communal mode of cooperation", which constitute a fundamental basis to the process of social life. The principle of "mutual co-existence" and "communal mode of cooperation" is an in-built mechanism devised for the harmonious working of a pluralistic society. This kind of mechanism, indeed, is a marked attribute of the "unity in diversity" of Indian society. The caste-based discriminatory approach of the successive governments and the vote-bank politics of our political parties in post-independent India are responsible to a major extent for the growth and consolidation of caste-ism in Indian society. In this process, both caste and communal politics moved hand in hand, and the secular values of our democratic system have gradually deteriorated year after year without any check on them. Speaking at the inaugural function of the South Asian Interfaith Harmony Conclave in Delhi, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh deplored the tendency of some political parties to exploit religious sentiments for political ends. He observed that "attempts to divide society along religious lines deserve to be condemned with comtempt"[8]

Indian society is basically anti-secular in its character. Religion has been a powerful factor in the making of Indian culture. Every aspect of human life, from birth to death, has been covered by religious conceptions and rituals. The Nation-State in India has

grown out of the multi-caste, multi-religious and multilingual social structure. Secularism in India appears to be primarily a political aspect rather than an overall process of social life. Hence, it is necessary to inculcate secular principles and values as a philosophy of life and conscious activity. A breakthrough from traditional social structure is an essential element in the process of secularization.

The participation of state representatives in religious functions and the state- sponsored celebrations of religious occasions are preventing the growth and consolidation of secularism in India. The Indian State, P.C.Chatterje observes:

"…apart from encouraging communal politics, the practice of VIPs visiting temples and mosques is leading to the denigration of the concept of secularism to which the government is committed-on paper. The public sees their behaviour as hypocrisy and for a lot of people secularism has become synonymous with hypocrisy." [9]

The Indian state, as it was established under the present constitution, with many discriminatory aspects between one individual and another based on caste, religion and sex, cannot be regarded as secular, and to describe it as secular was merely misusing the term. The government, as well as the opposition parties in India, instead of promoting the growth of secularism, prefers to reflect on the prejudices of the vested interests of different castes and religious groups to avoid alienation of these groups and consolidation of votes cast by them at the time of elections.

The constitution makers had realized that the difficulties involved in varied personal laws for different religious communities stood in the way of realizing a true secular state. Article 44 in the Directive Principles of the state policy declares: "The state shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India". Although the British rulers successfully introduced a uniform criminal law to all the citizens in colonial India, the successive Governments at Delhi, in post-independent India, failed to bring a uniform civil code based on secular principles. The existence of separate personal laws is inconsistent

with secularism. There is no justification for the law being different for different groups of citizens based on religion. The absence of a common civil code contradicts the very principle of "equality before the law".

The Supreme Court Judgment in Mohammad Ahmad Khan V. Shah Bano Begum delivered on 23rd April 1985 by a five-Judge Bench headed by the then Chief Justice, Y.V.Chandrachud, underscored the importance of a Uniform Civil Code as a Constitutional goal under Article 44 of the Constitution, which according to the bench, has "remained a dead letter"[10]

A simple judgment of the Supreme Court in the Shah Bano Case evoked a nationwide controversy and split the Muslim Community into two groups --- conservatives and progressives. The orthodox Muslims refused to make any change in Muslim Personal Law. The Government introduced the Muslim Women Bill (Protection of Rights on Divorce Act 1986) in the parliament. This bill came under severe criticism during the introduction stage itself in the parliament, and many intellectuals of India, both Muslims and Non-Muslims, opposed the bill. By passing the Muslim Women Bill, the Indian State has not only flouted the fundamental constitutional right of equality to Muslim Women, but also tarnished India's image as a secular state. Thus, the Indian Muslim Women were being sacrificed for the vote-bank politics of the Government.

The following factors, which are diametrically opposite to secularism, are perhaps responsible for undermining the consolidation of a secular state in India.[11]

- Separate personal laws for each religious community.
- Provision for special privileges to some groups on communal classification.
- Undue state interference in Hindu religious institutions.
- Provision for state subsidies to the educational institutions run by religious organizations.

Unlike the Western model of secularism, in which there is complete separation of religion and state, in India, there is no such full separation between religion and state. In other words, Indian secularism does not call for a total exclusion of religion from state affairs. For example, the state permits religious minorities to establish and maintain their own educational institutions, which may receive assistance from the state. The state established Departments of Religious Endowments and Wakf Boards and also appointed Trustees of these boards. The state should not engage in providing funds or promote religious activities or practices. According to secularism, every citizen is equal before the law regardless of his or her religion and the judicial process should not be hindered or replaced by religious codes or procedures. However, in India, the Muslim Personal Law prevents Muslim women from getting equal rights on a par with women of other religions concerning divorce and alimony. However, it is interesting to know that the Uttarakhand government declared that it is implementing the "Uniform Civil Code" with immediate effect. A few months back, the Uttarakhand Chief Minister announced that his state is the first state in India which adopt the Uniform Civil Code.

Nehru, like his political teacher Gandhi, did not succeed in his attempt to build a secular India. Furthermore, he was not successful in finding a solution to Hindu-Muslim unity, or suppression of religious conflicts, or the eradication of caste-ism in India. Nevertheless, Nehru honestly and earnestly tried to make India a secular state. No one can doubt his commitment to non-communal and secular nationalism. The history of human society and its development reveals the fact that one cannot expect radical changes in human societies or in social and political institutions within a short span of time. Perfections in human societies or in socio-political institutions may take hundreds of years. Since human civilization is advancing to higher and more rational forms of human society, let us hope, Nehru's vision of secular India may be realized, if not immediately, in the years to come.

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SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ABOUT SRI AUROBINDO'S PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

It is in an effort to explain this challenge that this paper tries to bring out Sri Aurobindo as not just an academic philosopher but as a tattvadarśi, as a seer of the truth whose philosophical system is not based on conjectures but on yogic intuition. Based on primary works of The Life Divine, The Synthesis of Yoga, Essays on the Gita, The Human Cycle and The Foundations of Indian Culture, and important secondary works, the paper discusses how Sri Aurobindo revisits the tradition of Vedic-Upaniṣadism and how he develops Integral Non-dualism (purnada vaita). It compares his assertion of the reality of the world with the illusion world-view of Śaṅkara and claims that the worldview of Sri Aurobindo is a positive synthesis of spiritual understanding in the East with the intellectual needs of the modern age of science. His view of the Absolute as Saccidānanda, as well as his cosmology of evolution, is a manifestation of a dynamic, goal-oriented universe where consciousness moves towards the higher forms of the divine. The paper has identified the special role of Sri Aurobindo in the development of Indian philosophical thought using an analysis that identifies depth, integrality and unprecedented synthesising ability.

Keywords: Integral Non-dualism, Saccidānanda, Evolution; Vedic-Upaniṣadic Tradition, Tattvadarśī; Mysticism, The Life Divine.

Introduction:

1. Sri Aurobindo is a mystery to many thinkers. His genius has many appreciators. There are genuine admiration for his brief and his pioneering political work and leadership, both in India

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and abroad. “But very few know, far less understand, what he was doing at Pondicherry” said Arabinda Basu in his short essay titled “Sri Aurobondo”.[1] How could we address this situation? It is indeed true that “the appreciation of greatness by us adds nothing to it, on the contrary, it is only a proof of our ability to appreciate. To be open and clear in our understanding, to have the proper sense of values, to be attracted by the compelling force of greatness, all this does credit to us instead of increasing the lustre of one who is great” like Sri Aurobindo.[2] Without this modest way of understanding it is very difficult to say anything describing the thought-world of Sri Aurobindo.

2. Every human being has great interest in the world we live in and we know it, in our experience, as real. But the question that disturbs us is sometimes as follows: Is the world ultimately illusory? Scholars of Indian philosophy are divided in response to this question. According to øaṅkara, ‘the world is illusory’ in a specific and technical sense, and according to Sri Aurobindo, ‘the world is real and not illusory’ in a different technical sense. It is argued that Sri Aurobindo’s interpretation is only an extensional interpretation of contextualizing the Vedic-Upaniṣadic philosophy for his own time when development of science has positive impact on philosophical thinking and it is ‘Integral Non-dualism’ (*pūrõādvaita*) what he advocates. We intend to say here a few words about Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy in general, and about his understanding of Absolute as Saccidānanda and his theory of evolution in particular. My proposed discussion is primarily based on *The Life Divine* (henceforth, *LD*), *The Synthesis of Yoga* (henceforth, *SY*), *The Human Cycle* (henceforth, *HC*), *The Hour of God* (henceforth, *HG*, written between 1910—1940 and published posthumously, 1959), *Essays in the Gītā (henceforth, EG*),*The Future Evolution of Man (*henceforth, *FEM*), *The Foundations of Indian Culture* (*FIC.*1918—1921; 1959), and secondarily onK. D Sethna’s *Aspects of Sri Aurobindo* (1995), HaridasChaudhury’s *Sri Aurobindo: The Prophet of Life Divine* (1973), *Philosophy of Integralism*

(1954), S.K. Maitra's *An Introduction to The Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo* (1941) and ArabindaBasu's collection of Essays titled Sri *Aurobindo: The Poet, Yogi and Philosopher* (2011).

3. Sri Aurobindo 'reinterpreted, reconstructed and re-valuated' the entire structure of Vedic-Upaniṣadic philosophy. Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is literally integral in the sense that it is both profound and comprehensive. He is one of the finest interpreters of modern Indian philosophy who by the rare multi-dimensionality of his genius, astoundingly remarkable profundity of intellectual acumen, creative insight gifted with the spirit of synthesis, discovered our own cultural roots after encountering the wisdom of the Non-Indian Traditions. He has no philosophy if by it we mean 'academic philosophy' with theories and counter theories. But his massive structure of metaphysics is only an insight into reality. In his own words, "I had only to write down in terms of intellect all that I had observed and come to know in practising Yoga daily, and philosophy was there automatically. But that is not being a philosopher."[3]

II. Three senses of use of the word 'philosopher'

4. There are three different senses in which the term 'philosopher' is used. In the narrow sense it means a group of thinkers who do not have any realization of truth but have the interest in comprehensive analysis of the truth discovered by the poets and seers. They hope that their analysis of the composition of those who had first-hand experience of truth or God realization will enable them and their readers to experience the truth in future. In some cases they have some awareness of truth. *In this sense Sri Aurobindo is half philosopher*. We see his rational analysis of what he had realized in Yogic practice in his writings. But in the *narrower sense* a philosopher is one who has no realization of truth but one who gives arguments for a theory or a counter-theory and proceeds through analysis which is traditionally known as *buddhibalāpekṣāvyākhyā*, and this type of a person is usually called an 'academic philosopher' as we see in our academic institutions today. *In this sense Sri Aurobindo is not a*

philosopher. Still there is *a broad sense* in which the term 'philosopher' is used in India. He is called *Tattvadarśī*, a seer of truth / Reality. A poet in India is called *Krānta-darśī*. And there is no essential difference between a *Tattvadarśī* and a *Krānta-darśī*. Such a person is one who has realised the truth, either partially or fully. And in the light of this act of seeing of the truth face to face for the benefit of mankind, he expresses in rational language what is being realized by him in mystical experience as supernatural truth which has impact on individual, society and the state such as the truth had been seen by the seer-poets of the *Veda*-s. In this *broad sense Sri Aurobindo is certainly one of the greatest philosophers.*

5. According to his own admission, Sri Aurobindo 'was first a poet and a politician and later became a Yogi'.[4] But he is a philosopher in the traditional line of Indian thinkers as *tattvadarśī*. He is called a Yogi also in a technical sense. Yoga in this technical sense points to "the means of achieving the direct knowledge of man's true being. … Yoga is primarily an organon of knowledge. The practice of yoga not only can give direct experience of Atman but also provides man with very direct and minute knowledge of the non-Atman, to wit, body, life, mind etc. And it is this detailed knowledge of the non-Atman aspect which is necessary for liberation from that which prevents us from having direct realization of the Atman…. All the founders of the great Indian systems of philosophies were yogis and mystics and those who came after them elaborated, explained, and interpreted the founder's principles but did not really add anything new to their insights into the nature of Reality. … The fact that he depends on his yogic experience as materials of his integral idealism should not in any way raise doubts about his being a philosopher as Indian tradition thinks of a *darshanika*". [5] As Sri Aurobindo said in *Essays on the Gita* "Philosophy is only a way of formulating to ourselves intellectually in their essential significance the psychological and physical facts of existence and their relation to any ultimate reality that may exist." [6]… "All philosophy is concerned with the relations between two things, the fundamental truth of

existence and the forms in which existence presents itself to our experience. The deepest experience shows that the fundamental truth is truth of the Spirit; the other is the truth of life, truth of form and shaping force and living idea and action."[7]

In the light of this explanation let us move further to see how Sri Aurobindo's philosophy contributes to the development of India's philosophical thought. In India characteristically philosophy is 'synthetic'. But this does not mean that it is devoid of analytic characteristic. To understand the nature of the world we shall have to analyse critically what is given before us. "There are great deal of logical controversies, refutations and partial support of other philosophers' doctrines, there are also frank and deep appreciations and even instances of acceptance, thought partial, of whatever is true in other philosophies. Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is no exception in this respect." [8]

6. In his *magnum opus, The Life Divine* (*LD*) Sri Aurobindo reconciles the traditional Vedantic varieties of philosophic thought such as Advaita, Viśisṣṭādvita and Dvaita into his 'Integral Non-dualism' (*purṇādvaita*). For the Advaitins, Brahman alone is real. On the other hand, Viśisṣṭādvitavādins say that the Supreme Reality is Divine personality and it is endowed with all auspicious qualities. Again, Dvaitavādins speak of the distinct reality of individual selves and the one Supreme Lord to whom they attribute love and devotion. But in Sri Aurobindo's writings the esoteric meaning of the *mantra*-s of the *Veda*-s is elucidated from a mystical plane and his philosophy baffles all attempts to be easily intelligible to our ordinary thoughts divorced from meditative experience. His new interpretation based on inner symbolism clears our 'confusion and misunderstanding' regarding truths realized by the Vedic Seers.

III: Creation Vs Evolution:

7. Sri Aurobindo in his Integral Non-dualism also reconciles the chief currents of Indian spiritualism with dominant streams of Western culture by his creative vision into the exquisitely elegant texture of harmony. We get a marvellous synthesis of

the East and the West which permits the *logic of the Infinite* and the *logic of finitude* appear side by side. The first one has no limitation of possibility whereas the second one is conditioned by limited possibility. Contrary to the idea of creation (as traditionally conceived as '*creatio ex nihilo*'), Sri Aurobindo speaks of the theory of evolution. It is the pivot around which all his metaphysical creeds revolve and this theory of evolution has a few unique characteristics that radically differentiate it from the so-called popular varieties of theories of evolution. His view on *māyā* appears only in connection with his theory of evolution and this is required to maintain his non-dualistic view of reality along with the reality of the world of multiplicity we see around us. *Supra-cosmic, transcendent and cosmic*—each is equally real for him. He developed a vision of integral Reality in which the *Nirguṇa Brahma* and the world (*jagat*) are perceived in the unity of self-evolving and self-revealing Absolute and thus his philosophy is known as 'Integral Non-dualism'. Matter, for him, is implicitly conscious. Apparent contradiction is a part of Nature's general method. Nature is working towards reconciliation through evolutionary progress. "Life evolves out of matter, mind out of Life, because they are already there: Matter is a form of veiled Life, Life a form of veiled Mind. May not Mind be a form and veil of a higher power, the Spirit, which would be supra-mental in its nature?" [9] Man's highest aspiration would then only indicate the gradual unveiling of the Spirit within, the preparation of a higher life upon earth. His idea of evolution allows him to reject the illusionary interpretation of the world.

8. According to Sri Aurobindo, man occupies the central position in evolutionary wave as it gives a ground for the possibility of a passage 'from an unconscious to a conscious evolution'.[10] There is no reason to believe that this evolutionary process will stop with man. 'Man's urge towards spirituality is an undeniable indication of the inner drive of the Spirit within towards emergence, its insistence towards the next step of its manifestation'.[11] There is an upward transformation in the evolutionary process from matter → Life→Psyche (Soul)→

Mind →(Higher Mind → Illumined Mind →Intuition → Over Mind)→ Super Mind. [12]*From Mind to Super Mind there seems to be a bridge through Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Intuition and Over Mind*. The ultimate stage is the evolution of the Super-mind. "When this takes place, Nature becomes transformed into Super-nature and human beings into Gnostic Beings".[13] Here we see a radical change in evolutionary process, because from this stage onward, the evolution is through knowledge and not through ignorance. The fourfold process of ascent explores the hidden consciousness-truths gifted with the higher spiritual lights that causally effects the supra-mental modifications "as a series of sub-limitations of the consciousness … All these degrees are grades of energy-substance of the Spirit".[14] Sri Aurobindo gives a philosophical interpretation of the theory of evolution which the western idea of evolution fails to give. The Western idea of evolution is limited to the physical and bio-logical data of nature but it is blind to the explanation of our being. It cannot explain adequately how mental consciousness could come into being from physical stuff? The modern scientists explain the 'how-ness' of evolution, but they fail to give an answer regarding the 'why-ness' of it.

9. Sri Aurobindo realises that we are bound to suppose that consciousness force or spirit must be involved from the beginning in the whole of matter, life, mind and all are latent, inactive or concealed active powers in all the progression of material, energy. Unless we assume this previous involution, we cannot justify and explain the evolutionary process at all. Evolution does not produce anything new; rather it unveils what was already there. He views the entire evolutionary process from a spiritual perspective and it is spiritual evolution, because the Spirit is hidden in the world order and it is an evolution guided by the spirit. The movement of 'descent' and 'ascent' constitute a circular movement and man belongs to a stage in this order of cycle. Evolution without involution is unbelievable. It is a sort of home-sickness of the Spirit and the

final result of this is the Supreme manifestation of the Existence, Consciousness, Delight – Saccidānanda.

It is to be noted that the Absolute of Sri Aurobindo is not the same as the Absolute in Hegel's philosophy. The Absolute of Hegel is 'self-distinguishing and self-objectifying' principle of self-consciousness. For Hegel, the world is a form of self-externalization of the Absolute. Thought evolves there dialectically. Logic follows the principle in the development of thought, so that the world follows the same principles in its evolution. For Hegel, Reality is thought. But this 'thought' does not change its character. It is essentially relative and cannot give rise to the Absolute. For Sri Aurobindo, the Absolute is integrally conceived. It is at once static and dynamic, transcendent and immanent.

IV: No Academic Philosophy:

10. What is said earlier about the nature of academic philosophy, I fear, Sri Aurobindo's thought may not be included within it. In other words, our narrowly conceived scope of the term 'philosophy' cannot include his thought. However, by 'philosophy' Sri Aurobindo does not mean a hard intellectual enterprise or a fascinating frivolity of thought. For him, philosophy is an integral view of life. As human life is a multi-dimensional unity it is to be viewed as a whole and for that reason, philosophy should aim at integration and unity of experience. Neither barren intellectualism nor extreme existentialist outlook has any place in Integral Non-dualism. The standpoint of philosophy must be all inclusive and harmonious and truth must be 'non-one-sided'. He said, "Philosophy dealing with the principles of things must come to perceive the principle of all these principles and investigate its nature, attributes and essential workings." [15] Philosophy, for Sri Aurobindo, although is not capable of securing spiritual realization, it is an indispensable aid to such realization. In the words of K. D. Sethna (AmalKiran) "His philosophy is not abstract logic-spinning from a few principles of thought mixed with a few data of ordinary observation. It is only the intellectual elucidation of the systematisation of concrete and

direct experience of realities lying beyond the mere mind; it is but a mental picture of what is reached by the inmost consciousness in its Yogic penetration of the subliminal and supraliminal."[16]

V: The status of the world: It is not illusory:

11. With this introductory observation let us concentrate on Sri Aurobindo's View on the status of the world. This world, for Sri Aurobindo, is the self-manifestation of the pure Being. It is a "free creative act on the part of the Absolute Spirit – an act which is eternal, which expresses the mystically latent power of self-determination (*śakti*) of the Absolute, and which symbolizes the Absolute's delight of mutable becoming or variable self-manifestation."[17] The Supreme Reality, Saccidānanda, is manifesting Itself through its creation, a joyful play (*līlā*) of the Absolute. The world is not the essential truth of Absolute but phenomenal truth of its free multiplicity and infinite superficial mutability and not truth of its fundamental and immutable unity.

VI: Māyā in the sense of cosmic illusion becomes meaningless, a mere phantasy:

12. If this world expresses a great creative motive, if it is a manifestation of a divine life into the finite life then, as Sri Aurobindo says, māyā in the sense of cosmic illusion becomes meaningless, a mere phantasy. He does not want to deny the joy and pain, the struggle and effort of human life like a Buddhist or Māyāvādin of Śaṅkara type, but takes them as real as Brahman. As stated in *The Life Divine*, "All the stress of struggle and effort, success and failure, joy and suffering, the mixture of ignorance and knowledge would be the experience needed for the soul, mind, life and physical part to grow into the full light of a spiritual perfected being." [18] Sri Aurobindo firmly believes that the world expresses a foreseen truth, obeys a pre-determining will, realises an original formative self-vision. Sri Aurobindo thus rejects Śaṅkara's view that the universe is a mere illusion. Some philosophers consider the status of the world as illusory just like dream or hallucination.

The world, for them, is only an appearance and therefore should not be taken as real. It is called *māyā* in the sense of something artificial. It seems to be real but not actually real. Such a view is called by Sri Aurobindo, 'the world negation theory' and he rejects this view.

VII: Analogy of Dream-Life Argument Rejected:

13. Sri Aurobindo questionsthe argument given by Śaṅkarite philosophers from the analogy of dream to explain the world of experience as false. For him, it fails to establish the falsity of the world. The events in dream are no longer be a mere unreal object as they are all only a transcript of reality, a system of symbol-images and our awake experience of the world is similarly not real but only a transcript of reality. In other words, our awaking experiences are series of collection of symbol-images. But in the theory of illusion the only reality is an indeterminable featureless pure existence, Brahman, who cannot be rendered by a transcript, a crowd of symbols or images. Again, when it is said that dream is felt to be unreal because it ceases and has no further validity when we pass from one state of consciousness to our normal state. This reasoning is not sound, because we know that there are different states of consciousness, each has its own reality. But when a state of consciousness fades back as soon as we pass into another state, it would not prove the reality of the state in which we exist now and the unreality of the other which we have left behind us. It is equally possible to regard them as three different orders of one Reality.

VIII: The Analogy of Hallucination Argument Rejected:

14. There are two aspects of hallucination— mental and visual. When we see an image of thing where it does not exist, this is a case of visual hallucination as the case of a mirage. But when we see a snake in a piece of rope, it is an instance of mental illusion. Now Sri Aurobindo explains that in each case either it is visual or mental – the illusion is not an image of something quite non-existent, but an image of something which exists elsewhere; here it has been imposed by the mind's error or by a

sense-error. In *The Life Divine* this argument which is based on this analogy is rejected as "unhelpful; it would be valid only if our image of the universe were a falsity reflecting a true universe which is not here but elsewhere, or else if it were a false imaged manifestation of the Reality replacing in the mind or covering with its distorted resemblance a true manifestation."[19]What we see is that the one manifests itself into a reality of numberless forms and powers. Sri Aurobindo admits that there is no doubt that the process of such manifestation is a mystery, he also calls it magic; but altogether he denies explaining it as a magic of the unreal. All mental errors and illusion are only a wrong perception of realities, a wrong relation which is the result of the ignorance. But the cosmic illusion is not of such nature; it imposes, figures, happenings that are pure invention on a Reality in which there never were or never will be any happenings, names or figures. Our mind, the parent of these illusions is a seeker and discoverer or a creator of truths, possibilities and actualities but it is limited in knowledge. The Original consciousness, from which mind must be a derivation, on the contrary, is not limited like mind, it is cosmic in its scope. It is free from all ignorance; it opens to no error.

This way of understanding of the status of the world has direct bearing on his socio-political philosophy. As he said in Karmayogin, "The religion which embraces science and faith, Theism, Christianity, Mahomedanism and Buddhism and yet is none of these is that to which the World-Spirit moves… All religions are seen as approaches to a single Truth, all philosophies as divergent viewpoints looking at different sides of a Single Reality, all sciences meet together in a supreme science." [20] For this much would depend upon us "who by their self-evolution or self-transcendence into a higher mould have qualified to be leaders of the spiritual march." [21] In this way Sri Aurobindo has thrown adequate light on 'man and collective man'.

IX: Concluding Remarks:

15. Therefore, according to Sri Aurobindo, the Supreme Reality manifests itself and reveals its true nature in countless number of ways. It takes innumerable forms and reveals its powers in infinite ways and enjoys itself through its creation (*līlā*). He discards the illusionist interpretation of the world. For him, "Brahman, the supreme Reality, is that which being known, all is known; but in the illusionist solution it is That, which is being known, all becomes unreal and incomprehensible mystery." [22] Sri Aurobindo affirms that *the cosmic universe is real, not illusion.* The eternal static and the eternal dynamic are both true of the Reality, both the immobile as well as the mobile Brahman represent the same Reality. Sri Aurobindo emphasises the reality of the empirical world, because it is essentially equal with the Supreme Reality. He does not subscribe to the view of Śaṅkara that the status of the world is as good as an illusion (*jaganmithyā*). He holds the reality and sanctity of the empirical world in which the Supreme Divinity is immanent. His interpretation is not only an extensional interpretation contextualizing the issue of his time when development of science has positive impact on philosophical thinking, but also an addition of new meaning to the tradition of Vedic-Upanisadic Culture. He gave us a message of 'growth from within in response to the influences from without'. In his own words, it is a message for India to "act in its own kind after its proper *dharma* in the right measure of importance, its spiritual, intellectual, ethical, aesthetic dynamic utility." [23] His idea of evolution allows him to reject the illusionary interpretation of the world. He gave us a philosophy of robust optimism that "a new spirit of oneness will take hold of the human race"; and "a spiritual religion of humanity is the hope of the future".[24]

- Revised version of the key-note address delivered in an international seminar on Sri Aurobindo held at Women's College, Shillong on 22 August 2022.

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DEVELOPMENT OF MĪMĀṀSĀ SYSTEM THROUGH COMMENTARY LITERATURE

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Abstract

In my view Indian Philosophy, indeed, developed through its commentary literature. The characteristic of this development is that the commentators have developed their own original philosophical ideas / view while interpreting the *sutras* / textsoftheir predecessors.Hence,itis,in no way, just a repetition. On the contrary, this is exactly how Indian philosophy developed and took its new shape; i.e. from *sūtras* to the present form i.e. various sub-systems / sub-branches within the same system or school. While commenting on aphorisms or *sūtras* commentators of the particular philosophical tradition differed among themselves and thus causing the emergence of new schools of thought in that particular tradition. A little reflection on any system of Indian philosophy tells us that it has developed mainly through its commentary literature. In this article I shall substantiate my point with the exposition of Mīmāṁsā system of Indian Philosophy. To show the significant contribution of commentators which caused the development of Mīmāṁsā tradition I shall highlight the differences between views of Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa; two pioneers of Mīmāṁsā tradition. Both Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his student Prabhākara interpreted the *sūtras* of Jaimini and *Bhāṣya* of Śabara differently, and establishedtwo new schools of Mīmāṁsādarśana.

Keywords: *Sūtra, Mīmāṁsādarśana, adhikaraṇa, Vedārtha, Vedārtha*

Indian Method of Writing:

We all are aware that prior to *Sūtra* Indian systems of knowledge passed from one generation to another orally. In this

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process of oral transmission of knowledge there was a possibility of deviation. In order to avoid suchpossibility, the accumulated knowledge was codified in *Sūtras*forming a system. The *sutras*, later, were commented upon by successors who followed the system. The particular knowledge system took its shape through commentarieson *Sūtras*which are technically called *Bhāṣya, Aṇubhāṣya Vārttika, Ṭīkā, Aṇutīkā, Aṇubhāṣya, Tātparyaṭīkā, Pariśuddhi, Prakaraṇa* etc. Successors while commenting upon the text/s of the system propounded their own philosophical view andthis is how Indian systems of knowledge developed and came down to us.

Three Schools of Mīmāṁsā:

Since in this article I have taken the example of Mīmāṁsā system, I will show how commentary literature played asignificant role in the development of two major schools of Mīmāṁsāsystem. As a matter of fact, there is, also, a third school propounded by MurāriMiśrabut unfortunately itdid not gain much popularity. Nevertheless, the credit for giving rise to three distinct schools of Mīmāṁsā, namely, Bhāṭṭa, Prābhākara, and Miśra school certainly goes to commentary literature of ancient system of PūrvaMīmāṁsā.In the 7th century,PūrvaMīmāṁsā systemsplit into Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools.Later on, the third school was developed by Murāri Miśra. These schools which are named after their foundersare antagonistic to each other. Both KumārilaBhaṭṭa and Prabhākarawere strong opponents of Buddhist philosophy. Theyhave written excellent commentaries on the *Bhāṣya*of Śabarasvāmīand both of them interpreted the *Bhāṣya* differently and thus introduced two separate schools.*Bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmīis an exhaustive treatisewhich put the earlier *Bhāṣya*son *sūtras* of Jaiminiinto oblivion. Earlier *Bhāṣya*s were written by Bodhāyana, Upavarṣa, Sundarapāṇḍya, and Bhavadāsa. These earlier Bhāṣyakāras were of the opinion that all the *sūtras* formed one single coherent whole. They systematized and interpreted conflicting Vedic sentences. They are referred by commentators of *Ślokavārttikam* and *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. School of MurāriMiśra has been referred by Gaṅgeśopādhyāyain his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. No original text written by MurāriMiśra is now available to us, so I

have confined myself only to theschools established by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara.They were followers of Vedic religion and were opponents of Nyāyaand Buddhist schools of Indian systems of Knowledge.

Meaning of Mīmāṁsā, and *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*of Jaimini:

Commentators while interpreting *sūtra*of Jaimini differed with regard to the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā. The word Mīmāṁsāis used to indicate discussion regarding Vedic sentences and rituals. Method of oral dialogue anddiscussion was in vogue from the earliest times. Scholars would deliberate on one and the same subjectbut opine differently. Jaimini wasthe firstscholar who collected those views/ opinions and added his own view. Thus, he wrote *Mīmāṁsāsūtrato* develop such views into a system of philosophy. One finds *pūrvapakṣa*and *siddhāntapakṣa* in this text. However, this is the one view only about the origination ofMīmāṁsā. There is another view too following which it has been claimed that there were many *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* before Jaimini, but after the advent of Jaimini all previous *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* disappeared due to dominating influence of Jaimini's*Mīmāṁsāsūtra*. This particular opinion has been given by Pārthasārthi Miśra while commenting upon *Ślokavārttikam* of Kumārilabhaṭṭta. Mimāṁsā is also called *Vākyaśāstra*, because it discusses Vedic texts and sentences. Authors of other systems of Indian philosophy widely quote the opinion of Jaimini while discussing any controversial sentence of Veda in support of their theses. They all accept authority of Jaiminiin respect of the determination of purport of Vedicsentences. Jaimini's interpretation of vedic sentence is considered last word by all vedicphilosopjers. *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa* himself says in his *Ślokavārttika* that *Mīmāṁsā*is a system of knowledge and various other systems of knowledge depend upon it.*Mīmāṁsā*removes the doubt of those who have already acquired the knowledge of sentence – meaning through other disciplines of knowledge. They remove their doubt regarding sentence – meaning with the help of *Mīmāṁsā* system of knowledge.[2]

Jaimini's *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* and its Commentators:

Jaimini's*Mīmāṁsāsūtra* contains sixteen chapters. Of these the first twelve chapters have separate topics for each chapter and *pāda,* and the topics discussed in each *adhikaraṇa*have regular link with the respective chapter, *pāda* and previous *adhikaraṇa*. Chapters thirteen to sixteen are called *saṅkarṣakāṇḍa*. There are no links between earlier twelve chapters and *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa. Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa* is an appendix to the former and in this *kāṇḍa*Jaiminidiscusses topicswhich were left earlierat proper places. This is also called D*evatākāṇḍa,* because thisbelongs to the discussion on deities. Study of all the sixteen chapters were in vogue, but this tradition was broken and only first twelve chapters are now studied. Rāmānujācārya, author of *ŚrīBhāṣya*, approves that *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa* is a subsidiary portion of twelve chapters.

Several commentators commented upon *Jaiminisūtra* before Śabarasvāmī wrote *bhāṣya* on the *sūtras*of Jaimini. They thought that Mīmāṁsādeals with *Vedārtha* and investigate the content of Vedas.Those commentators thought that students after learning Veda would be inclined to know the content of Veda, therefore, they interpreted the word '*dharma*'to mean *Vedārtha*. They gave more importance to verbal form of the sentence instead what was implicit in them. In this regard, at least three commentaries were available. Their works were called *vṛtti.* They are (1) *Bodhāyanavṛtti,* (2) *Upavarṣavṛtti*, and (3) *Bhavadāsavṛtti*. These works are not available to us; however, we find their reference in the various works of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara.*Bhaṣya* ofŚabarasvāmīhas surpassed all the earlier *Bhāṣyas*and consequently earlier *Bhāṣya* lost their identity. Earlier commentators had written commentaries on all the twenty chapters of Mīmāṁsāconsisting of *Sūtras* of Jaiminiand Bādarāyaṇa. They were of the opinion that all the *Śūtras*formed one single whole.Their purpose was to investigate and systematize conflicting statements of Vedas. They were more concerned with the *karmakāṇḍa*and *Upaniṣads*.

Purpose of Mīmāṁsā:

It is worthy to note here that *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa* and *Prabhākara* differed on the issue of the purpose of *Mīmāṁsā*.The purpose of *Mīmāṁsā*, according to earlier commentators, is to discuss*Vedārtha*. So *Mīmāṁsā*, in their view, is a system in which *Vedārtha* is discussed. It is a system of*Vedārthavicāra.* They thought that one should know the contents of Vedaonly, not *Dharma* as stated in the *sūtra – 'Athāto Dharma Jijñāsā'*. They interpreted *Dharma* to mean *Vedārtha.* They did not agree with Śabarsvāmī's and his follower'sinterpretation of *Dharma.* Verbal form of the sentence was more important for earlier commentators, and not what was implicit in the sentence. They discussed the validity of Vedic sentences instead of nature of *Dharma*. They subscribed *Akhyātivāda* and maintained that all experiences are valid. All the Vedic sentences in their view is valid, and invalid experience is not possible from Vedic sentence. Thus, Mīmāṁsā became a science of interpretation.

There are four commentaries on *Śabarabhāṣya*. These commentaries were written by Bhartṛmitra, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Prabhākara, andMurāri Miśra. Commentary written by Bhartṛmitra is known by the name *Vedārtha*, and commentary written by MurāriMiśra is known as Tripādanītinayanam.

A little reflection on *Śābarabhāṣya* shows that Śabarasvāmī deviated significantly from earlier commentators of *sūtras* of Jaimini. Śabarasvāmī commented only upon *dvādaśalakṣaṇī* of Jaimini. Thus, he separated Pūrva Mīmāṁsā from UttaraMīmāṁsā. As opposed to earlier commentators Śabarasvāmīmaintained that the knowledge of the nature and purpose of *dharma,* was the sole objective of Jaimini. Earlier commentators interpreted *Dharma* in the sense of *Vedārtha.* Śabarasvāmīsays that after learning Vedas students desire to acquire knowledge of *Dharma*. He says that *dharmajijñāsā*arises after learning Vedas.

Earlier commentators while formulating *Vedārtha* deviated from the well-known uses of the terms. While formulating *vedārtha* they did not consider well-known uses of the terms.As opposed to them, *Śabarasvāmī*finds no reason to explain the terms of *Sūtra* in a

sense different from the well-known uses of them. He says that terms should be explained in the sense as they are commonly understood, not otherwise. No otherwise meaning should be brought to define or explain Vedic statement. In each *adhikaraṇa* (chapter) *Śabarasvāmī* has discussed nature of *dharma,* and validity of Vedic sentences has been discussed in the first chapter only. He says that different sections of Vedaserve different purposes and knowledge of *dharma* is one among them. He says that *dharma* necessarily produces benefits to them, even if not stated in Vedic injunction, whosoever performsit, Credit goes to *Śabarasvāmī*for providing philosophical ground to PūrvaMīmāṁsā. He developed theory of knowledge in consonance with the ontology and ethics of *PūrvaMīmāṁsā* , and provided reasons for validity and invalidity of knowledge.

*Śabarasvāmī*has provided the proofs for the existence of soul, which, according to him, is (ontologically) different from the objective world. He says that soul can be emancipated from the world only by performing *dharma*. In this *sūtra* he has rejected the theory that all experiences are valid, and says that experience may be invalid in certain circumstances. An invalid experience, according to him, is one which has ill-cause (*duṣṭakāraṇa*) and is false experience. Other experience cannot be called invalid. Thus he gives reasons for invalid experience. Following the second *sūtra* of Jaiminihe defines *dharma*as a duty imposed by Vedic injunction. *Dharma* is followed to achieve highest good (*niḥśreyasa*). He defines both *dharma* and *adharma* in terms of Vedic injunction(*codanā*). One he calls *artha* and other *anartha.Adharma* should not be followed because it produces malefic result (*pratyavāya*).

The requirement for reform:

The reasons for new explanation of *Sūtra*and introduction of reforms in the system done by Śabarasvāmīcan be understood from the point of the view of the history and culture. He existed during the period when Buddhist thinkers vehemently opposed Vedic systems of philosophy and ethics to maintain their *kṣaṇikavāda*, *śūnyavāda*, *nirālambanavāda*, *nairātmyavāda*, and *vijñānavāda*. The authority of *Vedic dharma* and philosophies, particularly *Nyāya*

and *Mīmāṁsā*, were challenged by anti-Vedic philosophers with rational arguments. Their purpose was to destroy the structure of the society based on Vedic principles. It was a threatening situation for philosophies based on the principles of *Veda*. Consequently, exponents of six Vedic systems of philosophy reviewed and re-established their systems based on sound rational arguments to counter the attacks of non-Vedic philosophers. The system of *PūrvaMīmāṁsā* of Jaimini as interpreted by earlier Bhāṣyakāra was not capable enough to counter the logical arguments of Buddhists. Earlier Bhāṣyakāras of *Jaiminisūtra*considered *vedarthavicara* as the sole object of Mīmāṁsā, not *dharma* as the object of Mīmāṁsā. Those earlier Bhāṣyakārasopined that everyone is bound to obey the Vedic injunction without questioning the merit and demerit of the same. People did not know whether injunctions prescribed by the *Veda* would yield beneficial results and action prohibited by *Veda*would produce any harm. Actions that are prohibited in the *Veda*cannot be calculated to produce any harm whatsoever. Further, the system of Mīmāṁsā, as interpreted by the early commentators, became unpopular because people had no clarity regarding achievement of desired object by following the Vedic injunction and sacrifice. As long as purpose (*prayojana*) of any discipline (*śāstra*) or human action remains unstated, one does not follow that discipline or obey the action.

Reforms Introduced by Śabarasvāmī:

Several reforms had been introduced in Mīmāṁsā system by Śabarasvāmīand later on by Kumārila Bhṭṭta. To make the system more useful and acceptable to general people they condemned Bādari. They presented the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsāin a novel way so that old method to deal the subject-matter was automatically discarded by the people. These commentators presented the system in a new garb and the system took a new turn. Kumārila Bhaṭṭtafollowedthe lines of Jaiminiand Śabarasvāmī. He too introduced several reforms in the system. Thus, Bhāṭṭaschool ofMīmāṁsā came into existence. Prabhākara, though a disciple of Kumārila Bhṭṭta, differed from his teacher and thus Prabhākaraschool of Mīmāṁsā came into existence.

Śabarasvāmī in his commentary has introduced two reforms. He established the true sense of *Jaimini-sūtra* and rejected the views of earlier commentators, and secondly, he defended *dharma – mīmāṁsā* from the attacks of non-Vedic philosophers. The facts stated above will enable us to understand the implications of the first few sentences of *Śābarabhāṣya*where the later commentators offered 17 interpretations to explain the same.

Śabarasvāmīstresses that the first and the second *sūtra* of Jaimini refer to dharma and its meaning, and not *vedārtha* or kārya as advocated by earlier commentators. Thus, Śabarasvāmī deviated from earlier commentators. Jaimini has referred the views of various interpreters of Vedic sentences either in his support or to refute them. This means that, even before Jaimini, there were many thinkers who interpreted Vedic sentences differently. Their views and interpretations were divergent. Bādariwas one among them. Śabarasvāmīthought that there is nothing wrong to interpret Vedic sentences differently and thus to deviate from the views of earlier commentators.

Jaimini, in his *sūtra*111.1.3, introduces the view of Bādari. Jaimini in that *sūtra*, as *Śabara* says, does not state that Vedic injunctions (such as sacrifice, *yāga*, and others) lead one to *svarga*. Vedic injunctions say that those who are desirous of *svarga* should perform *yāga*. Bādari,on the contrary, states that Vedic sentence does not tell us that *yāga*is the means of *svarga*, nor Vedic sentences mean that one who desires *svarga* and performs*yāga* gets *svarga* for himself or for others.Bādari maintains that *yāga*or the action imposed by Vedic injunction is the most important thing expressed by the sentence and meanings conveyed by other words of the sentence are subordinate to *yāga.*

Jaiminideviates from the views of Bādari. He rejects his views in his *sūtra* 111.1.4. Contrary to the views of Badari,Jaiminimaintains that Vedic injunctions do not prescribe action alone but they impose actions as a means to achieve the object. Vedic injunctions are obeyed by the people and the injunctions are valid. Both Jaiminiand Śabarasvāmīmaintain it in detail in *sūtra* vi. i. 2. Both are of the opinion that *yāga* is an instrument to *svarga* and a man acts till the achievement of result.

The result is most important for a man.Jaimini, on another occasion, refers to Bādariwho has interpreted Vedic sentences on the same lines against convention. Bādarimaintains that all the members of the society irrespective of class to which they belong are permitted by Vedic injunctions to perform sacrifice if they desire any result. In order to substantiate his view, he has interpreted many Vedic sentences to suit his purpose.Interpretation and theories of Bādariand early commentators have been rejected by Śabarain his *Bhāṣya*. Rejection of interpretation of Bādari by Śabarasvāmībecame the source of inspiration for later authors / commentators who were opposed to Śabarasvāmī.

Commentaries on *Śabarabhāṣya* by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara:

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa(7th century AD) has written following two sets of commentaries, i.e. *ṭīkā*and*vārttika* on *Śābarabhāṣya*. (1) *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* and *Madhyamaṭīkā*, (2) *Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika*, and *Tupaṭīkā*. *Bṛhaṭṭtīkā* and *Madhyamaṭīkā* is not available to us. They are referred by him in his *Ślokavārttika.* These works are based on bhāvanā being the purport of the sentences. Among the five the last three available works in twelve chaptersconstitute a complete commentary. Thus, *Śabarabhāṣya* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is an exhaustive commentary on *Tarkapāda* of the *Bhāṣya.* There are 3300 couplets (kārikās)in it.As *Madhyamatīkā*is not available to us his *Ślokavārttika* is considered as an abridged version of Bṛhaṭṭīkā.Through this commentary Kumārilahas done a great service not only to the entire Mīmāṁsātradition but also to other systems of Indian Logic, particularly Nyāyaand Buddhist logic. Later writers quote Kumārila Bhaṭṭta in support of their arguments. *Karikas*of *Ślokavārttika* of KumārilaBhaṭṭtahave been extensively quoted by Naiyāyikas, Jainas, and Bouddhas to counter his arguments and thus to establish their thesis. They tried their best to refute the view point of Kumārila Bhaṭṭta.

Prabhākarawas a disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, but he did not follow him. On the contrary,Prabhākarafollowed early commentators such as Bādari and Bhartṛmitra. He had written commentaries called *Laghvī*and *Bṛhatī*on *Śabarabhāṣya*. While commenting on *Śābarabhāṣya,* he, following early commentators,

propounded the views contrary to Śabara. Though Prabhākara followed early commentators but they themselves differed from each other. At the time of Śabarasvāmīthere were two schools of Mīmāṁsā. School propounded by Jaimini and Śabarasvāmībecame more popular than the schools propounded by early commentators. Prabhākarais called *Guru* because he followed early commentators against the wishes of Kumārila Bhaṭṭawho followed Śabara. Kumārila,followingŚabarasvāmi, was in favour of reforms in Mīmāṁsā tradition.

Tarkapāda of the *Bhāṣya* is central to Mīmāṁsāand it is due to *Tarkapāda* that the system of PūrvaMīmāṁsābecame an independent system of Indian thought. Its main purpose is to establish the chief means of emancipation. Jaiminihas divided this *pāda*into eight topics. He has proved that Vedic injunctions alone determine *dharma,* and other sources of knowledge fail to prove it. Śabarasvāmī has followed the foot-print of Upavarṣaand supplemented the statements of Jaiminiin all aspects to establish the self-validity of certain experience and invalidity of certain experience arising out of faulty means. Credit goes to Śabarasvāmīto establish epistemology ofMīmāṁsāsystem. He has established the doctrine of Vedic and non-Vedic verbal experience and rejected *Nirālambanavāda*and *Śūnyavāda* of Buddhist for the first time. He propounded the theory that one must perform *dharma* for desired result. Independent existence of soul has been established to reap the result. These topics of Vedic philosophy had been controverted by Buddhist to establish his own point of view and thus to reject Vedic thought. Kumārila Bhaṭṭta rationally rejected Buddhist's point of view and established the system of Mīmāṁsā on rational ground.

Views of Śabarasvāmībecame a focal point of discussion by anti-Vedic philosophers such as Vasubandhu, Dignāga,and Dharmakīrti. They were great Buddhist logicians and flourished between 3rd to 6th century A D. They were idealist and rejected realist viewpoints of Nyāya system of Gautama and Mīmāṁsāsystem established byJaimini and Śabarasvāmī. These Buddhist logicians stood on Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavādaschools of Buddhism. It is due to voluminous writings of these Buddhist

authors and also due to royal support Buddhism became popular in the society. During the period of four century there were no works worthy of name from the side of Nyāyaand Mīmāṁsā. During this period Vedic and Upaniṣadic philosophy was almost on the death bed.

Thus, in the middle of 7th century there appeared four stars in the sky of Indian philosophy, especially in the field of Vedic and Upaniṣadic philosophy who successfully revived and re-established Vedic and Upaniṣadic philosophy. They were Bhartṛhari, Gauḍapāda, Uddyotakara, and Kumārila Bhṭṭta. Among them Bhartṛhari and Gauḍapāda, after refuting the views of MādhyamikaBouddha, established the positive idealism of Upaniṣads, namely Śabdādvaitaand Brahmādvaita. They did so by following the argumentative method of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā. Uddyotakara and Kumārila were the exponents of realist schools of Indian thought. They upheld the reasoning advanced by Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā. Uddyotakara wrote *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikam* on *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭta,besides other, wrote *Ślokavārttikam* on *Śabarabhāṣya*. They, with their sharp reasoning, thoroughly refuted and criticized Buddhist philosophy and logic to upheld Vedic philosophy. It is because of their severe criticism and refutation, Buddhist philosophy could not make any headway after 7th century A D. Kumārila Bhaṭṭtapreceded Saṁkarācārya, who also defended Vedic and Upaniṣadic philosophy from the attack of Buddhist philosophy. Saṁkarācārya wrote *Bhāṣya*on *Brahmasūtra, Upaniṣads*, *Bādarāyaṇasūtra*and *Bhagavadgītā*. Buddhist logicians could not stand before the arguments of Uddyotakara, Kumārila Bhaṭṭta, Bhartṛhari, and Saṁkarācārya. Thus, it may be said that they were responsible for the downfall of Buddhism in India.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭtajust at the beginning of his *Ślokavārttika* condemns some earlier commentators for making the Mīmāṁsāsystem lokāyata-vadii.e. akin to materialist. He claims that he has tried to bring Mīmāṁsāon the right track,i.e. on thetrack of orthodox.Kumārila Bhaṭṭtahimse lf does not mention the name of those commentators, but his commentators Umbeka, Sucarita Miśraand Pārathasārathi Miśramaintain that Kumārila Bhaṭṭtacondemns the works of Bhartṛmitra and others. These

commentators state that earlier commentators such as Bhartṛmitra and others have been referred by Kumārila Bhaṭṭtain this *kārikā*. From these commentaries one may reconstruct the views of Bhartṛmitra. Bhartṛmitra suggests that conduct of a noble person and *Smṛti* is not an authority on *Dharma*. He further suggests that Vedic sacrifice does not produce any result for them who perform the sacrifice. Actions prohibited by *Veda,* ifperformed by a person, does not produce sin. Kumārila Bhattarefutes these theories of earlier commentators of Jaimini. But later on, Prabhākara, student of Kumārila Bhṭṭta, differed from his teacher and developed the theories of early commentators. Bādariand early commentators maintained that *Vedārtha* is the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā. Thus, one finds a paradigm shift in Mīmāṁsāsystem due to differing views of commentators. One school came into existence due to KumārilaBhaṭṭtaandother school due to Prabhākara. One also finds a third school of Mīmāṁsādeveloped by Murāri Miśra. Views of MurāriMiśra has been mentioned and criticized by Gangeśopādhyāyain his magnum opus called *Tattvacintāmaṇi.*

Difference in the Subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā:

Two major commentators of *Jaiminisūtra* have interpreted the *sūtra* in different ways and thus give rise to two different schools ofMīmāṁsā. KumārilaBhaṭṭtastates in *karika* 1.11 of *Slokavarttika* that the first *sutra* of Jaimini *'athato dharma jijnasa'* is the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā.*Vedārthavicāra* as stated by early commentators is not the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā. Thus, KumārilaBhaṭṭtachangedthe domain and subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā. Earlier commentators were of the opinion that *vedārthavicāra* is the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsāand *Vedartha*is the outcome of Mīmāṁsā. Earlier commentators, as opposed to KumārilaBhaṭṭta, are of the opinion that the term '*dharma*' of the first *sūtra* of Jaimini should be understood as *vedārtha*. Śālikanāthain his *Ṛijuvimalā*claims that byfollowing earlier commentators Prabhākara maintains that the *dharma* is nothing but *vedartha*. These earlier commentators thought that after learning Vedas one tempts to know *vedārtha*, not *dharma*. So *vedārthavicāra* is the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā, not *dharmavicāra*. They further argued that in case if*dharma* is

interpreted in its normal sense then the *dharma* of Buddhists and Jainas too will come under the fold of first *sūtra* of Jaimini*;* and then one should enquire about *dharma* only after reading *āgama*literature of Buddhism and Jainism. However, Śabaraand KumārilaBhaṭṭtahave refuted the above view of early commentators and both have equivocally argued that *dharmajijñāsā* is possible only after learning Vedas, and therefore, *athātaḥ*should not be understood as 'after reading *āgama*literature of Buddhism and Jainism'. Thus, enquiry about *dharma*, according to Śabaraand KumārilaBhaṭṭta*,* begins when one finishes study of the *Vedas*. As opposed to KumārilaBhaṭṭta*,* Prabhākara followed the interpretation of early commentators; and maintained that the sole objective of Mīmāṁsāis to discuss *vedārtha*.Hewrote *Bṛhatī*and *Laghvī*, by presupposing *śabdabala* (import of word) and *arthabala*(import of meaning) of Vedic injunctions. He did not consider implied meaning of word and sentence of Vedic injunctions. As opposed to Prabhākara, Śabaramaintains that *dharma* is one among various purposes of *Veda* and he is concerned only with *dharma*, and not with others. For Śabara, *Vedārtha* is not the object of Mīmāṁsā, but only *dharma* is the object of Mīmāṁsā.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭta*inkārikā* 1.12 of *Ślokavārttika* maintains that actions prescribed by Vedic or non-Vedic injunctions are performed for some desired result. Unless the purpose of performing actions as per Vedic or non-Vedic injunctions is not stated, none will perform it. Mankind does not undertake any action without being clear about its beneficial result.Hemade this statement to refute the view of Bādari and Bhartṛmitra. Thus, by refuting their views Kumārila Bhaṭṭtaup held the view of Jaimini and Śabarasvāmī. Bādari and Bhartṛmitrawere of the opinion that Vedic and non-vedic injunctions state duties of mankind and must be followed without asking its authority and even without having any idea of the result to be achieved. This view of Bādarihas been stated by Jaimini in the sutra III.I.3 and further explained by Śabara in detail. Bādariand his followers discussed *vedārtha* only. He and his followers did not bother whether their views are acceptable to common man or not. Whereas KumārilaBhaṭṭta*,* following the path of Jaimini and Śabarasvāmī, criticized the above view of Bādari,

claiming that Vedic and non-vedic injunctions do spell the desired result. These injunctions say thatone achieves svarga by following them.Vedic sacrifice should not be undertaken if it does not yield any result. As opposed to Kumārila Bhaṭṭta, Prabhākara followed Bādari who has been criticized by Jaimini and Śabarasvāmī. Prabhākara maintained that *kārya*, *niyoga*, or *apūrva* as imposed by Vedic injunctions should be performed by mankind with the sense of duty only. Those who focussed on *Dharma* as the content of Vedas had to see how it would be acceptable to mankind. This is what gave rise to two schools of Mīmāṁsā: Prabhākara school and Bhāṭṭaschool. Gangeśopādhyāya,in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, mentions a third school i.e. that of MurāriMiśrawith its view.

Dharma as conceived by Kumārila Bhaṭṭta:

Taking clue from the second *sutra* of Jaimini and Śabarasvāmī, KumārilaBhaṭṭtadefines*dharma* as something which is imposed by Vedic injunction for some desired benefit. This desired benefit may be substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), or action (*karma*). Śabarasvāmīsays that *dharma* is prescribed in Veda for producing some desired result. Herefuted the view of early commentators who maintained that *kārya* or *apūrva* or *niyoga* is *dharma*. *Dharma* is neither *yāga* or *svarga*. Further,*Dharma*, according to earlier commentators, should not be related with any desired result. *Dharma* is an order which should be performed without any desired result. Kumārila Bhaṭṭarejected thisearlier view and maintained that *apūrva* is not known by anybody as *Dharma*, for none can see *apūrva*. Thus, the doctrine of apūrvadharmavāda maintained by early Bhāṣyakāras and Bhartṛmitra who followed Bādari, wasrejected by Kumārila.Whereas Prabhākara followed the old school and maintained *apūrvakārya* as the meaning of the Vedic injunctions. *Apūrvavāda* is his favourite theory, but this theory did not originate from him. He himself followed this theory of *apūrva* propounded by early commentators, which was rejected by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa following Śabarasvāmīdefined *codanā*in his *kārikā*as one which states the result, means and method of duty imposed. Early Mimāmsakasdid not define *codanā*as it has been later defined by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. It is clear from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's

definition of *codanā* that duty imposed must be related with the expectation of result. If rituals or duty imposed are not connected with the expectation of result, then none will perform the rituals. The motive of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was to repudiate the view of Bādariand his followers who maintained that *codanā*states only the*kārya* or *apūrva* to be performed by a person without expectation. Whereas Bādariwas of the view that Vedic sacrifices are not calculated to any result. Later on, Prabhākarafollowed Bādari, not Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Prabhākara in his *Bṛhati* says that Vedic sentences express duty or *kārya*alone. *Kārya* alone is *dharma*, therefore, *kārya* alone should be performed. No result should be associated with it. Vedic sentences express only *kārya* or duty, accomplished facts or results do not come under the purview of Veda. They are invalid in and outside the Vedas. Following Prabhākara, ŚālikanāthaMiśra also maintained the same and develops the view of Prabhākara.

Earlier commentators i. e. prior to Śabarasvāmī, tried to introduce atheism in Mimāṁsāon the ground that Jaimini did not say anything about soul, creation of universe, or liberation of the soul. Earlier commentators maintained that Vedas were authority only on *kārya* and persons were only functionary of that *kārya*. Thus, they introduced atheism in Mimāṁsā system. But Kumārila Bhaṭṭa strongly opposed the attempt of introducing atheism into the system. Firstly, Śabarasvāmī went beyond the range of *Sūtras*and introduced *Ātmavāda* to refute the charge of atheism into the system. Later Kumārila Bhaṭṭa praisedthe effort of Śabarasvāmī and established the view as to how the soul can achieve liberation from world by performing Vedic rituals and avoiding the actions prohibited by the Vedas. Hemaintains that soul is permanent and cannot be destructed. Whosoever says that soul is impermanent and destructible is unable to differentiate between unconscious matter and conscious soul. He opines that main aim of Mimāṁsā is to prove the validity of the Veda and this aim is achieved once one establishes the permanency of the soul. He says that knowledge of the self is necessary for liberation and those who are desirous for knowledge of the self to achieve liberation must follow Upaniṣad. Śabarasvāmī took a different view and rejected the views of early

commentators. Thus, he devided Pūrva Mimāṁsā from UttaraMimāṁsā. Bhartṛmitrain his *Tattvaśuddhi* supported the thesis of early commentators and his thesis in turn later on was rejected by Kumārila Bhaṭṭain his *Vārttika*. Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, though was the teacher of Prabhākara, mentioned and rejected the thesis of Prabhākara. Prabhākara wrote two commentaries on Śabarabhāṣya and established the views of old commentators. From the above discussions it is clear that two parallel thinking, arising out of various commentaries, existed from the early period of Mimāṁsā system. These two ways of thinking were further developed by later commentators of the two systems of Mimāṁsā. In the later stage Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his disciple Prabhākaradeveloped these two schools and became famous by their names. Now we can easily classify the scholars of the two systems who followed and developed these two schools from their early stages:

Sl. No.	**Prābhākara School**	**Bhāṭṭa School**
1	Bādari (4th century B C)	Jaimini (4th century BC)
2	Bodhāyana (3rd century BC)	Upavarṣa (3rd century BC)
3	Bhavadāsa (2nd century AD)	Śabarasvāmī (2nd century AD)
4	Bhartṛmitra(7th century A D)	Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th century AD)
5	Prabhākara (8th century A D)	ManḍanaMiśra (8th century AD)
6	Śālikanātha Miśra (9th century A D)	VācaspatiMiśra (9th century A D)
7	Bhavanātha (13th century A D)	PārthasārathiMiśra (10th century AD)

Since Jaimini has quoted Bādari, so school of Bādarishould be taken as older than Jaimini. Prabhākara, though, was junior to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, but followed BādariwhereasKumārila Bhaṭṭa followed Jaimini and Śabara. There are two fundamental principles

on which Bādariand Jaimini differ. Bādari was of the opinion that all commands are commands of superior, therefore, these commands must be followed without considering the result. Jaimini, on the other hand, rejected the view of Bādari, and maintained that followers should be aware of benefit of following the commands. Bādaristressed only on *codanālakṣaṇa* but Śabaraand his followers emphasized on the whole *Sūtra*including the word *'artha'* which means desired object. Early Mimāṁsakasand Prabhākara maintained that *Vedārthajijñasā* is the objective of learning Veda, whereas Śabara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa maintained that *Dharmajijñasā* is the objective of learning Veda. Again, this difference of opinion between the commentators gave rise to two major schools of Mimāṁsa, namely, Bhāṭṭaschool and Prābhākaraschool. Prābhākara could not understand human psychology and consequently the thought of this school could not be appreciated by public throughout its history.After Śālikanātha Miśra, Rāmānujācarya followed the foot print of him and wrote a primer named *Tantrarahasya*. Śālikanātha's*Prakaraṇpancikā* is a major work of Prābhākaraschool. In this text he has collected and developed all the points established by Prabhākara in *Bṛhati*. In the text, he has criticized Nyāya and Bhaṭṭa school of Mimāṁsā.Pārthasārathi Miśra, follower of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in his *Nyāyaratnamālā*argued against ŚālikanāthaMiśrain order to establish the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Śālikanāthain his *Prakaraṇapancikā*and his commentator Umbeka Bhaṭṭa quote profusely from *Bṛhaṭṭikā* and *Ślokavārttika* to refute the view of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Śālikanātha did so to show that Prabhākaraanticipated the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa to refute his view. All these topics of dispute centred on the eight *adhikaraṇa*of the *Tarkapāda*of *Jaimini*'s *Sūtra*explained by Śabarasvāmīin his *Bhāsya.* Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara interpreted explanation of Śabarasvāmī differently and drew different conclusion. Great scholars such as Prabhākara, Śālikanātha, Bhavanātha on the one hand, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Maṇḍana Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra, PārthasārathiMiśraon the other, held different views on the basis of the same text, i.e.*Bhāṣya*. The views of Bādari is accountable for school of PrābhākaraMīmāṁsā. His views have been rejected by

Jaimini and Śabarasvāmīwho are accountable for Bhāṭṭaschool of Mīmāṁsā. Prabhākara had written two commentaries on *Śābarabhāsya* entitled *Laghvī*and *Bṛhati*. In these works, he re-established Bādari's views which was rejected by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Prabhākara interpreted the same text, *Bhāṣya,* in his favour against the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Prabhākara maintained *akhyātivāda, kāryavākyārthavāda, apūrvaśāstrārthavāda.* These doctrines were maintained by Bādari. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa refuted those doctrines and Prabhākara revived all these doctrines in his *Bṛhati* without any reference to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Prbhākara was a disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and contemporary of Umbeka Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Miśra. All the three learnt Mīmāṁsāfrom Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.Whereas Umbeka Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Miśra followed Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and remain faithful to him. WhereasPrabhākara, while opposingthe view of his teacher, followed early commentators and claimed that Śabarasvāmī'originally' meant the same (what he has interpreted).

Maṇḍana Miśraillustrated the views of his teacher in his works namely *Vidhiviveka, Bhāvanāviveka,* and *Vibhramaviveka*. In these works, he has shown that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa rejected the views of early commentators and followed *Śabarabhāṣya*. He said that Jaimini was opposed to Bādari. Main purpose of MaṇḍanaMiśra was to reject *Kāryaparavākyavāda, Niyogavākyārthavāda*, and *Akhyātivāda* of Prabhākara.

Later Vācaspati Miśra commented upon *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra in his commentary, named *Nyāyakaṇikā*. He suggested that Prabhākara was not the founder of the school named after him, but there were earlier writers who maintained the same views as of Prabhākara. MaṇḍanaMiśra also, in his *vidhiviveka*, distinguished between Jaratprābhākara and Prabhākara. He calls Prabhākaraas *navīnāḥ* (new). This means that Prabhākarawas simply the follower of the old views and he was called 'new'.According to him, Prabhākara collected the views of earlier commentators and developed a new system of interpretation ofvedicsentences against the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Umbeka Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on *Śloka-vārttika*referred to the views of

those thinkers who were opposed to the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭaand called those thinkers as 'Anupāsitaguru'.

Prabhākara and Śālikanāthaquote passages of *Śabarabhāṣya* and interpret them to suit the principles of Bādari and his followers. Śabara's commentary of the first *sūtra* of Jaimini has been interpreted by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākaradifferently.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has provided sixteen interpretations to the commentary of Śabara, whereas Prabhākara has given his own interpretation different from the sixteen interpretations given by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Commentary of Śabaragoes against the earlier commentators. Views of earlier commentators had been adopted by Prabhākara to define *Dharma, Codanā, Kriyā, Apūrva* differently. To justify his definitions, Prabhākaraclaims that the passage of *Bhāṣya* is concerned with *Athātaḥ*of the first *Sūtra*of Jaimini. He says that learning of Veda by students is not for their benefit, but for making their teachers competent for profession of teaching. Students learn Veda only to help those who desire to become a teacher. Students, according to Prabhākara, are not expected to learn the meaning of Veda. Students are not expected to do *Dharmajijñāsā*. Prabhākara'sinterpretation is not supported by *Śabarabhāṣya* wherein it has been stated that learning of Veda by the students is for their benefits and they get knowledge of *Dharma* in all its aspects.However, KumārilaBhaṭṭa argues that Prabhākara's arguments are irrelevant in the context.

While commenting upon the first *Sūtra,* Bhāṣyakāra stated that investigation should relate to the nature of *dharma*, its means, and its objects etc.Prabhākara maintains that *Yāga, Homa* etc are momentary action so they should not be considered as *dharma.* But meaning of the injunctive suffix *Liñ*is dharma. *Kārya*alone is *dharma*. *Kārya* or *dharma* has no object to produce. Again, in this way Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa interpreted the *sūtras* of Jaimini differently and consequently created two schools inMīmāṁsā tradition. Both commenting upon the same *Sūtra* differed among themselves. A list of divergent views is given bellow:

Subject	Bādari – Prābhākara School	Jaimini- Śabara – BhāṭṭaSchool
Dharma	Niyoga or Apūrva imposed by the Vedic injunction	Action imposed by Veda for some end.
Adharma	Vedic injunction prohibiting an action.	Action prohibited by Veda as they are harmful.
Purpose of Mīmāṁsā	Vedārthavicāra	Dharmajijñsā
Validity	Vedic sentences alone are valid	Both Vedic and non-Vedic sentences are valid
Invalidity	No experience is invalid	Experience may be invalid
Codanā	Suffix '*Liñ*' expressing *kārya*	The complete injunctive sentence expressing action, method to act, and its result.
Categories	Eight	Six
Pramāṇa	Five	Six
Object of learning Veda	To become a teacher	For the benefit(individual and social)

The works of Prabhākara were not available to the students of Mīmāṁsātill recently. Credit goes to Mahāmahopādhyāya GangānāthaJhā who unearthed various texts of Prabhākaraand wrote extensively on Prabhākaraschool. On the other hand, Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā, started by Jaimini – Śabarasvāmī – Kumārila Bhaṭṭa – MaṇḍanaMiśra – Umbeka Bhaṭṭa – VācaspatiMiśra and several others - was quite popular among the scholars. This system was adopted by people in their daily life. After Prabhākara, Śālikanātha followed Prabhākara school and refuted the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in detail.

Bhāṣya of Śabarasvāmī had been commented upon by both, Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Kumārila Bhaṭṭawrote two commentaries on *Śabarabhāṣya*, entitled, *Vṛhatṭīkā* and *Laghuṭīkā*. These two are not available, but are referred extensively by others. He also wrote *Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika*, and *Tupaṭīkā*. These three are available in print. As I said earlier that the rise and development of two different schools of Mīmāṁsāwas due to different and sometime opposed interpretations of *Sūtras*done by both the scholars, such a development can further be marked by the introduction of two different schemes of epistemology presented by them. Thus, Prābhākara and Bhaṭṭa widely differedon the definition of knowledge, valid experience and its forms.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara on Knowledge:

Knowledge, according to Prabhākara, is of two kinds: experience by sense organs and remembrance due to previous experience. Former is valid because it is the result of direct cognition. Remembrance is invalid, because it depends upon our impression acquired previously. All experience, according to Prabhākara, is valid and comprises of three: the knower – knowledge – and the object to which knowledge relates. All experiences arise in the form 'I know the pot', not in the form 'This is pot'. Prabhākara does not believe in erroneous cognition, for he thinks that all experiences are valid. Our experience of silver in conch is due to undifferentiated cognitions arising out of direct experience and remembrance. In Prabhākara's scheme of thought Veda is eternal and universe also is eternal and real, consequently there is no place of erroneous cognition in his scheme.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, while interpreting Jaimini's*sūtra* and Śabara's *Bhāṣya* reaches to different theory. His scheme is different from Prabhākara. His scheme is nearer to Naiyāyika. Kumārila believes that our experiences are of two kinds: valid and invalid. Valid experience is one which cognizes the object for the first time and is not sublated by other cognitions later on. Thus, remembrance and erroneous cognition, according to Kumārila, are invalid. Experience is invalid if sense-organs are defective or the cognitions are sublated later on.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, while interpreting

Śabarasvāmī, accepts six pramāṇas. Prabhākara accepts only five and rejects pramāṇābhāva as a proof of the absence of an object.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara on Perception:

Perception, according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, arises from proper contact between sense-organ and existing object. Sense-organ should be active in perception. Sense-organ should remain active otherwise perceptual knowledge does not arise. Object of each sense-organ is different. Every sense-organ cannot come in contact with every object. Each sense-organ has its own object. Object of nose is different from the object of tongue. Smell is the object of nose and taste is the object of tongue. Perception of smell cannot arise from the contact of tongue with the fragrant object, because nose has its own object to be sensed and tongue has its own object. So is the case of another sense-organ. Thus, the knowledge of an object arising from the contact of sense-organ with object is called perception.Prabhākara disregards the definition of perception as given by Jaimini. He says that direct awareness (*sākṣātpratītiḥ*) of all the three, theknower–knowledge– and the object to which knowledge relates, is called *pratyakṣapramāṇa*. Perception, according to him, does not arise from contact of sense-organ with object.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara on anumāna:

Prabhākara's view of *anumāna* or inference is quite different from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.Prabhākaramaintains that the relation between *sādhya* and *hetu*(once observed between them) takes the form of universal generalization and thus the relation becomes natural and permanent. This relation is free from temporal and spatial limitations. Inference of fire on the top of the mountain on the basis of smoke seen there is not remembrance, because the knowledge of fire arising out of the cognition of smoke is an experience, not remembrance.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa while defining *anumāna* or inference differ from both Prabhākara and Śabarasvāmī.KumārilaBhaṭṭathinks that universal generalization is not a pre-requisite for inferential knowledge. He thinks that the relation between smoke and fire i.e. wherever there is smoke there is fire (*anvaya*) along with the observation of the absence of smoke

wherever there is no fire (*vyatireka*) lead one to conclude that smoke is invariably connected with fire. This relation, according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, helps one to infer fire on the top of the mountain from perception of smoke there. Thus, we see that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is closer to Nyāya.

Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on abhāva (absence):

There is clear difference of opinion between*Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa* on the issue of *abhāva* (absence) as a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Śabarasvāmī and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accept *abhāva* (absence) as sixth *pramāṇa* to prove non-existence of a thing. Śabarafor the first time introduced *abhāva* as a separate source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).Śabarapointed out that one may deny the existence of *Dharma* on the basis of absence of *pramāṇa*. When *pramāṇa* such as perception and others are unable to prove the existence of *Dharma*, the absence of *pramāṇa* becomes another proof for non-existence of *Dharma*. Jaimini inthe fifth sūtrasays that eternal Vedic passages are the proof for *Dharma*, and thus *abhāvapramāṇa*too cannot prove the non-existence of *Dharma*. Thus, Śabara establishes *abhāva* as a source of knowledge to prove the absence of a thing. Prabhākarasays that *abhāva* cannot be regarded as a separate category and as such there is no need to accept a separate *pramāṇa*to prove *abhāva*. The same has been maintained by Prabhākara in *Bṛhatī.*Thus, in the scheme of Prabhākara there are only five *pramānas*and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accepts six *pramāṇas* which include *abhāva* as a separate pramāṇa.

Difference on the notion of prameya or categories:

In the second chapter of his *Tantrarahasya,*Rāmānujācārya, following Prabhākaraand Śālikanātha, discusses the notion of *prameya* or categories. Mīmāṁsakas are of the opinion that objective universe is real and eternal, though constituent elements of universe have beginning and end. There are philosophers who believe that there was complete void before the creation of universe. Again, there are philosophers who believe that the universe has been created from something and this means that something existed before the creation of the universe. Prabhākara opposes them and maintains that Universe has not been created. He himself is silent on

the issue of *prameya* or category. Perhaps he did not find it necessary to discuss it while commenting upon the *Bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmī. However, Śālikanātha and Rāmānujācaryamaintain that there are eight categories. They are as follows: Substance (*dravya*), Quality (*guṇa*), Action (*karma*), Generality (*sāmānya*), Inherent relation (*samavāya*), Potency (*śakti*), Number (*saṁkhyā*) and Similarity (*sādṛśya*) and discuss each one of them in detail. Out of the eight, first five have been accepted by Vaiśeṣika and the last three have been added by Prabhākara. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accepts only five. He accepts first four as stated by Prabhākaraand adds *abhāva* (non-existence) as fifth one. Acceptance of *abhāva* as a separate category led Kumārila Bhaṭṭato accept*abhāva* as a separate *pramāṇa*.Śabara does not regard *abhāva* as a positive *pramāṇa*. He calls it as *pramāṇābhāva*. His argument is based on the fact that sense-organ cannot come in contact with 'absence'.Prabhākara's interpretation of this sentence is different from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that five *pramāṇas* (*pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti*, and *śabda*) is unable to comprehend 'absence' which is one of the categories, hence one needs *abhāva* as a separate *pramāṇa*. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, as opposed to Prabhākara, accepts darkness (*tamas*) as a positive entity on the ground that it is cognized by eye in the absence of light. Its black colour and movement are also cognized by eye. But Śālikanātha and Rāmānujācāryawhile explaining the same *sūtra*differs from Kumārila. Theymaintain that darkness (*tamas)* cannot be regarded as a separate substance (*dravya*). They think that darkness is the shadow of an object;hence,they claim that black colour is not real, because to a blind man everything is black.

Difference on the definition of Śāstra:

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara both have interpreted definition of *Śāstra* provided by Śabarasvāmī differently and thus giving rise to two different systems of Mīmāṁsā.Śabara- svāmī has defined *śāstra* as knowledge conveyed by significant words. It gives us knowledge of things about which nothing was known earlier.He used the term *śāstra* for Vedic knowledge only. However, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa differs from Śabarasvāmī and states that *śāstra*refers to both Vedic and non-vedic words where valid verbal testimony exists.

This means that both Vedic and valid non-vedic words constitute *śāstra*.This means that both Vedic and non-vedic words can be *śabdapramāṇas*. Prabhākara while commenting upon the definition of Śabarasvāmī holds that *śāstra*refers only to Vedic injunction (*vidhivākya*). Vedic injunction alone can be regarded as a *śabdapramāṇa*. Words not necessarily imply knowledge. Hence,the view of Śabarasvāmī that words imply knowledge is not correct. Prabhākara does not regard non-vedic words as verbal testimony (*śabdapramāṇa*). For, non-vedic words always refer to things already known to the speaker. Vedic words produce knowledge unknown to anyone, so Vedic injunctions alone can be treated as *śāstra*. Non-vedic words cannot be treated as *śabdapramāṇa*. Experiences emanating from non-vedic words are inferential in character because they arise from a knowledge of the relation of the words with what they signify. Thus, Prabhākara while commenting upon Śabara differs from him and also from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with regard to the nature and definition of śāstra.

A sentence or a *vākya* is made up of words or *pada*. A sentence must confirm to certain conditions otherwise it cannot covey any meaning. So, it is necessary for the conveyance of a meaning that a sentence confirmscertain conditions. A word means an object and sentence expresses the relationship between the objects expressed by constituent words. Hence the question arises, namely, how is the meaning of constituent words related with the sentence as a whole? Is the meaning of a sentence the sum total of the meaning of its constituent words? Does a sentence convey the meaning which is new, but determined by its constituent words? Does a sentence convey its meaning independently of its constituent words? Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa both while explaining *Jaiminisūtra* and *Śabarabhāṣya* provided different answers to the above questions.Thus,again it is worth highlighting that consequently they gave rise to two different philosophiesof language, and so developingMīmāṁsā system in two differentdimensions. One theory of the relation between the meaning of a sentence and those of its constituent words is known as *abhihitānvayavāda*, and another is known as *anvitāvidhānavāda*.Prabhākara in consonance with his

epistemology propounded *anvitā vidhānavāda* and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa propounded *abhihitānvayavāda.*

All alphabets and words, Prabhākaraopined, is eternal. Words, though uttered by speakers, are not produced by them. The relation between language and meaning is not produced by humanbeing. It is *apouruṣeya*. Letters and words are eternal. When speakers utter them, the hearers recognize them on account of their sameness with previously uttered and heard words. If the words uttered later are different from the previous one then they will not be recognized and will not convey any meaning. Following Jaimini and Śabara, Prabhākaramaintains that words, their significance and the relation between them is eternal. Process of learning the significance of words is also eternal. As it was learnt in the past in the same way it is learnt today by young people.

Anvitāvidhānavāda and Abhhitānvyavāda:

Prabhākara's view on sentence-meaning is different not only from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, but all other systems of Philosophy. Prabhākara does not regard sentence as a separate unit, but it is only a collection of words. The import of the words is always expressed as connected with some action. Each word in a sentence is capable of signifying a complete sense. Prabhākara, as stated above, maintains *anvitāvidhānavāda*. According to this theory the meaning of a sentence is not merely the aggregate of the separate meanings of its constituent words. The sentence has a unitary meaning of its own which cannot be resolved into the complex meaning of its words. Every sentence is a *vidhivākya* and means an action (*kriyā*). It either asks us to do or asks us not to do. Hence the *kriyā*is the central meaning of a sentence. The constituent word possesses meaning only as they are related to the action meant by the sentence. Thus, in the sentence 'Bring the cow', the word 'cow' does not mean cow as such but the 'object' of the verb 'bring'. Hence in a sentence first words are arranged i.e. we arrange (*anvaya*) the words, and thus sentence conveys (*abhidhāna*) it's meaning. This theory of *anvitāvidhāna* is advocated not only by Prabhākara but by grammarians too. Prabhākara maintains that words convey their own meaning and arranged to convey the meaning of the sentence. Words in a sentence convey their

individual meaning till they are arranged to convey the unitary meaning of the sentence. Hence the meaning of a sentence is neither the aggregate meaning of the words nor is quite independent of their meaning. Rather, sentence-meaning is a new meaning arising from arranged (*anvita*) meaning of its constituent words. Prabhākara maintains that words occur in a sentence in succession and their meaning is remembered when we come to the end of the sentence.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa answered the above stated question differently and followed *abhihitānvyavāda*. Following this theory, meaning of a sentence is merely the synthesis (*anvaya*) of its constituent words. When we read or hear a sentence we have first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after the other. Then by putting together the meanings of all the words, according to their expectancy (*ākāṇkṣā*), proximity (*sannidhi*), fitness (*yogyatā*), and intention (*tātparya*), we arrive at the meaning of whole sentence. On this view, meaning of words precedes the meaning of a sentence. We synthesize (*anvaya*) the meaning (*abhihita*) of words on the basis of expectancy (*ākāṇkṣā*), proximity (*sannidhi*), fitness (*yogyatā*), and intention (*tātparya*) to arrive at the meaning of a sentence. Different meaning of words expressed successively by words are put together by means of memory. We understand the meaning of words successively and when we come to the last word of a sentence we remember the meanings of all preceding words. The meaning of the last word when combined with the meanings of preceding words gives us the meaning of whole sentence. This theory of *abhihitānvayavāda* is advocated by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.Nyāyaand Vedānta also maintain this theory.

Veda alone, according to Mīmāṁsā, is the source of knowledge of *dharma*. If this is so, how *smṛti* and ācaraṇa(conduct) of cultured people can be considered as *pramāṇa* of *dharma*? This question has been raised by Jaimini. He says that if Veda is the root of *dharma*, then non-vedic words should not be considered as the root of *dharma*.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara interpreted this *sūtra* differently and thereby developedMīmāṁsā system on two different lines. Prabhākara has developed his view following Bādari. Śabara while commenting on this *sūtra* says that *dharma* has its base in *smṛti*. If dharma has no base in *smṛti* i.e. not

supported by Veda, should one say that it has base in ācaraṇa (conduct) of pious and cultured people.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa provides two answers to this question. He replies, that dharma whose base is not found in Veda but is followed by pious and cultured people must have existed in some Vedic schools or *śākhā* of Veda now extinct. Those *śākhā* of Veda have extincted in want of their followers.Further he says, that dharma must have known to the authors of *smṛti*, but we have not traced or identified so far. Therefore, Kumārila Bhaṭṭamaintains that *dharma* which is now found in *smṛti* must have existed in Veda and those passage must have been available to the author of *smṛti*. Unfortunately, those passages are not traced today.

Śabarasvāmīdiscarded those *dharmas* which are not found in Vedic passage and thus not supported by Veda.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa did not agree with Śabarasvāmī. He claimed that *dharma* which is based on *smṛti* and conflicts with known Vedic passages must have been based on those Vedic passages which have been lost or not identified by us so far. Those Vedic passages lost today may be found out some day by learned person. However, Kumārila Bhaṭṭamaintained that those *dharmas*should not be practiced by people till Vedic passages corresponding to those *dharmas* are found.

Prabhākara adopted the different method to solve the above stated two problems. He maintained that no branch of Veda should be considered as having once existed and lost afterwards. He believed that no new discovery can ever be made from the existing Veda. According to him, authors of *smṛti* must have learnt that dharma, which are not supported by Veda, from early *smṛti* works. Prabhākaraconsiders authenticity of those *dharma* on the basis of trust-worthiness of the author of early *smṛti*. Thus we see that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara interpreted the *sūtra* differently and propounded different theses.

Necessity for The Discussion on Vedic Passage

Rāmānujācārya, in the last section of his *Tantrarahasya*, deals with the question whether investigation regarding *dharma*or content of Vedic passage, after finishing study of veda,is obligatory

or optional. It cannot be an obligation for a student of Veda if not suggested by any Vedic injunction. Students of Veda may give up all the rules and restrictions imposed on them during the study of Veda and proceed to enter into *gṛhasthāśrama*.Jaiminihas answered the above stated question. He says that students of Veda, after learning Veda, should discuss Vedic passages for knowledge of *dharma* and thus should stay with his teacher before entering into *gṛhasthāśrama*. There is a Vedic injunction '*svādhyāyoadhyetavyaḥ*'. This injunction imposes that a student should learn not only Veda but should engage himself in discussing Vedic passage for knowledge of *dharma*. Consequently, he should stay with teacher for a further period. At this stage the question arises whether this injunction has any objective or this injunction gives us any unseen benefit or it is only for understanding of *dharma*. While answering this question Śabara, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara differ with one another. Śabarasvāmī, in his *Bhāṣya*, states that sacrifices prescribed by Veda are for the benefit of mankind. But he does not say clearly that this Vedic injunction asks us to learn *dharma*or content of Vedic passagefor the benefit of mankind.

Jāti (Generality):

Prabhākara states that we observe *Jāti* or generality in different perceptible objects of the same class. First time we come in contact with *Jāti* through our sense organ in the (first) perceptible objects such as pot or cloth. The second time when we observe pot or cloth our previous contact with the generality or *jāti* found in the substratum (of pot or cloth) reveals generality in the pot or cloth observed second time. For example, cow-ness is experienced in different cows and ox-ness is observed by us in different oxes. Prabhākaradiffers from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on this issue of *Jāti*. Śālikanātha, a strong supporter of Prabhākara, in his *Prakaraṇpañcikā*has devoted a full chapter entitled *Jātinirṇaya* to discuss the notion of *Jāti. Jāti*, according to *Śalikanātha*and *Rāmānujacārya*, is found in perceptible entities only, not elsewhere. When we observe pot or cloth second or third time we find that there is something which follows pot or cloth observed second or third time. The one which follows second or third time is called

*jāti*or generality. In our first observation of pot or cloth, we do not know that *jāti* or generality will follow in the subsequent observation of pot or cloth. In our subsequent observations of pot or cloth, *jāti* or generality is known. To follow in subsequent observations of pot or cloth is the essential quality or character of *jāti*or generality.In the same way, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in his *Tantravārttika* and *Ślokavārttika*, also try to prove that *Brāhmaṇatva* and *Kṣatriyatva* etc are *Jāti* (generality or universal) and are found in *Brāhamaṇa* and *kṣatriya*. This view of *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa* has been refuted by *Śalika Nātha* in*Jātinirṇaya*of his *Prakaraṇpañcikā*.

Thus, we have seen that the same *sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* there on have been interpreted by Prabhākara and Kumārila differently resulting into two different schools of *Mīmāṁsā*system.They were the founders of respective schools.Kumārila while interpreting and explaining *Jaiminisūtra* and *Bhāṣya*widely differs from Prabhākara on various ideological / philosophical points viz nature of Dharma and Adharma, purpose of Mīmāṁsā, validity and invalidity of Vedic and non-Vedic sentences, validity and Invalidity of experience, number of categories and *pramāṇas*, meaning and use of suffix '*Liñ'*, nature of *Jāti,* and main objective of learning Vedas etc.

Therefore, the claim that the so-called development of Indian philosophy is nothing but the repetition of what had been stated earlier in the original *sūtras*/ texts is contrary to the truth, and is presupposed and misguided. As a matter of fact, subsequent philosophers of the system have introduced some new philosophical ideas/ approaches/ point of views through their conceptual and hermeneutic analysis of the same fundamental *sūtras* or texts. While commenting upon the text of the predecessor, the successor, not only has propounded his own view, but also sometime has gone beyond the scope of the sūtrakāra. Hence, it can be safely concluded that commentary literature, indeed, played a significant role in the development of Indian Philosophy. In other words, the tradition of *sūtras*and *Bhāṣyas* truly represent what is called the 'continuity and development' of Indian philosophical tradition.

Notes and References:

1. [1] I am indebted to the Department of Philosophy, Utkal University (Odisha), and Dr Saroj Kant Kar who gave me an opportunity to write and read this article.
2. [1]Ehekalk[;k rq fo|s;a cgqfo|kUrjkfJrkA u “kqJw’kf;rqa “kD;k izkxuqDRok iz;kstue~A Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, pg 7, 1971
3. [1]o`ÙkkRdekZf/kxeknuUrja czãfofofn’kkA
4. [1] See Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, 1971
5. , 1 – 1 – 5
6. [1]Ibid 1. 11
7. [1]See Śābarabhāṣya 1.1.1
8. [1]Ibid 1.1.1 Yksds ;s’oFksZ’kq izfl)kfu ;kfu inkfu rkfu lfr lEHkos rnFkkZU;so lw=sf’oR;oxUrO;e~A u v/;kgkjkfnfHkjs’kka ifjdYiuh;ks·FkZ% ifjHkkf’krO;ks okA ,oa osnokD;kU;so ,fHkO;kZ[;k;UrsA
9. [1]Ibid 11.1.1
10. [1]Ibid V.1.6 lfr ijkFkZRok}snL;A ijkFkksZ fg osn%A ;|nusu ”kD;rs drqZa rLeS rLeS iz;kstuk;S’k lekEuk;rsA
11. [1]Ibid 1. 1. 2
12. [1]Ibid 1. 1. 5
13. [1]Ibid 1. 1. 5
14. [1] Ibid 1. 1. 5
15. [1]Ibid 1. 1. 5
16. [1]Ibid 1. 1. 5 ;L; p nq’Va dj.ka ;= p feF;sfr izR;;% l ,oklehphu% izR;;%] ukU; bfrA
17. [1]Ibid 1. 1. 2 rsu ;% iq#’ka fu%Js;lsu la;qufä l /keZ”kCnsuksP;rsA mHk;feg pksnu;k y{;rs vFkksZ·uFkZ”pA dks·FkZ% ;ks fu%Js;lk;A dks·uFkZ% ;% izR;ok;k;A
18. [1] izk;s.kSo fg ehekalk yksds yksdkrhÑrkA rkekfLrdiFks drqZe;a ;Ru% Ñrks e;kAA

19. uuq osnkFkZxzg.kkfoLej.kkFkZefi rÙk˜ÙkZ` fe=kfnfojfprrÙo”kq)Ókfny{k.kizdj.keLR;sosfr xrkFkZfena okD;fefrA
20. Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras,1.1.10
21. [1] loZL;So fg “kkL=L; deZ.kks okfi dL;fpr~A ;kor~ iz;kstua uksDra rkoÙkr~ dsu x`ársAA Slokavarttika, 1.1.12
22. [1] yksd bR;kfnHkk’;L; ‘kMFkkZu~ laizp{krsA Hkk’;dkjkuqlkjs.k iz;qäL;kfnr% i`Fkd~AA Slokavarttika, 1.1.26
23. [1] See Sabarabhasya, 1.1.2
24. [1] Interpreters referred by *Sabaraswamin* are – *Badarayana, Badari, Aitisayana, Kamukayana, Atreya* and others.
25. [1] See Śābarabhāṣya, 111.1.3. ukfLr “kCnks ;kxsu fØ;rs LoxZ bfrA ;kxLrkodrZO;% iq#’kL;A l fg iq#’kkFkZ%A Qyefi u rsu fØ;rsA
26. [1] Ibid, l ;% LoxZa dke;rs l ;kxa dq;kZfnR;srkoPNCnsuksifn”;rsA ukReu% ijL; ok bfrA
27. [1] Ibid, rLek|kxks u “ks’kHkwr% dL;fpnFkZL;A
28. [1]Śābarabhāṣya dekZ.;fi tSfefu% QykFkZRokr~A tSfefu 111.1.4 lfg nn”kZ u ;kx% drZO;r;ksifn”;rsA QydkeL; rRlk/kuksik;RosusfrA ,oa Jqrks·FkZ% ifjx`ghrks HkofrA vFkZoka”pksins”k%A
29. [1]Śābarabhāṣya VI.I .2 Lfg vlk/kda rq rknF;kZr~A tSfefu VI. I - 2;ks fg izhR;FkZ% l lk/;rs ukU;%A ;|fi ;kx% drZO;r;k pks|rs rFkkfiu drZO;%A lq[kn% drZO;ks HkofrA
30. [1] See Jaiminisutra vi.i.27 and Sabarabhāṣya thereon.
31. [1] See Tattvasaṁgrahaḥ of Śāntarakṣita Nos 30 – 31, Gawekawad Oriental Series
32. [1] izk;s.kSo fg ehekalk yksds yksdk;rhÑrkA rkekfLrdiFks drqZe;a ;Ru% Ñrks e;kAA Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, 1.10

33. 30 uuq osnkFkZxzg.kkfoLej.kkFkZefi rÙk˜Ùk`Zfe=kfnfojfprrÙo”kq)Ókfny{k.kizdj.keLR;sosfr xrkFkZfena okD;feR;r vkg & izk;s.kSosfrA ehekalk fg lokZfLrd”kkL=k.kkexz.kh% ] loZiq#’kkFkZlk/kuifjKkuL;SrfécU/kuRokr~A lSoekfRedk vkyksdk;reso lrh ckgqY;su yksdk;rhÑrkA lRLe`frlnkpk &jk.kka fouk dkj.ksu /keZizek.kRofujkdj.kkr~ fof/kfu’ks/k;ksfj’Vkfu’VQykuH;qixekPpA Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, i` …] *f‹‰f*

34. [1]vkg yksdk;ra uke ukfLrdkuka rU=e~A r˜koekikfnrk ukuk·ifl)Urlaxzgs.kA See Kāśikā a commentary on Ślokavārttika 1.10 of Sucarita Miśra, Trivendrum Ed,

35. [1]Uke Hkr`Zfe=kfnfHkjyksdk;rSo lrh yksdk;rhÑrk fuR;fuf’k);ksfj’Vkfu’VQya ukLrhfr cºoifl)kUrifjxzgs.kA See Nyayaratnakar commentary on Slokavarttika 1.10

36. [1] *vFkk·rks /keZftKklk* lw=ek|fena Ñre~A /kekZ[;a fo’k;a oDrqa ehekalk;k% iz;kstue~AA

37. [1] See Ṛjuvimalā (Madras Ed) p 20 /keZ”kCn”p osnkFkZek=ij%A

38. [1]bg ok dkfu okD;kfu fooj’;fr tSfefu%A /keZek=kfHk/kkukf) cq)kfnopukU;fiAA ifBRok /keZftKklsR;U;L;kihfr pks|rsA 1 77 Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras,

39. [1]vkyksP; “kCncyeFkZcya JqrhukaA Vhdk};a O;jp;r~ c`grha p y?ohe~A Tantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 1, 1956

40. [1]Sabarabhasya V.I.6 ijkFkZRok}snL;A ijkFkksZ fg osn%A ;|nusu “kD;rs drqZa rLeS rLeS iz;kstuk;S’k lekEuk;rsA

41. [1]Slokavarttika 1.12 loZL;So fg “kkL=L; deZ.kks okfi dL;fpr~A ;koRiz;kstua uksDra rkor~ rRdsu x`ársAA

42. [1]Śābarabhāṣya III. 1-3

43. [1]Jaimini I.I.2 pksnuky{k.kks·FkksZ /keZ%A

44. Śābarabhāṣya on I.I.2rLekPpksnuky{k.kks·FkZ% Js;Ldj%A ,oa rfgZ Js;Ldjks ftKkflrO;%A fda /keZftKkl;kA mP;rsA ; ,o

Js;Ldj% l ,o /keZ”kCnsuksP;rsA dFkeoxE;rke~A ;ks fg ;kxeuqfr’Bfr ra /kkfeZd% bfr lekp{krsA rsu ;% iq#’ka fu%Js;lsu la;qufDr l /keZ”kCnsuksP;rsA bfr ;tfr”kCnokP;eso /keZa lekeufUrA

45. [1]Js;ks fg iq#’kizhfrLlk nzO;xq.kdeZfHk%A pksnuky{k.kSLlk/;k rLekÙks’oso /keZrkAA Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, 2 – 191, 1971

46. [1]vUr%dj.ko`ÙkkS ok okluk;ka p psrl%A iqn~xys’kq p iq.;s’kq u`xq.ks·iwoZtUefuAA iz;ksxks /keZ”kCnL; u –‘Vks u p lk/kue~A iq#’kkFkZL; rs Kkrqa “kD;Urs pksnukfnfHk%AA Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, 2 – 195 &96, Umbeka’s commentary on them ,oa nzO;fØ;kxq.kknhuka /keZRoefHk/kk;snhuka rhFkkZUrjifjdfYirkuka /keZRofu’ks/kekg & vUr%dj.ksfr “yksd};suA vUr%dj.ko`fÙkoklukfo”ks’kiqn~xyu`xq.kkiwosZ’kq lka[;ckS)kgZroS”ksf’kdehekald & dfYirs’kq /keZ”kCniz;ksxkHkkokr~A

47. [1]Ślokavārttika 2 - 3fdek|isf{krS% iw.kZ% leFkZ% izR;;ks fo/kkSA rsu izorZda okD;a “kkL=s·fLeu~ pksnuksP;rsAA Ślokavārttikam, 2 - 3 with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras,

48. [1] Bṛhati 1.2 *pksnusfr fØ;k;k% izorZda opuekgq%* bfr dk;sZ·FksZ osnL; izkek.;a n”kZ;frA *rYy{k.kks /keZ%* bfr onu~ dk;Z:Ik ,o /keZ bfr n”kZ;frA Ṛjuvimalā 1.2 ;k; rsu dk;Z ,o osn% izek.ke~A dk;Z:Ik ,o osnkFkZ%A u fl):Ik bfr izfrKkre~A

49. [1] Ṛjuvimalā 1.2Hkk’;k{kj;kstuk rq & mHk;feg pksnu;k y{;rs·FkksZ·uFkZ”psfrA vFkksZ·fuf’k)Qy%A vuFkZ”p fuf’k)Qy%A

50. [1]Ślokavārttika,Atmavāda, 147 and 148 vfouk”kh Lo:is.k iq#’kks ;k rq ukf’krkA ek=k.kka lk·f/kdkjk.kke~ HkwrkfnukelafKrkAA

51. bR;kg ukfLrD;fujkdfj’.kqjkRekfLrrka Hkk’;Ñn= ;qDR;kA – <Roesrf}’k;”p cks/k% iz;kfr osnkUrfu’kso.ksuAA

52. [1]Ślokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepa, 110 eks{kkFkhZ u izorsZr r= dkE;fuf'k);ks%A fuR;uSfeR;ds dq;kZr~ izR;ok;ftgkl;kAA

53. [1]U mEcsd% dkfjdka osfÙk rU=a osfÙk izHkkdj%A e.MuLrwHk;a osfÙk uksHk;a osfÙk jso.k%AA

54. [1]Vidhiviveka, Banaras Ed, pg 109 v=SotjRizkHkkdjkséhrkFkZxqjksoZp% laxPNr bR;kg & mäa p drZO;rkfo'k;ks fu;ksx%A u fu;ksx% drZO;rkekgA fu;ksx% izoZÙkZuk fu;ksDrq)ZeZ%A uohukLrwé;fUr & vfu:firfu;ksxO;kikjL;sna pks|feR;qiØE;sneqDre~A drZO;rkfo'k;ks fu;ksx% u iqu% drZO;rkekgA

55. [1], Śābarabhāṣya 1.1.1 , yksds ;s'oFksZ'kq ;kfu inkfu izfl)kfu rkfu lfr laHkos rnFkkZU;so lw=sf'oR;oxUrO;e~ uk/;kgkjkfnfHkjs'kka ifjdYiuh;ks·FkZ% ifjHkkf'krO;ks okA

56. [1] Nayaviveka 1.1.1 v= p ;|fi ijers yksd bR;kfnHkk';L; 'kMFkkZuqDRok n"kn{kh pkijksDrkA rnfi eUna eRok xq#% lIrn"keFkZekgA

57. [1]Śābarabhāṣya 1.1.1–'Vks fg rL;kFkZ% dekZcks/kua ukeA u p r=k/;;uek=kr~ r= HkoUrks ;kfKdk% Qya lekeufUrA ;nfi lekeuUrho r=kfi *nzO;laLdkjdeZlq ijkFkZRokr~ QyJqfrjFkZokn% L;kr~* bR;FkZoknrka o{;frA

58. [1]bfr ckyHkkf'krfeo u% izfrHkfrA v/;kiufof/k"p uk/;;us izsj;fr (vf/kdkfjHksnkr~] vuqcU/kkU;RokPpA vkpk;ZL; rq uk/;;ua LoO;kikj%A rnsoelEc)rkek"kaD; iz;kstuijRosu ldy"kkL="ks'krkeL; lw=L; n"kZ;kékg & vFkkrks /keZftKklsfrA Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, 1.11, pg 4 - 5

59. [1]dks /keZ% dFka y{k.k% dkU;L; lk/kukfu dkfu lk/kukHkklkfu fda ij"psfrAŚābarabhāṣya 1.1.1

60. [1] Bṛhati 1.1.5dFka rfgZ foi;Z;%A vxzg.kknsosfr onke%A vxzg.kfufeÙkrk p nf"kZrk Hkk';dkjs.kA ;fn p{kqjkfnfHk#iâra eu%A

61. [1] Śabarabhāṣya 1.1.5 rLekr~ ;L; p nq'Va dj.ka ;= p feF;sfr izR;;% l ,oklehphu% izR;;%A ukU; bfrA

62. [1]r= iapfo/ka ekua izR;{keuqek rFkkA “kkL=a rFkksiekukFkkZiÙkh bfr xqjkseZre~AAPrakaraṇapañcikā Panṅcaṁ prakaraṇam
63. [1] lRlaiz;ksxs iq#’kL;sfUnz;k.kka rRizR;{kefufeÙka fo|ekuksiyEHkuRokr~AŚlokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, pg 121
64. [1] rLekn~ ;fnfUnz;a ;L; xzkgdRosu dfYire~A rsuSo lfr lEcU/ks izR;{ka ukU;Fkk Hkosr~AAŚlokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, pg 182
65. [1]lk{kkRizrhfr% izR;{ka es;ekr`izeklq lkA Prakaraṇapañcikā Panṅcaṁ prakaraṇam
66. [1]bfUnz;kFkZlféd’kksZRiéa Kkufefr rq u y{k.ke~A Tantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 8, 1956
67. [1] x`ghrxzkfgRos·fi vuqekuL;kuqHkwfrRosu /kkjkokfgdor~ izkek.;e~A Tantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 10, 1956
68. [1]Śābarabhāṣya 1.1.4 izR;{kiwoZdRokPpkuqekuksiekukFkkZiÙkhukI;dkj.kRofefrA vHkkoks·fi ukfLr & ;r%A
69. [1]vHkkok[;a ‘k’Ba izek.keHkkoxzg.kk; dSf”pnaxhfØ;rsA vHkkoL; Hkkofoy{k.kr;k Hkko:iizek.ksu rn~xzg.kk”käs% iapizek.kkuqRifÙk:ieHkko:ia izek.kesf’krO;fefrA rn;qäe~] izes;kHkkokr~A Tantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 14, 1956
70. [1]nzO;xq.kdeZlkekU;leok;”kfäla[;klk–“;kU;’VkS inkFkkZ%ATantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 17, 1956
71. [1]u HkofrA vHkkok[;a ‘k’Ba izek.keHkkoxzg.kk; dSf”pnaxhfØ;rsA vHkkoL; Hkkofoy{k.kr;k Hkko:iizek.ksu rn~xzg.kk”kDrs% iapizek.kkuqiifÙk:ieHkko:ia izek.kesf’krO;fefrATantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically

Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 14, 1956

72. [1]Śābarabhāṣya,vHkkoks·fi izek.kkHkkoks ukfLr bR;L;kFkZL;klafuÑ'VL;A
73. [1]izek.kiapda ;= oLrq:is u tk;rsA oLrqlÙkkocks/kkFkZa r=kHkkoizek.krkAA Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, pg 409
74. [1]ukfLr reks uke nzO;kUrja u HkofrA vU/kkukfeo dsoya uhfyek& fHkeku%A Tantrarahasya , Rāmanujācārya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 18, 1956
75. [1]Śābarabhāṣya,1.1.5 "kkL=a "kCnfoKkuknlféÑ'Vs·FksZ foKkue~A
76. [1]izR;{kkfn'kq oäO;a "kCnek=L; y{k.ke~A rnfrRofjrsusg fda "kkL=L;kfHk/kh;rsAA Ślokavārttikam, with Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Ed. S K Ramanatha Sastri, Univ. of Madras, pg 350
77. [1];fn rkoPNCns foKkua "kCnkyEcufeR;FkZ%A rn;qDre~A u rLekPNklueoxE;rsA "kklukf) "kkL=e~A Bṛhatī 1.1.5 Bṛhatī 1.1.5 See Also rLekPNCnkyEcukf}KkuknFksZ foKkua "kkL=fefr y{k.ke;qäe~A Ṛjuvimalā 1.1.5
78. [1]Jaiinini 1.1.5
79. [1];Fkk LokHkkfodks·ikS#'ks;ks fuR; bR;FkZ%A o.kkZuka fuR;RoknFkkZuka izokg:is.k fuR;Rokr~ lEcU/kL;kikS#'ks;Roe~A Tantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 22, 1956
80. [1] Ṛjuvimalā 1.1.5 vukfnLrq o`)O;ogkj%A iq#'kkUrjiwoZdRokRiq#'kkUrjksRiÙks%A ;Fkk [kYo|ruk%iq#'kk% iq#'kkUrjiwoZdk% rFkk izkP;k vihfrA
81. [1]rr"p xkeku;sR;qäs xksineku;sR;fUorLokFkZcks/kde~A ,oeku;sfr inefiA rr"pkfUors "kfäxzgknfUorkfHk/kkf;Roa inkuka fl)e~ATantrarahasya , Rāmanujācarya, Critically Ed K S Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute , Baroda, pg 29, 1956

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84. [1] Jaiminisūtra 1.3.1/keZL; “kCnewyRokn”kCneuis{ka L;kr~A
85. [1]vFksnkuha ;= u oSfnda “kCneqiyHksefgA vFk p LejUR;soe;eFkksZ·uq’BkrO; ,rLeS iz;stuk;sfrA fdelkS rFkSo L;kéosfrA
86. [1]Tantravārttika 1.3.1 inkuk –“;rs fg izeknkyL; iq#’k{k;kPpkIrfo’k;Roe~A u pSoa lfr ;fRdafpRizek.kekiRL;rsA
87. [1]Tantravārttika 1.3.1fg ;}k fo|eku”kk[kkxrJqfrewyRoesokLrq] dFkeuqiyfC/kfjfr psr~A mP;rs &
88. “kk[kkuka foizdh.kZRokr~ iq#’kk.kka izeknr%A ukukizdj.kLFkRokr~ Le`rsewZya u –“;rsAA
89. [1]Jaiminisūtra 1.3.3-4 fojks/ks Rouis{ka L;knlfr áuqekue~] gsrqn”kZukPpA
90. Śābarabhāṣya 1.3.3rLeknqäa Jqfrfo#)k Le`frjizek.kfefrA vr”p loZos’Vukfn uknj.kh;e~A
91. [1]Tantravārttika 1.3.3ckf/krk p Le`frHkwZRok dkfpUU;k;fonk;nkA Jw;rs u fpjknso “kk[kkUrjxrk Jqfr%AA
92. Rknk dk rs eq[kPNk;k L;kéS;kf;dekfuu%A ck/kkck/kkuoLFkkua /kzqoeso izlT;rsAA
93. [1]Tantravārttika 1.3.1 ;Ùkq fdeFkZa pksnuk uksiyH;r bfrA r= dsfpnkgq%A fuR;kuqes;kLrk u dnkfpnqPpk;ZUrsA ;Fkk fyaxkkfndfYirk%A dFkeuqPpkfjrkuka ewyRoksiifÙkfjfr psr~A uS’k nks’k%A ikBkfoPNsnoRikjEi;sZ.k Lej.kkÙkfRl)s%A ;FkSo fg xzUFk% laiznk;knfofPNéks·fLrRoa Hktrs rFkSo izfrK;k fuR;kuqes;Jqfrlaiznk;kfoPNsnflf)%A rÙo;qäe~A vU/kijaijkU;FkknsoA ;k fg pksnuk u dnkfpnqPpk;Zrs rL;k% loZiq#’kizR;{kkfnizljkHkkokÌyZHkrjefLrRoe~A

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95. [1]tkfrjkJ;rks fHkék izR;{kKkuxkspjkA iwokZdkjkoe”ksZu izHkkdjxqjkseZrkAA Prakaraṇapañcikā, Śalika Nātha, Ed by Shrisubramanya Shastri B H U 1961,, pg 64

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97. [1] Ibid, pg 18 vuqo`Ùkk fg tkfr%A vuqo`fÙk”p r)eZ%A vr% izFkefi.Mxzg.kle;s fi.MkUrjkuqlU/kku”kwU;r;k rnuqo`fÙkuZ izrh;rsA f}rh;kfn &xzg.ks’kq rq rRlEHkokr~ lk izrh;rsA

98. [1]vu;So p fn”kk czkã.kRokfntkfrjfi fuokfjrkA ufg ukukL=hiq#’kO;fä’kq iq#’kRoknFkkZUrjHkwresdekdkjekRelkRdqoZUrh efrjkfoHkZofrA ufg {kf=;kfnH;ks O;korZekua ldyczkã.ks’ouqorZekuesdekdkjefrfpjeuqlU/krks·fi cq/;UrsAPrakaraṇapañcikā, Śalika Nātha, Ed by Shrisubramanya Shastri B H U 1961, pg 100 – 101

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WALKING THE MIDDLE PATH: BUDDHA'S MADHYAMĀ MĀRGA AND ARISTOTLE'S GOLDEN MEAN

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Abstract.

The paper presents a comparative analysis of two seminal doctrines of ethical moderation: the Buddha's *Madhyamā Mārga* (Middle Path) and Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean (Golden Mean). While both philosophies advocate the avoidance of extremes, their underlying philosophical frameworks differ radically. The Buddha's Middle Path is rooted in a process ontology defined by impermanence (*anicca*), no-self (*anattā*), and dependent origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*). The paper concludes that while the Buddhist vision possesses profound existential depth, Aristotle's account provides a justification for moderation that is more universally applicable and ontologically robust. Unlike the Buddhist account, which relies on metaphysical claims often at odds with common-sense realism, Aristotle's doctrine remains metaphysically anchored in observable substance, epistemologically coherent with human experience, and practically accessible. Thus, walking the "middle path" is not a uniform ethical ideal but a contested philosophical terrain where moderation is inseparable from divergent commitments regarding ontology, epistemology and human purpose.

Keywords: Buddha; Aristotle; Madhyamā Mārga; Golden Mean; Moderation; Nirvāṇa; Eudaimonia; Metaphysics; Ethics; Comparative Philosophy.

1. Introduction

The concept of moderation has long occupied a central place in the ethical reflections of diverse civilizations. Human experience,

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across varying times and cultures, has consistently revealed the dangers inherent in excess and deficiency—whether in pleasure, power, or discipline—and the consequent need for a balanced path between extremes. Within the history of philosophy, two of the most influential and systematic articulations of this idea are found in the Buddha's *Madhyamā Mārga* (Middle Path) and Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean (Golden Mean). While both propose that ethical flourishing is possible only when life avoids extremes, the justification, scope and purpose of such moderation differ radically between the two traditions.

The Buddha's Middle Path is first articulated in the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*, where he warns against the twin dangers of sensual indulgence and self-mortification (Samyutta Nikāya V, 420). The path between these extremes is not merely ethical but soteriological: it functions as a practical method for overcoming *dukkha* (suffering) by cultivating insight into the Four Noble Truths. Consequently, the Middle Path is inseparable from the ontology of impermanence (*anicca*), no-self (*anattā*), and dependent origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) (Rahula, 1974). Moderation here is not an end in itself, but a therapeutic strategy designed to deconstruct attachment, dissolve ignorance and open the possibility of *nirvāṇa*.

Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean, by contrast, presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book II, 1106a–1109a), is foundational to his virtue ethics. Unlike the Buddha's Middle Path, this conception of moderation is firmly embedded within a substance ontology and a teleological framework. Aristotle posits that human beings are rational animals with a natural end (*telos*), and moderation in conduct derives its necessity from this metaphysical conception of human nature. To live virtuously is not simply to avoid extremes for pragmatic or therapeutic reasons, but to actualize one's essential potentiality, culminating in *eudaimonia*—the flourishing life in accordance with reason (Kenny, 1992; Nussbaum, 1994).

The comparison of these two traditions reveals not only differing ethical ideals but divergent philosophical commitments. The Buddha's Middle Path is provisional, contextual and oriented

toward liberation from the cycle of rebirth; its authority rests on soteriological efficacy rather than metaphysical necessity. Aristotle's Golden Mean, however, is anchored in an essentialist ontology and thus claims universal validity: moderation is the necessary condition for realizing what it means to be human. This divergence raises a methodological question at the heart of comparative philosophy: how do metaphysical assumptions about reality shape ethical prescriptions and on what grounds can one framework be preferred over another?

The paper argues that, while both traditions make compelling cases for moderation, Aristotle's doctrine provides a more metaphysically grounded and epistemologically coherent account. The Buddhist framework, despite its existential profundity, rests on doctrines such as *anattā* and momentariness that lack intuitive and empirical appeal for many modern minds. By contrast, Aristotle's teleological realism remains accessible to common-sense experience, logically structured, and adaptable to contemporary discussions on virtue ethics (MacIntyre, 2007).

The discussion proceeds by situating the idea of moderation within the general history of ethics, examining the Buddha's articulation of the Middle Path and Aristotle's account of the mean, and subsequently comparing their respective metaphysical and epistemological commitments. The conclusion defends the claim that Aristotle's view, though historically situated, offers a more sustainable philosophical foundation for an ethics of moderation.

2. Historical Antecedents

The ideal of moderation has held a privileged locus in the ethical imagination of diverse philosophical traditions. From early Greek thought to the ascetic and devotional strands of Indian philosophy, balance has been invoked both as a principle of individual conduct and a broader vision of the good life. What unites these traditions—despite their metaphysical variances—is the recognition that human existence is prone to extremes, whether of indulgence, austerity, or intellectual speculation and that wisdom consists in navigating the perilous space between them.

In the Indian context, long before the Buddha, the Vedic tradition already emphasized self-restraint (*dama*) and sacrifice (*yajña*) as forms of harmonizing desire with cosmic order (*ṛta*) (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1996). The early Upaniṣads radicalized this search for balance by advocating renunciation (*sannyāsa*) as the higher path, yet they simultaneously warned against the extremes of hollow ritualism and absolute world-denial, envisioning liberation as a balance of knowledge (*jñāna*) and discipline (*tapas*) (Olivelle, 1996). Later, the *Bhagavad Gītā* would crystallize the notion of balance (*samatva*) as a spiritual disposition, urging Arjuna to act without attachment to either success or failure (*Bhagavad Gītā* 2.48, trans. Radhakrishnan, 1948). The Gītā's ideal of yoga as equanimity (*yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam*) resonates closely with the broader Indian concern for harmonizing worldly and spiritual goals, establishing the fertile ground upon which the Buddha would later reformulate moderation in a more radical direction.

The Greek tradition reveals an equally enduring fascination with moderation. The Delphic maxim "nothing in excess" (*mēden agan*) captured the ethos of archaic Greek wisdom, while Hesiod counselled the mean in economic and moral life. Socrates also affirmed moderation and self-control as cardinal virtues (Plato, *Charmides* 159b–160d). It was, however, Aristotle who gave moderation its systematic articulation in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. While he framed virtue as a mean relative to us, determined by reason in accordance with the function of human beings as rational animals (Aristotle, *NE* II.6, 1106b36–1107a2), his doctrine stands historically as the culmination of these earlier Greek insights, connecting ethics with metaphysics, psychology, and political life.

Outside these two focal traditions, other philosophies have similarly valorised moderation. Confucian ethics stressed the "Doctrine of the Mean", presenting balance as the harmonious expression of ritual propriety and moral cultivation (Confucius, trans. Legge, 1893/1971). Stoicism, in the Hellenistic world, advocated *apatheia*, the rational regulation of passions as a virtue (Long & Sedley, 1987). In each case, moderation is not mere compromise but a principle grounded in deeper ontological or cosmological commitments.

The Buddha and Aristotle, then, emerge not in isolation but as culminating voices within broader traditions that wrestled with the dangers of excess and deficiency. They did not invent the concept of balance but rather gave it its most rigorous philosophical forms. However, as the preceding introduction established, their respective justifications for this ancient ideal—one therapeutic and soteriological, the other teleological and realistic—diverge fundamentally, reflecting the distinct ontological landscapes from which they emerged.

3. The Buddha's Madhyamā Mārga (Middle Path)

The *Madhyamā Mārga*—commonly translated as the Middle Path or Middle Way—represents not merely a moral strategy of moderation but an entire existential orientation toward liberation (*Nibbāna*). While the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* identifies the rejection of sensual indulgence and severe asceticism (Bodhi, 2000, p. 1843), the path is defined positively as the vehicle "that gives vision, gives knowledge, and leads to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna" (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* V.421).

The content of this Middle Path is substantively articulated as the *Ariya Aṭṭhaṅgika Magga* (Noble Eightfold Path). This framework integrates three interrelated dimensions of the Buddhist life: morality (*sīla*), meditation (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*). Its eight components—Right View, Right Intention, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration—constitute a holistic way of life designed to regulate both conduct and consciousness (Rahula, 1974). Structurally, this principle prevents deviation into the extremes of Brahmanical ritualism or the radical asceticism of the *śramaṇa* movements. In this sense, the Middle Path is simultaneously a practical and theoretical orientation: it charts a disciplined manner of living in the world that nonetheless aims at transcending it.

The doctrinal grounding of the Middle Path lies in the Buddha's analysis of existence as conditioned by impermanence (*anicca*), suffering (*dukkha*), and non-self (*anattā*). Since all phenomena are transient and devoid of abiding essence, neither indulgence nor asceticism offers a genuine resolution to the

existential predicament. Indulgence clings to the ephemeral, while asceticism clings to the illusion that liberation can be secured through bodily torment. The Middle Path avoids both by cultivating detachment through mindfulness and insight (Gethin, 1998). Further, this framework is supported by the principle of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), which explains that suffering arises through conditioned craving (*taṇhā*), itself rooted in ignorance (*avijjā*). The Eightfold Path functions as the Middle Way precisely because it interrupts this chain by fostering wisdom, ethical restraint and meditative absorption. Moderation is thus not an end in itself but a means of undermining attachment to the conditioned world.

This orientation is at once ethical, psychological and soteriological. Ethically, the Middle Path does not endorse hedonism or self-destructive renunciation but recommends a mode of conduct rooted in compassion, mindfulness, and equanimity (Harvey, 2000). Psychologically, it cultivates equanimity (*upekkhā*) and mindfulness (*sati*) as antidotes to craving and aversion, thereby balancing the affective and cognitive faculties of the practitioner. In this respect, some modern interpreters such as Keown (1992) have suggested that the Middle Path represents a Buddhist analogue to virtue ethics, concerned with the cultivation of character rather than adherence to external rules. While such an interpretation highlights the developmental aspect of the path, it must be noted that the Buddha's conception of moderation differs fundamentally from Aristotelian *phronēsis*. Unlike Aristotle, whose mean is ordered toward worldly flourishing, the Buddhist mean is ordered toward release from the world altogether.

It is therefore important to stress that the Middle Path cannot be reduced to a principle of compromise or balance between extremes. As Rahula (1974) observes, it is "not a compromise between two extremes but a path of its own" (p. 45). Its refusal of extremes is not pragmatic but ontological: it articulates a different orientation that undermines the very attachments which make both extremes possible. The Middle Path is not simply equilibrium but transcendence, a new existential disposition that arises only through the disciplined cultivation of morality, meditation, and wisdom.

This underscores the distinctively soteriological thrust of the Buddhist Middle Path. Its ultimate aim is *Nibbāna*, the cessation of suffering and release from the cycle of birth and death (*saṃsāra*). In contrast to traditions in which moderation is valued as intrinsic to human flourishing or civic virtue, in Buddhism moderation is instrumental to the cessation of craving and to the realization of liberation (Collins, 1982).

4. Aristotle's Doctrine of the Golden Mean

Diverging from the soteriological orientation of the Buddhist path, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean emerges from a distinct philosophical and metaphysical framework. Rooted in *eudaimonia*—commonly rendered as flourishing or the good life—Aristotle situates the mean within a virtue ethics deeply embedded in his teleological vision of nature. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he defines virtue (*aretē*) as a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean "relative to us," determined by reason and by the practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) of the prudent person (Aristotle, trans. 2009, II.6, 1106b36–1107a2). Thus, virtue is neither an abstract principle nor a rigid rule but a cultivated disposition to act and feel appropriately, avoiding the extremes of excess and deficiency.

Aristotle's mean is not arithmetic but qualitative and contextual. For example, courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, generosity between prodigality and stinginess, and temperance between self-indulgence and insensibility (Broadie, 1991). The determination of this mean cannot be captured by universal formulae but requires *phronēsis*—a kind of moral discernment that perceives, in each circumstance, what is fitting. As Aristotle insists, "it is no easy task to be good. It is no easy task to find the middle" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, II.9, 1109a24–26), for everything. The doctrine is therefore inseparable from the practice of ethical judgment and from the shaping of character within a *polis*. Unlike rule-based ethical systems, it emphasizes habituation, the gradual training of desires, emotions, and actions through practice and education (Sherman, 1989).

This focus on habituation reflects Aristotle's broader metaphysical vision. For him, human beings, like all natural

entities, possess an intrinsic *telos*, a final cause toward which their nature is directed. The human *telos* is rational activity in accordance with virtue, and the mean provides the structural principle by which this rational activity finds harmony (Ackrill, 1980). Whereas extremes represent distortions or failures of human nature, the mean represents the actualization of our natural potential. Ethical life is thus continuous with Aristotle's metaphysical account of the cosmos as ordered and purposive. In this sense, the doctrine is not merely practical moderation but a reflection of his conviction that virtue is the realization of what it is to be human.

It is important to note that Aristotle does not advocate mediocrity or compromise. The mean is not the arithmetical midpoint between two vices but the point of excellence relative to context and person. For instance, in the giving of money, the mean of generosity might involve large sums for the wealthy but small sums for the poor; in both cases, it is not the numerical amount but the appropriateness of the action that matters (Aristotle, trans. 2009, II.7, 1107a9–27). This relativity underscores the sophistication of his ethical thought: it resists simplistic formulae while affirming an objective grounding in human nature.

Scholars have debated whether Aristotle's doctrine can be reduced to a principle of moderation. While moderation captures part of its sense, it is inadequate to the complexity of his account. As Cooper (1999) argues, Aristotle is not prescribing avoidance of extremes for its own sake but articulating a substantive conception of virtue as human excellence, guided by reason. Similarly, Nussbaum (1994) has highlighted that the mean is best understood as an expression of Aristotle's broader ethical naturalism: virtue is the proper functioning of the human being, much as health is the proper functioning of the body. To act virtuously is therefore to actualize one's capacities in alignment with reason and the demands of the situation.

The political dimension of Aristotle's doctrine is equally important. Virtue, as he makes clear, is inseparable from life in the *polis*, the community that provides the conditions for moral development and flourishing. The doctrine of the mean is thus not

an isolated principle of individual moderation but a social and educational project. Through laws, customs, and institutions, citizens are habituated into virtues that sustain communal life (Kraut, 2002). Ethical moderation, in this sense, is integral to political order and civic friendship.

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean therefore represents a systematic articulation of ethical moderation grounded in metaphysics, psychology and political philosophy. It is neither an abstract compromise nor a pragmatic balancing act but the realization of human flourishing in accordance with reason. Its enduring significance lies in its capacity to illuminate how virtue requires judgment, practice and community, and how moderation, rightly understood, is not mediocrity but excellence.

5. Two Middle Paths: Convergences and Divergences

The Buddhist Middle Path and Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, when juxtaposed, reveal both intriguing convergences and profound divergences. At first glance, they appear to share a commitment to avoiding extremes, valorizing a form of moderation that secures balance in human life. Yet, a closer examination discloses that these frameworks are underpinned by distinct metaphysical assumptions, ethical goals and anthropological presuppositions, which decisively shape the significance of moderation in each case.

The primary locus of convergence lies in their shared structural rejection of extremities. Both the Buddha and Aristotle argue that excess and deficiency distort human life. In the Buddhist context, the extremes of ascetic mortification and indulgent sensuality are rejected because they equally perpetuate *dukkha*, binding individuals to the cycle of existence (Rahula, 1974). Similarly, Aristotle identifies extremes of vice—such as rashness or cowardice—as contrary to the virtue required for *eudaimonia* (Aristotle, trans. 2009). In both traditions, extremities are symptomatic of error, while moderation signals alignment with the proper orientation of life. Furthermore, both highlight that such regulation is not mechanical but requires intellectual virtue: *prajñā* (wisdom) in Buddhism and *phronēsis* (practical wisdom) in

Aristotle. Each recognizes that ethics cannot be reduced to rigid rules but demands a cultivated capacity for judgment.

However, this similarity becomes superficial when their respective ends are brought into view. The Buddhist Middle Path is soteriological in orientation; its concern is not ethical flourishing *within* worldly existence but liberation *from* existence as conditioned by impermanence (*anicca*) and suffering. Moderation here is instrumental: it is a method for cultivating detachment and overcoming ignorance to transcend *saṃsāra*. Aristotle's doctrine, by contrast, is teleological and immanent. The mean is not a tool for transcendence but the very form of ethical excellence within the natural world. Human beings flourish not by escaping existence but by realizing their nature as rational animals in accordance with virtue (Nussbaum, 1994). The mean is therefore constitutive of the good life, not merely instrumental to its attainment.

This divergence is further underscored by the role of community. In Buddhism, while the *saṅgha* provides support, the Middle Path is primarily an individual trajectory toward the cessation of suffering. The Aristotelian mean, however, is inseparable from civic life. Virtue is cultivated within the *polis* through laws and social practices that habituate citizens into excellence (Kraut, 2002). Thus, the Buddhist path is oriented toward universal liberation, while Aristotle's mean is oriented toward the perfection of character within political society.

The decisive difference between the two lies in their respective metaphysical grounding. While both traditions commend moderation, the philosophical justification for it diverges. The Middle Path is advanced as a pragmatic strategy for overcoming suffering, guided by the recognition of *anicca*, *anattā* (non-self), and the cessation of craving. It is not founded upon an enduring conception of human nature or any intrinsic *telos*. Aristotle's mean, conversely, is anchored in a framework that conceives of human beings as possessing an essential nature defined by rationality and ordered toward *eudaimonia*. For this reason, Aristotle's mean may be considered metaphysically more grounded.

Buddhism's metaphysical stance is characterized by a deliberate resistance to essentialist categories. The doctrine of dependent origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) explains all phenomena as arising contingently, devoid of intrinsic essence. Within this ontological horizon, the Middle Path is not a realization of a stable human essence but a method of loosening the grip of ignorance to attain liberation. Moderation is thus pragmatic, therapeutic, and instrumental, but not grounded in a substantive metaphysical anthropology. Its justification rests on the contingent fact of suffering and the empirical efficacy of moderation in overcoming it. As Nāgārjuna later underscored, even the Middle Path is ultimately empty (*śūnya*) when seen from the perspective of ultimate truth (Garfield, 1995). In this light, moderation is a skillful means rather than a metaphysical necessity.

Aristotle's doctrine, by contrast, is integrally bound to his metaphysics of form, essence, and teleology. Human beings are defined as rational animals whose essence entails a natural orientation toward the exercise of reason (Aristotle, trans. 2009). This essentialist anthropology is nested within a broader teleological cosmos. For Aristotle, virtue is the state that allows human beings to actualize their rational essence, and the mean is the structural form of this virtue. It is not merely a pragmatic method for reducing suffering but the very condition under which the human essence is perfected. As such, moderation is metaphysically necessary: without it, the realization of the human *telos* is impossible (Ackrill, 1980).

This grounding provides Aristotle's mean with a robustness absent from the Buddhist Middle Path. By linking moderation to an essentialist metaphysics, Aristotle can claim that the mean is universally valid for all human beings, as all share the same essence. Virtue is not contingent on empirical conditions but arises from the very structure of human nature. Buddhism, in rejecting any permanent self, cannot appeal to such an ontological foundation. The Middle Path is valid insofar as suffering arises and liberation is sought; but since it rejects the notion of an abiding essence, it cannot claim that moderation is metaphysically necessary.

Aristotle's account, by contrast, ties moderation to the very fabric of existence as understood through teleological realism.

From this analysis, it follows that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean offers a more ontologically robust foundation for moderation. This is not to deny the profundity of the Buddhist insight nor its transformative potential. Rather, it underscores that moderation in Buddhism functions as a therapeutic strategy within a soteriological framework that eschews essence, while in Aristotle it functions as the necessary realization of an essence within a teleological cosmos. The former is pragmatic and provisional; the latter is essential and necessary.

6. Conclusion

The comparative analysis of the Buddha's *Madhyamā Mārga* and Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean demonstrates that while these traditions converge on the ethical necessity of moderation, they diverge decisively in their philosophical foundations. Both paradigms identify the avoidance of extremes as the antidote to existential distortion: the Buddha's rejection of sensual indulgence and severe asceticism parallels Aristotle's insistence that virtue occupies the mean. However, as this paper has argued, this surface resemblance belies a fundamental difference in the ontological weight assigned to moderation itself.

The divergence is not merely procedural but foundational. Because the Buddhist Middle Path is embedded within a non-essentialist framework of impermanence and dependent origination, it operates primarily as a therapeutic strategy. Its validity is soteriological rather than ontological; it is a "skilful means" necessitated by the condition of ignorance and craving, rather than a reflection of an enduring human essence. Consequently, once the disease of suffering is cured and liberation attained, the remedy of the path is transcended. In this specific sense, Buddhist moderation remains instrumental, provisional, and metaphysically unanchored.

By contrast, Aristotle's teleological realism provides a framework in which moderation is not a temporary remedy but a permanent structural necessity. Because human beings are defined

by a rational essence that entails a natural *telos*, the mean represents the only possible mode of living in accordance with reality. The justification here extends beyond therapy into a comprehensive vision of the cosmos: the universality of moderation is guaranteed by the universality of the human essence. It is not a raft to be discarded, but the constitutive form of the flourishing life.

This comparative assessment therefore supports a qualified philosophical judgment: while both traditions offer profound ethical guidance, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean possesses a superior metaphysical grounding. It derives its necessity from a stable anthropology and a teleological cosmos, whereas the Buddhist Middle Path, while existentially transformative, eschews the very essentialist categories required to ground ethics in the structure of being. Aristotle's account ties ethical moderation to an objective reality in a way that the pragmatic, anti-essentialist orientation of the Buddha does not.

Such a conclusion has wider implications for comparative philosophy. It suggests that "walking the middle path" is not a univocal ethical ideal but a contested terrain where one must choose between competing metaphysical commitments. It forces a decision between affirming a realism that secures moderation ontologically, and embracing a pragmatic path oriented toward liberation without reliance on essence. Ultimately, if one seeks an ethics of moderation that is intelligible as a universal necessity derived from the nature of things, Aristotle's account offers the more robust philosophical justification.

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THE RELEVANCE OF KANTIAN ETHICS IN THE PRESENT ERA

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Abstract

Kant is one of thefamous philosophical thinkers of the present day Western field who gives to society an alternative account of obligations, duty and rights, one of themost influential thoughts any logician has produced. This paper is an attempt toexamine Kant's ethicaltheory and try todiscover its tenets and implications, and also try to find out how the dominant moral theories may beapplied to the discourse on respect for human beings for living a worthwhilelife. It no longerrelies upon the notion that human lives and liberties are gifts from God, as an alternative, it trusts the conceptthat one and allhumans are rational beings; worthy of dignity and admiration. Kant does not accept utilitarian ideas of Mill and Bentham. Kant claims that morality cannot be founded solely on empirical considerations of the aspirations, benefits, desires, choices and objectives that people have at any particular moment. In contrast to the morality of Bentham, Mill and Aristotle, Kant's morality that emerges from his ethical writings carries powerful implications for today's society.

Keywords*:* ethics, duty, goodwill, maxim, utilitarianism, God.

Introduction:

Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) advances deontological ethics through two notable works: The *Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788). In defining the shape of critical thinking inspired by Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804), we can consider him the pre- pioneer of contemporary moral philosophy which bring back, united and reconcile previous philosophical

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speculation as a novel form in moral theory through the introduction contains incorporate metaphysics of morals to its field. Kant exerted a powerful impact through his ethical writings. Kant states that morality is neither a matter of consequences, feelings nor is a subjective issue at all. In another place Kant affirms that to be able to reason lends a value of its own kind — makes chief moral worth. Kant declares that moral ground or obligation must be a priori required but only in concepts of pure reason,[1] which carries powerful implications for today's society.

Let us proceed to discuss why Kant' ethics is known as deontological ethics.

Deontological Ethics:

Kant's ethics is deontology, meaning it holds that the morality of an act isn't based on its results (consequences) but on whether it fulfills a **duty.** Ethics is that philosophical branch that discusses questions on morality. The most vital question may arise in ethics or moral philosophy is: Why should we be moral? Why not just pursue our self-interest and let everybody else do the same? Generally, most people think of someone doing the morally right things, they normally have in mind people who act either out of concern for others or as a matter of principle, whether it is the agent's own benefit or not. Ethics is also called "moral philosophy" as the word 'moral' comes from the Latin word 'mores' which means 'custom' or 'habit'. The character of a human being finds its expression in and through his conduct, which again springs out of and expresses human character and is good or bad according to his character. Thus literally '*ethics*' means the science of custom or habits of men.[2]Ethics deals with human behaviour, i.e., a collective name of voluntary acts which a human has chosen freely along with his freedom of will. According to J.S. Mackenzie, "ethics is the study of what is right or good in conduct,"[3] i.e., ethics is hooked up to the study of conduct of human beings living in society. William Lillie, defines ethics "as the normative science of the conductor human beings living in societies, i.e., a science which judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in some similar way."[4]Ethics is a normative science which deals with the judgment

of moral ideals, moral behaviour, and their application. "Ethics (Greek, ethos, character) is the study of the concepts involved in impractical reasoning, goodness, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, and choice. Also, the Second-order study of objectivity, subjectivity, relativism, or scepticism may attend claims mode in these terms."[5] Whereas Kant deontological ethics is also known as the ethics of duty or acting from a sense of duty.

Unlike teleological ethics, Kant's deontological ethics is applicable to situations where ideas of ethics are normal, invariable and absolute, applying to all people and in all situations. This moral view of Kant, emphasizes the motives of action, so, it is called deontological ethics.

Thus, Kant's deontological ethical view is that regards responsibility because of the essential concept of ethics. Kant thinks, there are at least two fundamental troubles with making the morality of an action depend on its results: **First**, humans aren't usually in a role to predicate efficiently the consequences of their motion, and, **second**, a utilitarian general of morality might allow for ethical really worth to be allowed for actions done for the worst feasible cause.

So, he presents the ethical theory that rests on duty and the moral well worth of an action on the reasons of the appearing agent, instead of the results. Besides, the moral doctrine of Kant is rationalism, moral purism, rigorism and formalism. Thus, opposed to Hedonism, Kant is considered as the father of modern liberal ethics and he influences contemporary thinkers and hence occupies a completely critical region inside the canon of western philosophy, and believes in rationalism. Kant's rationalism is corresponding to Philosophical Intuitionism. It regards the moral law is known intuitively, it is the internal law, self- evident law of conscience. From the moral law, maxims or morality are deduced by Kant. So, Kant's ethical doctrine gives us a natural form of morality- the categorical vitality.

Kant's theory of morality is based on rationality and any moral precept needs to observe universality. He distinguishes among natural purpose and sensible cause, of which sensible reason is self

–legislative.[7]The fundamental question of practical reason from which ethics begins is not What shall we do? But what should I do? [8] Kant regards judgment of right and wrong because of the sensible motive which imposes ethical regulation upon itself. The moral law is obeyed from a feeling of responsibility, it's far regularly occurring and unconditional, i.e. specific. For Kant, an ethical agent has an amazing will insofar as they act reliably from obligation. To behave from responsibility is to observe the moral regulation, that is nicely known as the categorical imperative. The explicit vital demand to follow humans as ethical dealers to behave only in ways that would rationally be made into regular laws. For Kant, to act morally and to act in accordance with reason are one and the same, he advocates the whole suppression of emotions and other sensibilities, and needs us to cultivate the existence of pure motive wherein consists of the moral life. So, Kant's important ethical concept is grounded on three notions, viz; good will, duty and imperative.

Good will:

For Kant, "there is nothing inside the world, or maybe out of it, that can be called true without qualification, besides a very good will."[9] Wealth is crucial whilst we need positive luxuries. We price these certified items handiest at the situation that they assist or bring about diverse matters we feel, however from time to time, they are placed to awful use. A bad individual may also use his intelligence, courage, and judgment to rob or murder. Kant wishes to mention that wealth can be used to corrupt morals, create conflicts, Wars, or maybe ruin our civilization. Likewise, health is a necessity for many items; however, in the case of a few human beings, it could be an awful issue. As for that reason, most things commonly appeared as appropriate are absolutely correct, however they are proper relying on qualification, as a minimum most of the time and that they can be definitely terrible, similarly, if we apprehend maximum matters typically called good are proper. inside the heritage of philosophers who regularly regard as intrinsic goods, viz; pride, the absence of ache, and extra usually happiness, and many others. These states of thoughts, for Kant, are suitable handiest whilst they're deserved.

Kant is of the opinion is that "A good will is not good for what it effects or accomplishes, but for its fitness to achieve some proposed end, except for its preference, i.e., it is good in itself and, considered for itself…"[10] It's miles of goodwill so one can completely be determined by way of reason and must fulfil the identical situations. a reasonable agent results easily inclined the good must achieve this in freedom. There may be no different way wherein we can work out our freedom than motivation by material issues. We figure our freedom and chiefly, come to be conscious and most positive of it, when the boundaries on our way to the fulfilment of moral duties, are greatest. However, we can't be positive of our freedom while there's a war between our inclinations and the categorical imperative, without any of our regular goals on the side of responsibility, and our will announces its freedom in the face of all influence and chooses to follow the moral regulation. In this state, we are filled with the attention of freedom, but the recognition of a rational human being, mainly of its soul, and positioned excessively above the bondage of material causality. Consequently, to take heed to the liberty of the need is to be conscious of a basic term's rational dedication within the face of all material motivation. However, rational determination of this description is the essential excellence of goodwill.

God:

The other important view of Kant's unqualified goodness is that when he considers only things that are in this world or out of it, Kant refers to God in something. Here, Kant argues, that if God consists that counts as out of the world and God may be taken into consideration perfectly good will which God has. it's far a truth Kant overtly admits that goodwill can't be the sole and complete appropriate or remaining suitable, i.e., It isn't always honestly good without qualification, wherein every rational being is both supremely satisfied and due to the fact he's morally ideal, worthy of being supremely happy which is seemed as a moral perfect. We all do with our ability to realize it, but we have no guarantee that it will be realized at all.[11]

According to Kant, virtue is the supreme good which consists of goodwill, so Kant opines that the only thing that in itself is the 'good will,' that will is that drives our moves and grounds the intention of our act and it is good whilst it acts from duty. This autonomous will, for Kant, is self-sufficient or free, when it is a law unto itself whilst it acts solely from an experience of obligation. Ethics as a discipline of philosophy has discussed the concept of duty as one of its major concerns. Kant's ethics is based totally on the view that the simplest intrinsically true factor is goodwill, that is manifested in purpose. Kant opines an action is right if it's far finished out of a purpose of responsibility and no longer in any other case. Kant's teachings of morality endorse the performance of action without contemplating consequences or pleasure of dreams.

The concept of duty:

Kant's concept of duty plays a very important role in his duty ethics. In fact, Kant's explanation on duty clearly outlines why Kant's ethics is deontological. For Kant duty is always duty's sake; there can be no exception to it. However, it may be challenged that we may not have the capacity of performing the thing which we may interned as our duty, here Kant suggests that "Thou oughtest, therefore, thou canst." Later carefully study of Kant's notion of the good will; which is regarded as the highest good in Kant's deontology, we observe that Kant opines that virtue is the supreme good which is consists of goodwill, so; Kant opines that only goodwill is good, thus he has not allowed any alternative for ordinary people, e.g., always keep promise- this should be performed; this is why Kant's moral theory is rigorism or moral purism. Thus Kant claims that duty is the necessity of an action from respect of law.[12]

Virtue lies in the cultivation of good will or rational will, i.e., doing one's duty for duty sake.

For Kant, a right action, need to satisfy two conditions: It should obey from the ethical regulation found out with the aid of motive; and it need to carry out of natural regard for the moral law.[13]At the same time Kant opines that a perfect universe is a good universe that could be accompanied by a way of happiness. Here

Kant considers the necessity to postulate the lifestyles of God alongside the immortality of soul. It is God, Kant claims, who harmonizes virtue with happiness and brings complete good.

Principles of Categorical Imperatives:

Kantian ethics are the ones frequent moral principles that all human beings follow, irrespective of context or state of affairs. Immanuel Kant opines that morality can be summed up in a single remaining principle, from which all our obligations and responsibilities are described, he calls this principle of categorical Imperatives.[14] Kant opines that his moral idea requires trust in good will, God's existence and the immortality of soul as a postulate of morality. A will that is completely rational and entirely free is called by Kant a good will. Kant opines that the concern of morality implicit in all ethical enjoyment is made evident in the concept of goodwill and claims that goodwill is the only element within the universe that is simply and altogether good. Kant's claims are commonly, even unanimously, believed to be real. Kant allows human action desires, reasons, purposes, volitions, acts, habits, and behaviour, to be the proper subject remember of ethics and different things like happiness, wealth, and many others., insofar as they influence our acts, i.e., Kant does not embark on an inquiry into the character of 'good' and 'values", to deduce the right from them. Kant seems to mark the rightness of acts based on their significance to serve as universal laws in a kingdom ofends. This is conflicting with Kant's reiterated and entirely established view that the rightness of acts can only be aground in the modalities, i.e., the exact manner of willing of the will itself.

This is conflicting with Kant's reiterated and entirely connected view that the rightness of acts can most effectively be aground within the modality i.e., the specific way of willing of the will itself. Kant gave his first formulation of the sensible law that he's going to utter, 'the moral law', and 'the specific imperative.' Kant offers the following formulations of the categorical imperative: Universal Law Formula: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time that it should become or be a universal law,"[15] this is the *first maxim of morality*. This maxim makes it clear that right is

universal for all. Kant clarifies it by the example of '*breaking of promise*.' It is wrong to break a promise, as 'breaking of promise' cannot be universalized. If it were a universal rule, if every person broke promises, then there would be no meaning in making promises. So, we should act or behave in such a way as would want that others should also act under the same general conditions.

Then another maxim states that we need to treat humanity (self and others) as an end and in no way as a method, it can be stated as: "So act that you use humanity in your own person as well as in any others, at all times as goal and not as means," it is second maxim. Kant elucidates this formula as: Each human being is obligated to respect all other humans and has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings. This legal assertion of humanity itself is a dignity since no human being can be used only as a means either by himself or by others, but must always be used at once as an end in itself. He raises himself above all other beings in this world that are not human but are nevertheless useful, and above everything else, because of this dignity (personality).

However, just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this would go against his duty of confidence), he also cannot act in a way that deprives others of their human dignity, which means he must practically recognize each other's humanity. Therefore, he has a responsibility to treat all other people with respect. Hence, there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human being.[16] According to Kant, the moral law is established by and for rational beings who share the same level of autonomy. As a result, other rational beings must be equally respectable throughout our actions. Since everyone should value their own personality, committing suicide is wrong since it amounts to treating oneself as though one has no inherent value.Hence the third maxim states that "act as a member of a Kingdom of ends." A kingdom of ends, for rational people, is an ideal society. So, the third formula defined by Kant as the law's social setting: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in other persons, always at the same time as an end, but not merely as a means." [17]

From these three ideas, Kant opines that everyone follows legitimate moral principles, laws, and rules. Furthermore, the relevance of all maxims, which might be the clarifications of the intentions that decide our acts, must be tested, e.g., you should test this maxim if you want to know if you can cut the line at the hospital because your headache is caused by a particular bad attitude. We find that this goes against the categorical imperative to be universalized, as a people's pain does not affect how a queue is prepared. Since all of an agent's moral obligations can be inferred from the formulations, Kant's moral theory is suitably referred to as a "deontological theory," or a theory of duties.

The keystone of Kant's philosophy is the idea that the only thing good without qualification is the **Good Will**, which is good only because it wills rightly without any condition, acting from the motive of **duty** itself. The moral law is expressed through the **Categorical Imperative,** an absolute command that reason imposes on all rational human beings. Kant opines that even though the moral law is recognized to us by the will to ourselves, morality as we experience, holding back our will, it is categorical imperative for human beings, and all other duties are finally based on this principle.

The relevance of Kantian ethics:

To observe the relevance of Kantian ethics in the present era, we have to first discuss pre-Kantian western ethics. historical Greece became the origin of Western philosophical ethics. But Sophists worked only on the external value based on passion for success and Socrates worked merely on a passion for truth. During the Greek period, happiness which is also called eudemonia, was given more importance. The ancient philosophers, in their moral thinking, emphasized important notions that include the virtues, happiness(eudemonia), and the soul associated with living well and doing well. Early Greek sophist moral trend and Socratic moral pattern did not examine the moral ideals in the light of reason and they could not make it a universal trend to be followed by all. In Plato's Apology, the character of Socrates suggests that 'the unexamined life is not worth living,' here Socrates claims that

examining life somehow makes it worth living. Following Socratics; Plato believes the objectivity of goodness and notion inside the link among understanding nicely and doing it. a few people do not join morality and self-interest. Plato argues that those people who are just, in the end, happier than unjust people. For Plato, motive is the best element in the human soul and a virtuous life is an included and harmonious lifestyle in which the lower details within the soul are subordinated to cause. Afterwards, Plato emphasized in his ethical discussion in the light of his popular theory of universal and particular. Plato revealed happiness as a moral ideal in terms of universal and particular. According to his view, there would be an absolute universal, i.e., universal happiness and all other human happiness, i.e., particular happiness participates in it. For Aristotle, a virtuous man is a happy man. So, happiness is the simplest properly that we need for its own sake, all of our other goods are conditional items as these are for the sake of accomplishing happiness, so, the notion of happiness, for Aristotle isn't surely a feeling of satisfaction, however a hobby for people indicating the sports of the soul following motive. As social animals, people stay to be satisfied and flourishing, they should live by using cause. It approaches that we've got a balance between motive and emotion in which cause is the guiding element. Eudemonism, a prominent philosophical outlook on the coolest life locations stresses on residing a meaningful and gratifying existence.[18]

For Hegel, God is the ultimate reality and all creatures including man are able to realise his potential spiritual self by rational systematisation of his desires and impulses, he will attain perfection. Thus, a good life or a happy life. As a result, an amazing lifestyle or a happy lifestyle as the moral end does no longer simply contain moral virtue, but, alternatively, contains intellectual distinctive features as well.

Kant’s morality is rule-governed, absolute and universal, it is deontological. Let us see what Kant means and in what sense Kantian ethics fulfils all these features cited above. While outlining the significance and importance of Kantian ethics and morality it's far said, in ethical philosophy, it ranks with the Republic of Plato

and the Ethics of Aristotle; and likely no small doubt through the quantity of Christian beliefs and via the extensive enjoy of the human race over the past two thousand years; it appears in some respects a deeper incite even than these.[19]

John Stuart Mill's and Jeremy Bentham each supported utilitarianism; which states that an act needs to be taken to bring about the greatest good for the best variety of people. Utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism; its moral rightness trusts on the consequences it produces, following its grounds an action which harms less human beings and benefits extra people may be considered ethically right. In Utilitarianism, Mill utterance is depicted as famous quasi-evidence of the best happiness principles. John Stuart Mill's concept on Utilitarianism indicated that the only proof that something is desirable is meant that people do actually desire it. So, each person's happiness is good to that man. Consequently, the general happiness is good to the aggregate of all people.[20] For Bentham, happiness changed into the closing suitable and that happiness changed into pride; thus, the action that seems to maximise the satisfaction of all people probably to be affected is the morally right action. Like Utilitarianism, Kant's ethical principle is primarily based on an idea of intrinsic value. But, unlike a utilitarian, who takes happiness, or satisfaction, i.e., the absence of pain to be what has intrinsic value. Kant argues that all humans have to be visible as fundamentally worthy of appreciation and dignity. Kant admits that all morality needs to comply with such duties, so his ethics is known as Deontological Ethics, opposite to Utilitarianism, and therefore, consequences inclusive of pain or delight are irrelevant. allow us to see what Kant meant and in what experience Kantian ethics fulfils all these functions stated above.

Observation:

From the above discussion and observation, we come to the conclusion that to be moral is our inherent urge. For being rational creatures, it is intrinsic to our being in the world. It is morality which liberates us from these confusions and guides us towards the peaceful co-existence in this intersubjective world of experience. It implies that we are in relation with others and so we are not isolated

beings, and we think that this should lead human beings to peacefully live their whole life in society.

Kant's uniqueness is that the was very different as compared to those who were involved in the formulation of moral ideals in the present era. In the beginning, Kant summed-up all the heritage of moral thoughts of pre- critical era and started working on it, then he gave up the philosophical assumption of the past and gave a novel dimension to moral philosophy by introducing a priori moral concepts. Kantian Ethics advocates the human's intrinsic value, stressing that people should be dealt with simplest as a quidas opposed to be handled as a way. So, we think that Kant affords a rational manner to evaluate the morality of an action primarily based on principle in preference to on an outcome; which makes Kantian ethics as a unique approach to Morality. Kant's concept is to construct a society or a social system founded upon the concept of the "Rational nature exists an-end-in-itself."[21] Kant's moral theory being duty based, it gives extreme interest to the motive of duty and thereby makes us understand that always duty is to be the cause of obligation and thereby makes us take into account that always obligation is to be done for the sake of obligation out of reverence for the ethical law. The moral law is intrinsically valuable and hence morality is a virtue. Kant's ideologies of morality work as a prescriptive law that helps us to choose what should be done or what is the right thing to do? Kant suggests these three formulas.

The moral theory of Kant gives special appreciation for its valuable contribution to the aspect of glorifying humanity. This implies that humanity is to be regarded as an end in itself. The highest and noteworthy contribution made by Kant's moral theory is that morality permits an intersubjective universe and so, it must be applicable to all rational human beings. This is of great significance for it shows that morality cannot be restricted to any particular society, this makes morality a priori i.e., universal and necessary.

Conclusion:

Even though Kant's theory appears as a rigid one, the 'goodness' of our goodwill provides the path for a better world to

live, it may seem to be utopian to many, but if we want to practice or uphold some of its basic concerns if not all; then surely we will be able to bring a world consisting of harmony, mutual respect and peace for worthy life. Kant's deontology remains a precious foundation for protecting customary ethical standards and as it is rooted inside the concept that morality is based on responsibility, no longer consequences. At the core of his philosophy is the specific vitality, which needs that we act simplest in step with maxims that we can will to emerge as universe allows.

Kant's deontology is a relevant framework for maintaining universal moral principles and fostering ethical responsibility in both personal and public spheres within an always embryonic and morally ambiguous world.

Kant's notion of intrinsic human value underpins contemporary ideas of human rights, justice, and equality. Not only laws but policies around the world today often rest on the belief that people should be treated with dignity—an idea directly linked to Kantian ethics.

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THE ESSENCE OF RĀṢṬRA-BHAKTI: VANDE MĀTARAM TO VASUDHAIVA KUṬUMBAKAM

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Abstract

This paper examines the philosophical foundations of *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* within the Indian intellectual tradition, and argues that it expresses a distinctive mode of political and moral belonging fundamentally different from modern notions of patriotism and nationalism. Drawing on *Śruti* and *Smṛti sources*, the study clarifies key concepts such as *rāṣṭra*, *dharma*, *ṛta*, and *bhakti*, and shows that premodern Bharat understood collective life through a moral and cosmic framework rather than through territorial or contractual categories. The paper contrasts this indigenous understanding with Western political concepts of nation, citizenship, and patriotism, highlighting that Indian *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* is grounded in stewardship, sacred duty, and filial devotion to the motherland. It further argues that the Vedic and Upanishadic worldview situates love for one's own land within a universal horizon, culminating in the ideal of *Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam.* Through conceptual analysis and illustrative historical examples, the paper shows that *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* is neither parochial nor exclusionary, but a discipline that deepens moral consciousness and expands it toward the welfare of all beings. The conclusion affirms that the transition from *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* to *Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam* reflects an ethical movement from filial devotion to universal responsibility.

Keywords: *Rāṣṭra-bhakti; Patriotism; Rāṣṭra; Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam; Indian political thought; Analytical philosophy.*

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Introduction

India, that is Bharat,[1] now stands in its 78th year of independence. It is necessary to ask whether we have truly decolonized our intellectual categories and our understanding of nationhood. Although political freedom was achieved in 1947, the conceptual frameworks through which we interpret "nation," "nationalism," and "patriotism" remain largely shaped by Western political thought. These categories continue to structure debates on Indian identity, often without examining whether they adequately capture indigenous philosophical conceptions.

Modern historiography frequently presents Bharat as a political and cultural unity that emerged only under the Mughal or British empires. In this narrative, the idea of India as one civilizational entity is regarded as a modern construction, and Indian nationalism is treated as a derivative of colonial modernity. This approach rests on European conceptual categories and then retroactively applies them to premodern India. Such a method imposes anachronistic assumptions and overlooks the rich indigenous vocabulary that historically informed collective identity.

This view misses the deep civilizational continuity found in the traditions of *Sanātana Dharma*. Long before modern states or colonial structures, Bharat possessed a coherent understanding of collective life through concepts such as *rāṣṭra*, *dharma*, *ṛta*, and *bhakti*. These categories formed an integrated framework binding land, people, cosmic order, and ethical duty. They reflect a mode of unity grounded not in political centralization but in shared moral, metaphysical, and cultural principles.

The present study offers a philosophical analysis of this conceptual universe. It examines *Śruti* and *Smṛti* sources that articulate *rāṣṭra* and *rāṣṭra-bhakti*, aiming to uncover indigenous foundations of political identity and moral allegiance. Through careful conceptual distinctions, particularly between *rāṣṭra* and the modern "nation," and between *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* and contemporary "patriotism" the paper situates Indian political consciousness within its own normative and metaphysical matrix rather than within borrowed categories. Finally, it assesses how a renewed

understanding of *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* can contribute both to the making of a morally grounded contemporary Bharat (*Viksit Bharat*) and to the cultivation of the universal ethos of *Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam*.

Methodological Framework

This study adopts a coherent methodological approach combining close reading of traditional texts, philosophical clarification of concepts, and comparison with modern political thought. First, it examines selected passages from *Śruti* and *Smṛti* not to reconstruct historical events, but to understand how these texts conceive collective life, moral order, and the relationship between people, land, and the sacred. These sources are analysed with attention to their conceptual vocabulary, symbolic imagery, and interpretive traditions. Second, the study employs conceptual analysis to clarify the ideas of *rāṣṭra*, *dharma*, and *bhakti*, identifying the assumptions underlying them and distinguishing them from modern categories such as nation, state, and patriotism. Finally, the paper brings these indigenous concepts into dialogue with modern political theories, not to privilege one framework over another, but to illuminate their distinct philosophical foundations. The aim is to reveal the conceptual world that shapes the idea of Bharat and the unique understanding of *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* articulated within it, rather than to provide a historical narrative.

Antiquity and Civilizational Continuity of Bharat

The idea of Bharat as a culturally and morally unified entity predates modern political constructs and is rooted in the philosophical and cosmological vision of *Sanātana Dharma*. Its continuity does not depend on centralized political authority but on a moral-cosmic framework that binds land, people, and *dharma* across long stretches of time. This becomes clear when Bharat's civilizational consciousness is viewed through the Yuga system, the traditional model for understanding cosmic and human history. According to *Sanātana Dharma*, time is cyclical and moves through *Satya Yuga* (1,728,000 years), *Treta Yuga* (1,296,000 years), Dvapara Yuga (864,000 years), and *Kali Yuga* (432,000 years), together forming a *Mahāyuga* of 4,320,000 years. Seventy-one *Mahāyugas* create one *Manvantara*, and fourteen *Manvantaras*

make a Kalpa[2]. The present Kalpa is the Śvetavara Kalpa also known as Varaha Kalpa [3], with the current Kali Yuga understood to have begun over 5,000 years ago.

This vast temporal framework situates Bharat within a civilizational horizon of great antiquity, where moral, philosophical, and cultural continuity spans multiple Yugas. Even when modern science dates the Earth to about 4.5 billion years, the expansive scale of the Yuga system shows that Indian cosmology conceived human, terrestrial, and cosmic processes on timescales far larger than those used in most modern historical narratives. This recognition of deep time suggests that Bharat's intellectual traditions were inherently oriented toward long-duration thinking, grounding civilizational identity in a cosmic rather than merely historical frame.

Rāṣṭra in Vedic Thought

The word *rāṣṭra* derives from the root *rāj*, meaning "to shine" [4]. Classical grammarians explain it through three related derivations: that which makes people visible [5], that through which things appear in their greatness[6], and that which shines over all realms[7]. These derivations indicate that *rāṣṭra* signifies an illuminating moral and cultural order rather than a mere territorial unit.

Sāyaṇācārya interprets *rāṣṭra* variously as kingdom[8], subjects [9], or realm [10]. Modern scholars commonly translate it as kingdom, dominion, or country, but within the Vedas the term often refers to the people and their collective order. A *rāṣṭra* is therefore not a political apparatus; it stands for shared culture, religion, emotion, inspiration, and the foundations of social life.

In Vedic civilization, the *rāṣṭra* is viewed as a divine trust. The seers understood its protection, nourishment, and alignment with ṛta (cosmic order) and *dharma* as sacred duties. A *rāṣṭra* encompasses people, leaders, land, animals, crops, prosperity, and the cosmic forces that sustain life. The *Rāṣṭra Sūktam* presents this vision with remarkable clarity, depicting the flourishing of the community as a moral-spiritual undertaking [11].

Professor Narahari Narayan Bhide defines *rāṣṭra* as the shared consciousness of humanity's eternal goal, which ennobles and refines life. He includes within it common race, language, literature, economic interests, traditions, homeland, state administration, and vigilance against foreign aggression. This collective awareness constitutes rāṣṭrīyatā (nationality), and those who possess it are rāṣṭrīya (members of the *rāṣṭra*) [12]

Nation and *Rāṣṭra*

In modern discourse, the term "nation" derives from the Latin *natio*, introduced into European languages through French, originally referring to "that which has been born" [13]. A nation, in this sense, is a human construct defined by territorial boundaries, collective identity, and political sovereignty, an entity that comes into existence through historical events, legal recognition, or institutional formation. The Indian conception of *rāṣṭra* differs fundamentally from this model. A *rāṣṭra* is not a political unit "born" at a specific moment in time; it is an enduring, divinely resonant order that grows organically from the land, culture, and cosmic principles.

Vedic texts portray the Indian subcontinent as a continuous sacred landscape. The Manu Smṛti describes the region as a unified holy domain[14], and *Brahmāvarta* [15] as "the country created by the God," while the *Bārhaspatya Śāstra* refers to Bhārata as "*tam devanirmitam deśam*," a land created by the God. Such descriptions do not treat the land as a territory defined by cartography or formal political acts. Instead, the *rāṣṭra* exists as part of *ṛta*, the cosmic order, and *dharma*, the ethical framework that binds rulers and subjects. Its legitimacy arises from moral law, spiritual duty, and cultural continuity, not from institutional recognition or political declaration.

Thus, while a modern nation may emerge from a revolution, treaty, or constitutional founding, a *rāṣṭra* represents an eternal principle of governance and social order. It is woven into the land, the people, and the dharmic vision of life itself. The contrast reveals a deep philosophical divergence: a nation is an artifact of human organization, whereas a *rāṣṭra* embodies cosmic, ethical, and

cultural continuity rooted in the soil and in collective consciousness. A *rāṣṭra* is therefore not "born" in a mechanical, temporal sense; it is revealed, sustained, and renewed through adherence to eternal law.

Citizen and Child of the Motherland

In the Western political lexicon, citizenship derives from the Latin *civis*, meaning a member or inhabitant of a city or town [16], and denotes a contractual relationship between the individual and a political entity. This bond is temporal, legally defined, and contingent on political history. In contrast, the Indian tradition conceives human belonging in a sacred and filial manner. We are not simply citizens but children of *Mā Bhūmi,* the Earth who nurtures and sustains life. This spiritual-filial bond is affirmed in Vedic literature, which reveres the Earth as Mother and calls upon human beings to acknowledge their dependence and responsibility toward her.

Sanātana Dharma honours Earth as *Bhūmi–Devī*, and daily practice reflects this reverence. Upon waking, before placing one's feet on the ground, one offers obeisance through the hymn: "*samudra-vasane devi parvata-stana-mandite, visnu-patni namas tubhyam pada-sparsam ksamasva me*" [17]. The meaning "Mother Earth… please forgive me for stepping upon you" expresses gratitude rather than dominance.

This filial understanding is explicitly articulated in the *Bhūmi Sūkta* as "*Mātā Bhūmiḥ putro 'haṃ Pṛthivyāḥ"*[18] ("Mother Earth, I am your son"), across its 63 verses, the *Bhūmi Sūkta* portrays Earth as a living, divine mother whose welfare is inseparable from that of her children. The Rig Veda extends this imagery by pairing Earth (*Pṛthivī*) with Heaven (*Dyauḥ*) as primordial parents "Heaven is my father, and the great Earth is my mother." [19] The Earth is celebrated as *Vasudhā*, the giver of life and prosperity, and as *Jagato Niveśanī* [20], the eternal abode of all beings. To recognise ourselves as her children is to accept a sacred duty: to preserve, nurture, and honour her bounty.

Patriotism and *Rāṣṭra-Bhakti*

The concept of patriotism in the Western tradition carries a specific historical and etymological trajectory. Derived from the Greek *patrios*, meaning "of one's father," [21] it originally denoted familial or ancestral allegiance. Its transformation into political loyalty occurred during the religious and territorial conflicts of 16th-century Europe, especially during the Protestant–Catholic struggles. Over time, patriotism came to mean love for one's country and a willingness to support or defend it, typically expressed through concerns for territorial integrity, political sovereignty, and national identity. In this framework, the nation is implicitly viewed as a possession of its citizens, something to be defended, served, and, if necessary, fought for. The bond between citizen and state is contractual, shaped by legal rights, duties, and political arrangements.

In contrast, the Indian understanding of *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* rests not on legal or territorial foundations but on spiritual, ethical, and cosmic principles. The Vedic worldview situates land, people, and polity within ṛta, the cosmic order sustained by *dharma*. Here, the individual is not the owner of the land or the state but its trustee and caretaker. The *Īśā Upanishad* articulates this foundational perspective: "Īśāvāsyam idaṃ sarvaṃ yat kiñca jagatyāṃ jagat; tena tyaktena bhuñjīthā mā gṛdhaḥ kasyasvid dhanam." [22] ("Everything in this universe belongs to the Lord. Enjoy the world through renunciation. Do not covet anyone's wealth.") This teaching introduces a crucial shift: all creation, including the polity and its resources, belongs to the Divine (*Īśvara*). Humans hold it in trust. Accordingly, *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* does not arise from personal gain, fear of invasion, or contractual obligation; it emerges from filial devotion, moral responsibility, and reverence for *dharma*.

While Western patriotism often stresses defence, conquest, and law-bound allegiance, Indian *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* emphasizes protection, nurturance, and moral stewardship. The allegiance is spiritual and ethical, flowing from the recognition that the land is sacred and maternal, and that we, as her children, are called to honour, preserve, and serve her.

Freedom Struggle

The sacred Mother-Child bond between the land and its inhabitants was not merely a philosophical ideal; it became a living force in India's struggle for freedom. During colonial rule, this relationship with *Mā Bhūmi* or *Bharat Mata* provided the ethical and emotional foundation for selfless sacrifice. Unlike Western patriotism, which often mobilizes citizens through duty or legal obligation, Indian revolutionaries understood themselves as children bound to protect, nurture, and honour their mother.

Shri. Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay's *Vande Mātaram* (1875), the spiritual anthem of the Indian freedom movement, gives one of the strongest expressions of reverence for the nation. The song presents *Bhāratamātā* as a living and divine mother who nourishes and protects her children. Her rivers, forests, harvests and mountains are described as parts of her own body. The verses praise the land as *sujalām suphalām*, full of water and rich in crops, *mallayaja śītalām*, cool with the fragrance of sandal, and *sasyasyāmalam*, green with growing fields. The night sky shines with clear moonlight, *śubhra jyotsnā*, and the flowering trees seem full of life. The Mother speaks in a sweet and gentle voice, *sumadhura bhāṣinī*, blessing all her children.

In the line *tumi vidyā, tumi dharma*, the mother becomes the source of knowledge, righteousness and spiritual power. The later verses of the song address *Bhāratamātā* as Mother Goddess. Bankim describes her as *bahubal dhāriṇī*, the holder of great strength, and *ripudalavāriṇī*, the destroyer of enemies. He directly identifies her with Goddess-*Durgā*, *Tvam hi Durgā daśa-praharaṇa dhāriṇī* , the Goddess with ten weapons[23]. In this way, *Vande Mātaram* turns love for the motherland into a sacred feeling. Bharat becomes not just a piece of land but a divine form of strength, kindness, knowledge and Dharma. This joining of Rāṣṭra-bhakti with freedom struggle explains why the song inspired so many people during the freedom struggle. It taught them to see service to the nation as selfless service, an offering to the mother, and sacrifice for the nation as an offering at her feet.

Singing *Vande Mātaram* became a ritual that reaffirmed the sacred bond between the individual and the land. Revolutionaries across Bharat carried these lines in their hearts as they faced imprisonment and death, offering their lives at the feet of *Mā Bhāratī*. Figures such as Damodar Hari Chapekar, Khudiram Bose, Madan Lal Dhingra, Ram Prasad Bismil, Rajendra Nath Lahiri, Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev, Rajguru, Chandrashekhar Azad, Hemu Kalani, and many others articulated their courage in terms of filial duty. They carried these lines in their hearts and lips as they walked towards the gallows, chanting Vande Mātaram and Bharat ki Jai till their final breath.

Sri Aurobindo captured this spiritual conception vividly: Bharat is "…not a piece of earth, nor a figure of speech, nor a fiction of the mind. It is a mighty Shakti… The Shakti we call India-Bhawani Bharati."[24]. In his conversation with K. M. Munshi, he pointed to a map of India and said, "It is not a map, but the portrait of Bharat-mata… Concentrate on Bharat as a living mother, and worship her with the nine-fold *bhakti*"[25]. This perspective transformed revolutionary action into dharmic offering, where personal will aligned with the cosmic order of *Dharma*.

This devotional ethos continued in daily prayers that expressed reciprocal love between the Motherland and her children. One such prayer declares:

"Namaste sadā vatsale mātṛbhūme… mahāmaṅgale puṇyabhūme tvadarthe patatveṣa kāyo… tvadīyāya kāryāya badhdā kaṭīyaṁ… vidhāyāsya *dharma*sya saṁrakṣaṇam paraṁ vaibhavaṁ netumetat sva*rāṣṭra*ṁ…" [26] This prayer reveals the core of *Rāṣṭra-bhakti*: the motherland is *sada vatsale, mahāmaṅgale, and puṇyabhūme*, a compassionate, auspicious, and sacred presence. The devotee becomes her trustee and servant, bound to her work (*tvadīyāya kāryāya badhdā kaṭīyaṁ*) and contributing their energy to her welfare (*vijetrī ca naḥ saṁhatā kāryaśaktir*). The link between *Dharma* and national welfare is explicit: protecting righteousness (*vidhāyāsya dharmasya saṁrakṣaṇam*) is inseparable from guiding the sovereign land toward prosperity (*paraṁ vaibhavaṁ netum etat svarāṣṭraṁ*). This mirrors the *Īśā Upaniṣad's*

principle that all belongs to the Divine and humans are trustees, not owners. The spiritual foundation of *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* is affirmed in Lord Rama's celebrated declaration: "*Jananī janmabhūmiśca svargādapi garīyasī*." [27] ("Mother and motherland are superior even to heaven.") This teaching makes devotion to the motherland a dharmic obligation of the highest order, uniting filial reverence with civic responsibility. Thus, the mother–Child bond transformed patriotic sentiment into *Rāṣṭra-bhakti*: a form of devotion that fused love, ethics, and spiritual responsibility. Revolutionaries offered their lives not out of contractual loyalty, but out of sacred, selfless devotion. The motherland was not a geopolitical unit; she was a living, maternal presence worthy of the highest reverence.

Conceptual Contrast

While modern patriotism emphasizes loyalty, affection, or pride in one's nation, *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* goes beyond these emotional or political sentiments and becomes an act of worship toward the motherland. Patriotism is grounded in allegiance to a state, but *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* is grounded in *Dharma*, the moral–cosmic order that sustains both society and the universe. Patriotism expresses love for the land; *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* treats the land as sacred. Nationalism often asserts ownership "This land belongs to us"- whereas *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* begins from the opposite intuition: we belong to the motherland, and therefore our relationship is one of stewardship rather than possession.

Patriotism primarily seeks national welfare or material progress, and nationalism may even generate competition or exclusion. In contrast, *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* aims at *śreyas*, the highest moral and spiritual good-fostering harmony, ethical excellence, and integration. It manifests through *seva* (selfless service), *tyāga* (renunciation), and *niṣṭhā* (steadfast dedication). By transforming attachment into devotion and civic duty into a moral-spiritual offering, *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* makes one's bond with the motherland sacred and filial, not contractual. Ultimately, while patriotism and nationalism operate within material or political frameworks, *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* encompasses the full range of Purusharthas: *Dharma*, *Artha*,

Kāma, and *Moksha*, integrating them into an ethical life oriented toward the motherland and the cosmic order.

Rāṣṭra-bhakti* to *Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam

Rāṣṭra-bhakti in the Indian tradition begins as a profound, filial devotion to the motherland, yet it is never narrow, possessive, or exclusionary. The Vedic worldview situates love for one's own land within a wider cosmic and ethical horizon, where gratitude to the motherland becomes the first step toward recognising the interconnectedness of all beings. This expansive moral vision is articulated in the Śānti Mantra of the Yajurveda: "*Dyauḥ śāntir antarikṣaṃ śāntir pṛthivī śāntir āpaḥ śāntir oṣadhayaḥ śāntir vanaspatayaḥ śāntir viśvedevāḥ śāntir brahma śāntiḥ sarvam…*" [28]. By invoking peace for heaven, atmosphere, Earth, waters, plants, forests, all deities, and the entire cosmos, the mantra teaches that genuine devotion includes care for the welfare of all existence. This universal orientation is echoed in the prayers: "*Oṃ sarveṣāṃ svastir bhavatu… oṃ śāntiḥ śāntiḥ śāntiḥ" and "sarve bhavantu sukhinaḥ; sarve santu nirāmayāḥ…*", which extend blessings of happiness, health, and goodness to all beings without distinction.

The *Mahopaniṣad* deepens this universalism: "*Ayaṃ nijaḥ paro veti gaṇanā laghu-cetasām; udāra-caritānāṃ tu Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam"* [29]. Rejecting the narrow distinction between "mine" and "the other," it affirms that the world itself is one family. The Vedic injunction "*kṛṇvantu viśvam āryam*" [30] likewise calls for ennobling the entire world, situating patriotic devotion within an ethical responsibility toward all beings.

The Upaniṣadic teaching reinforces this unity. In the Bhagavad-Gītā, *Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa* declares: "*īśhvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānāṁ hṛid-deśhe … tiṣhṭhati*" [31] "the Lord abides in the hearts of all beings." Recognising the same Self in all naturally expands one's affection from one's own land to all humanity and creation. The repeated chanting of "*Oṃ śāntiḥ śāntiḥ śāntiḥ*" at the conclusion of Vedic recitations seeks to remove disturbances in the physical, divine, and internal realms, symbolising peace not merely for oneself but for the universe.

In this light, *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* becomes a spiritual discipline cultivating loyalty, self-control, and responsible action. Devotion to the motherland acquires meaning only when aligned with *Dharma* and universal consciousness. It nurtures moral and spiritual faculties that naturally extend outward, just as a tree, firmly rooted, grows to shelter and nourish the wider world. Thus, devotion to the motherland forms the foundation for a broader, global dharmic awareness.

Indian *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* therefore begins with *Rāṣṭra-bhakti,* reverence for the motherland, but culminates in *Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam,* the vision that the world is one family. True love of one's land does not negate universal unity; it enables and sustains it by grounding patriotism in an ethical commitment to peace, harmony, and the upliftment of all creation. Far from parochial or isolationist, *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* transforms devotion into a universal ethic, preparing the individual to transcend narrow attachments and embrace the welfare of all beings.

Conclusion

The ethos of Rāṣṭra-bhakti in *Bharatiya Samskruti* embodies a distinctive synthesis of filial devotion, ethical responsibility, and universal consciousness. For a Bharatiya, the motherland is not merely a geographical or political entity but *Bharat Mātā*, the sacred source of life, culture, and Dharma. Loving, serving, and protecting the motherland is therefore not a legal duty or transient emotion; it is a sacred obligation expressed through selfless service, sacrifice, and steadfast adherence to Dharma.

At the same time, *Bharatiya Samskruti* extends this devotion beyond territorial boundaries through the ideal of Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam, the affirmation that "the world is one family." The moral and spiritual discipline cultivated through Rāṣṭra-bhakti naturally expands toward harmony, justice, and well-being for all beings. In this vision, patriotism does not become a narrow or exclusionary loyalty but forms the ethical foundation for universal responsibility.

Thus, the mother-child bond with the land becomes the basis for a wider moral life in which one is both a devoted child of the

motherland and a conscientious member of the global family. Bharatiya Samskruti holds that love of the motherland and love of humanity are inseparable, and that the highest fulfilment of life lies in serving Dharma, one's nation, and the world with equal devotion.

At core, *Bharatiya Śāstra, Samskruti*, and the tradition of Rāṣṭra-bhakti teach that reverence for *Bharat Mātā* and compassion for all living and non-living beings is interconnected. For a Bharatiya, Bharat is the mother and the world is the family, expressing the essence of *Rāṣṭra-bhakti* from *Vande Mātaram* to *Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam*.

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METAPHYSICS OF PHYSICS
(With a Special Reference to *Sri Vethathiri Maharishi's* Model)

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Abstract

The understanding of the nature of metaphysics has undergone a sea-change over the years. It is now seen as the foundational stone of sciences, especially the physical science. The search for new metaphysics always hangs in the minds of the thinking men and this somehow puts the scientific enterprise in the path of progress. A more comprehensive a scientific (physical) theory is, the better would be the understanding of the universe. But no physical theory can ever be guaranteed as complete. Sri Vethathiri Maharishi having a deeper vision of reality sees the physical science as searching for the truth purely from external considerations, when there is a need of both external and inner searches. Based on the Vethathirian metaphysical model where the Primordial Space is considered as the fundamental reality, a new way of looking at the universe is envisaged vis-à-vis the modern science. The idea of completeness that somehow could not be guaranteed in modern science could however be attainable in the Vethathirian model that has a balanced vision of the external and the internal through a state of super-active transcendental consciousness.

Key words: Vethathirian model, Primordial Space, Completeness, Plenum, Primary energy particle, Shadow-wave particle, Super-active transcendental consciousness

Introduction

A general contention goes, *"Why bother about metaphysics when there is enough physics?"*[I] Metaphysics has been traditionally

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associated with a vast speculative world that lies beyond the scope of observation and experiment. This probably has made many to go on with this general contention. But the understanding of the nature of metaphysics has undergone a sea-change over a period of time. At present, metaphysics has been the foundational stone of all sciences in general and the physical science in particular. Without a strong metaphysical base, the theoretization of most of the sciences could have never been possible. To add to it more, most of the theories could have not been formulated without the formal metaphysical articles, say for instance, the Ψ –function in micro-physics. This makes metaphysics so important and the *search* for a new metaphysics still more important. The search for the unknown should always hang in the minds of the thinking men. It is immaterial whether something concrete materializes from the given search, provided the search continues even though facing the rough patches of time, all with a ray of hope to see a spark in the journey in darkness. This keeps science progressive and ever-expanding to grasp the physical reality as close as possible through a suitable theoretical construction. A more complete a physical theory is, the better is its understanding of the universe and the related phenomena. Though completeness of a theory for all time cannot be asserted in science, yet a relative completeness with new parameters following from the proposed provisional thesis can however change the way we think wherein something unknown becomes known. This is the biggest challenge in science.

The completeness of a scientific idea (or theory) demands the fulfillment of the necessary and sufficient conditions. The necessary condition is: *Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory.*[2] And the sufficient condition is: *If without in anyway disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical reality, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to the physical quantity.*[3] Now looking at completeness theorem, we find: *If a physical theory is complete, then if 'x' is an element of physical reality, there is a state-description within the theory which includes 'x'.*[4] This hits at a fundamental point that the physical reality that we are conversant with today, arrived at by the available equations

based on a theory, may not be the true picture of reality since it might have excluded certain fundamental elements, being not guaranteed to be a complete theory. Though there is an immense advancement in science, yet certain things are missing in science since it is searching for the truth from outside. One of the best instances to suggest here is the Vethathiri Maharishi's ideas on Eternal Space. He considers Eternal Space as primordial, static, and most importantly, insensible; and this somehow is missing in the scientific researches. But the intuitive philosophers and yogic practitioners from the time immemorial have tried to bring the mind of human beings as close as possible to the deeper understanding of Nature through their inner searches. The strict confinement of scientists and yogic practitioners to the outer and inner searches respectively makes their positions, ideas, theories, etc incomplete. Hence, Vethathiri Maharishi writes, "*If a few scientists in the world come forward to practice the mind to achieve the super-active transcendental state, the realization of the truth to identify the Eternal Space, Almighty, will be easily possible.*"[5] He had an intuitive vision of the Eternal Space as Absolute, static, omnipotent and invisible. The invisibility of the Eternal Space does not mean that the Eternal Space is qualified with nothing, rather it is full of everything. He sees three invisible inherent elements in the Eternal Space, namely, plenum, force and consciousness. Plenum is omnipotent (all-powerful) and it can transform into anything or an action or a behavioral pattern depending upon the available conditions. The self-compressive force in the Eternal Space results in an energy particle which is just the spin of the Eternal Space in an infinitesimal volume. The sooner the spin stops, the particle becomes one with space. But as long as the primary energy particle spins with an infinite speed, it undergoes a friction with the surrounding Eternal Space, the Silent Static State resulting in an innumerable infinitesimal wave which get compressed and take the shape of shadow-wave particles which spin, but in a very short time their speed decreases due to the surrounding pressure of the Eternal Space and finally they dissolve into the Eternal Space. It is important to note here that the primary energy particles in appropriate combinations give rise to atoms, molecules, cells, and these in turn in definite combinations give rise to planets, stars,

living beings, etc.; and the association of shadow-wave-particles in various combinations give rise to pressure, sound, light, taste and smell in the inanimate entities, and in addition, to mind in the animate beings.

The Eternal Primordial Space is the fundamental reality out of which the entire world has shaped out. The entire universe is nothing but the association of the primary energy particles and shadow-wave-particles, all shaped out of an all-inclusive, all-comprehensive Eternal Space, the Unified Force, the fundamental reality. Even Einstein reduces all matter to a space-time continuum and in his final analysis considers 'field' as the ultimate reality, which when takes a certain form or structure, we call it matter. What is important to see here is that the particles, as modern science says, have no reality of their own, they are field-dependent. On this N.C. Panda writes, *"As a matter of fact, particles are interactions between fields. When two fields interact, they do it simultaneously and locally at a single point in space. These interactions are particles. Thus, physical reality is essentially non-material…… the universe is not made of matter, it is made of fields that alone are real. Matter is made of particles that are the momentary manifestations of interacting fields."*[6] This may be taken in parallel to Sri Vethathiri Maharishi's position that energy-particles are Space-dependent. The difference that we come across between Western science and Vethathiri Maharishi's Model is that while the former finds *field* as fundamental, the latter asserts the *Primordial Eternal Space* as the basis and ground of everything out there in the physical universe. A question may arise here as to why is the Eternal Space imperceptible. Sri Vethathiri Maharishi explains this thus, "*……..human range of perception is conditioned to a minimum and maximum. Anything which is below or above the range will be imperceptible. The volume of the Eternal Space is so unimaginably vast and its inherent contents are infinitesimal. So it is imperceptible."*[7]

With this background of the Vethathiri Maharishi's position and modern science, certain things come to my mind which may be stated as under:

(1) The modern science needs two theories of evolution: (a) The evolution of the material universe and (b) The evolution of the species. But the Vethathirian Model is competent enough to explain the evolution of both the inanimate and animate. In this model, the evolution, functions and the outcomes or results of the entire universe are well-dealt by *one Ultimate or Fundamental Reality*, namely the Eternal Space; *three core principles*, namely, primary energy particles, shadow-wave particles and universal magnetism; and *six results in evolutionary transformation*, namely, pressure, sound, light, taste and smell in all inanimate matter; and in addition to all these, a mind in animate beings.

(2) While energy is the quantitative aspect of the primordial space, consciousness is its qualitative aspect. Both these aspects can be seen in the evolutes, even in the inanimate matter, where the degree of consciousness though too low or negligible, yet cannot be totally ruled out. Vethathiri Maharishi very clearly puts forth that even in all inanimate entities the consciousness operates as a pattern, course, regularity, etc. Modern Science too today in the light of some conscious behavior in the microscopic particles ascribes consciousness to matter. The following two quotes come close to the aforesaid: E. H. Walker writes," *Consciousness may be associated with all quantum mechanical processes……. the universe is inhibited by an almost unlimited number of rather discrete, conscious, usually non-thinking entities that are responsible for the detailed working of the universe.*"[8] Similarly, Prof. K. L. Kwatra asserts*," Perhaps the truth is that everything is charged with consciousness. Perhaps again, it is our sheer conservativeness bordering on miserliness that makes us deny consciousness to a stone or an electron. Probably electrons too, like human beings, consciously exercise their choice.*"[9]

(3) Plenum, self-compressive surrounding pressure force and consciousness are nothing apart from the Eternal Space. They are the inherent invaluable potentials that have no existence independent of the Eternal Space. While distinctions can be drawn between them, but divisions cannot be made. Though

distinct, yet they together constitute an identity in the Eternal Space (Identity-in-difference).

(4) The sharp distinction between matter and energy has disappeared after Einstein has come up with his famous mass-energy conversion equation, $E=mc^2$. In the Vethathirian Model, Space is charged with energy and consciousness. Since mass and energy are convertible ($E=mc^2$) and also that energy has no existence apart from the space, if we can think of a mathematical equation between space and energy, then it would give a new direction to the entire understanding of the universe. An equation between space and energy would imply that space can even be mathematically expressed in terms of mass. With energy at the core of both space and mass, in the lines of the Vethathirian Model, we can convert the potential energy of space into the usable energy forms in the physical systems at various levels.

Very recently Vethathirian, Dr. Alagar Ramanujam and his team has come up with a preliminary equation for mass connecting it with the compressive and repulsive force in space as: $\boldsymbol{m = \beta A(C - R)}$, where **A** is the area of a system in space, **C** is the compressive pressure on the system due to space, **R** is the repulsive pressure force on an unit area of the system due to the spin of the particles comprising the system and $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ is a universal constant.[10] If this equation is further developed taking into account various complex parameters and also if it gets a successful validation from different quarters in the forefronts of modern science, then we may come up with a new way of looking at the universe.

(5) The Big Bang Theory asserts the birth and later the expansion of the universe from the cosmic egg. The Vethathirian Model (which I believe) may raise certain questions like: Where was the cosmic egg localized? Was it floating on the Eternal Primordial Space? If this is so, then the Eternal Space is the world of noumena and all that has emerged out of the cosmic egg after the big bang constitutes the world of phenomena that science tries to explore. Science, it is to be noted, cannot go

beyond the world of phenomena and this defines the limitation of science. Further, the world of noumena, the Almighty Eternal Primordial Space, is not separate but just distinct from the world of phenomena and has within its purview the world of phenomena since it is the source and the guiding principle of the world of phenomena.

(6) In the Vethathirian Model, the all-comprehensive Eternal Space is seen as an omnipotent dark matter having within its purview a self-compressive pressure force that serves as the source of all forces in operation out there in the universe. Does this model anyway guide in the construction of a Grand Unification Theory (GUT) is a big issue to address.

The aforesaid observations, I hope, may move the searches and researches in science and philosophy to come up with some novel outcomes.

Now corroborating the Vethathirian Model with the recent trends in science, the following lines of Stephen Hawking are worth to note here who writes, *"However, if we discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason for then we would know the mind of God."*[11] These are the concluding lines of Hawking in his work *'A Brief History of Time'* which leave behind certain questions that need to be taken seriously. If in the interpretation of Hawking, the mind of God means the mechanism that makes the whole universe work, then such a mechanism, it is felt by many in the past and also at present, is unknowable in all its intricate details by a theory, however complete it may be. This is what that makes one to go on with the quest for the metaphysical reality. This metaphysical reality in the Vethathirian Model is the all-penetrative, all-comprehensive, all-powerful, invisible Eternal Space, which though is beyond the grasp of the scientists, yet can be clearly perceived in the intuitive vision in the super-active transcendental state of consciousness. This

somehow lands us on a platform to assert that for completeness in the understanding of the universe, reaching a state of super-active transcendental consciousness is inevitable.

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PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH REFERENCE TO CHARAKA SAMHITA AND SUSHRUTA SAMHITA

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Abstract:

It is indeed true that the ancient Indian thinkers have contributed immensely to the development of positive sciences in different spheres of the Indian Knowledge System. Its contribution to Medical Science is well recognized, similar to the Hippocratic Oath. Charaka and Sushruta prescribed certain ethical norms and vows for the medical professionals as the mandatory ethical code of conduct. In the Indian tradition of the patient-physician relationship, ethical issues occupy a prominent and important place. The relevance of such ethical issues is felt more in modern India, especially in the context of considering health as a commodity. Naturally, the relevance of ethical issues should be considered with special attention. The discussion of the views of ancient texts like Charaka Samhita and Sushmita Shamita would guide us to address the professional ethics concerning the physician- patient relationship. This paper is a critical study of the issue of 'patient-physician relationship' with special reference to Charaka Samhita and Sushruta Samhita. I would consider it a contribution to the Indian Medical Knowledge System. This system emphasizes on moral values and principles for the treatment of patients in a holistic way. The paper is divided into several sections with relevant subheadings.

Keywords: Vaidya-narayana, aushadi, upasthata, kayachikitsa, rogabhisara, pranabhisara.

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Introduction:

The status of the physician was established during the Rig-Vedic period around 5000 B.C. In ancient India, the dignity of the physician (vaidya) was at the peak of its glory, for the reason that people believed in the dictum "Vaidya Narayana Hari", which means a Physician is equal to God. In fact, the noble art of healing was primarily considered as a philanthropic service to humankind without any financial or material gains. Later on, the noble art of healing or medical practice was considered for the sake of livelihood, but was never practiced for the sake of pecuniary earning. The healer was otherwise called a 'Bishak', and the physician was treated equal to gods, particularly the "twin God physicians—Ashwinis".

Charaka Samhita and Sushruta Samhita:

The Charaka Samhita and Sushruta Samhita are two important Sanskrit texts of the ancient Indian medical system, and they are the foundation for the Indian Ayurvedic system of medicine. Ayurvedic medicine is very popular in India, and even now, many people practice it.

Charaka Samhita is a foundational text for Ayurveda, and it contains detailed ethical guidelines for physicians and patients. These ethical principles emphasize the importance of compassion, integrity, and the well-being of the patient. Physicians are encouraged to prioritize the health of the sick and are cautioned against quackery and unethical practices. The Sushruta Samhita outlines a comprehensive code of ethics for physicians and surgeons, emphasizing virtues like compassion, truthfulness and adherence to principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. It also addresses a professional code of conduct for physicians and patients to uphold good relationships between them, and underscores the importance of proper training and knowledge for the physicians.

To maintain a proper physician-patient relationship, Charaka Samhita proposed a reciprocal trust, respect, and a compassionate relationship between the physician and patient. For the well-being of patients, the physician should work with all sincerity and dedication as a guide, a mentor and a guardian. The physician must

also treat his patients with affection, dignity and respect to the extent possible. The patient should impose faith and confidence in the competence of the physician, his knowledge and skills.

According to the philosophy of Ayurveda, the success of the treatment of ancient Indian medicine mainly depends on four pillars, which are called "Chatuspada", four constituents of holistic treatment. They are (a) the physician (bhishak), (b) the patient (rogi), (c) medicines (aushadi), and (d) the nursing person (upasthata).

The ethical principles of 'physician – patient relationship' in classical Indian medical ethics are mandatory in both theory and practice. It is always expected of physicians to give quality treatment to their patients. The basic idea for good medical practice depends on professional competence, a healthy relationship with patients and good ethical practice. "Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct" is essential for the physician to follow because the health of the patient is the main concern for medical practice. The Central Council of Indian Medicine (CCIM) has issued guidelines on medical education and practice, and a code of ethics for Indian medical professionals practicing Ayurveda, Unani and Siddha.

Ethical Principles and Values Prescribed to Physicians:

In the Charaka Samhita, it is said that a medical student should have some special qualities. The person should be compassionate and treat everybody like a brother. He or she should be free from bad habits and expected to be calm, generous, noble-minded, virtuous, tolerant, preserving, modest, intelligent, rational, truthful, and a sympathetic person. A physician must be a well-groomed, pure, clean and pleasant person.

A physician must be interested in the art of healing and should know the science of healing. He should be ready to sacrifice his own comforts to help people in their distress.

A physician should continuously learn and update his or her knowledge to provide the best possible updated modern care to every patient, irrespective of caste, creed, colour, religion, etc. A doctor should always be ready to learn the latest techniques,

diagnostic tools and gadgets, etc., to extend better health care to his patients.

Physicians must be free from addiction, irritability, greed, arrogance and intolerance. He has to be enthusiastic, hard-working and sincere in his profession.

According to Charaka, a physician must increase proficiency in all aspects appropriate to his own ability and by all possible means, because he is considered a life-giver to the people.

The physician must be familiar with four aspects of treatment, i.e., diagnosis, etiology, therapy and prevention of diseases.

In the Sushruta Samhita, more importance is given to practice than to knowledge. A person who has theoretical knowledge but not practical applications gets bewildered in the time of confrontation with the patient, just as a coward on the battlefield. It also admits that without a foundation of sound knowledge, practice is more dangerous. So a physician must be well qualified before he chooses the medical profession. Unqualified doctors are dangerous to society and must be punished by the authorities.

Physicians are called pranabhisara, i.e., one who cures the disease and saves life, and quacks are called rogabhisara, that is, the person who promotes diseases and takes life away. In ancient texts, there are detailed discussions about quacks and how to expose them. People are advised not to get into their traps. These texts elaborately discussed the qualification of physicians in order to prevent the death of innocent people in this profession, and the entry of some inefficient people into the medical profession who lack knowledge and expertise.

A physician is worshiped like a God by his patients because he gets them back into life by curing the sickness. The source of all enjoyment is health, whereas the cause of all sufferings is disease. Therefore, it is the duty of physicians to maintain high morality in their profession and never resort to robbing patients to fulfill their own greed.

In the Charaka Samhita, the physician is advised to consider his profession as a benevolent service and not to take it just as a

means of earning income. Extortion, otherwise called blackmail, has to be avoided by the physician, as an advantage of the patient's weak background for his financial gain. Since life is the best gift, the physician must think first about the patients' well-being rather than his personal gain.

A physician's first and foremost responsibility is the life of the patient, so he should never breach the trust. The patient may have doubts about his relatives, son, daughter, or even his parents but he or she keeps faith in the physician and has no misgivings about him. So it is the duty of the physicians to take care of the patient as his own offspring.

In the Charaka Samhita, a code of conduct has been given for the physician while treating a female patient. It is cautioned not to treat women patients in the absence of their husbands or guardians.

The students of medicine are properly instructed by the teacher before entering the medical profession. It is also said that not accept any meal offered by a female patient without the permission of their husband or guardian. Similarly, Sushruta Samhita also advices the physicians to avoid any close contact with female patients. These points signify that the physician should work within the limits of the social code. He should not try to cross the social boundaries to avoid chaos and create a bad reputation for the medical profession.

According to Charaka, memory, obedience, fearlessness and being well-informed are the four qualities expected from a patient. It indicates cooperation, frankness, total trust in the physician and readiness to supply all information that is required for obtaining satisfactory results in the treatment. The patient should also choose his position carefully and should not fall prey to the false attraction of a quack.

Professional Ethics:

There are certain norms to be maintained in medical practice. Charaka Samhita differentiates between curable and incurable diseases for the success of the profession. A physician is bound to lose wealth, knowledge and reputation if he attempts to treat an

incurable disease. A competent physician should not treat a patient who is beyond all treatment. Incurable diseases can be treated only when they can be controlled, if not cured. A physician can give some relief to the patient, who will ultimately die. A physician should examine the patient thoroughly before giving medication. Charaka Samhita mentions details about a set of examinations, such as physical, emotional, environmental, etc. The process of therapy must be preceded by having a complete understanding of the state of the disease and the patient. Because the method of such investigation is very elaborate, it calls for the highest competence of the physician.

According to Sushruta Samhita, an investigation about a patient's illness should be carried out by interrogation, and the method of treatment should be decided according to the physical condition of the patient. Every treatment should be done only after the full consideration of the severity of the disease, the general condition of the patient, and his digestive and metabolic strength.

Surgical Ethics:

According to Charaka Samhita, consideration of the condition of the patient is to be done very carefully in the case of surgery. It is observed that in the case of a patient who has having weak constitution, powerful medicines, thermal and caustic treatment, or major surgical procedures cannot be applied.

In the case of young, strong, mentally good and physically able patients, surgery becomes successful. Sometimes, the disease cannot be cured by the application of medicines, nor is success guaranteed by surgery; the surgery is to be performed after taking the consent from the guardian of the patient.

Charaka Samhita mainly deals with Kayachikitsa, i.e., general medicine; whereas Sushruta Samhita discusses surgery. The Charaka Samhita empathetically says that the two disciplines are different and there should not be any kind of interference between these two. In the case of surgery, only experienced surgeons, who are efficient in operative techniques, and in the art of healing, are authorized to perform operations. In the application of caustic (ksaraprakriya), the eligibility of the surgeons is focused on.

The following rules of ethics are prescribed to the medical profession: [1]

- Well-being of the patient should be the primary goal of the physician.
- Physicians are advised to be careful and respectful towards patients.
- There should not be strict time limits to examine the patients.
- Physicians should not disclose confidential information to patients.
- Patients must be treated regardless of nationality, religion, culture, race, gender and social or political status.
- A physician must be well dressed, polite and maintain professionalism.

How to maintain a good relationship between Doctor and Patient?

The basic requirement of a good relationship between a doctor and a patient is mutual trust. The patient must have trust or confidence in the physician that he is receiving the proper treatment, and the physician must be sure that he is not revealing the illness of the patient to others.

Doctors must have some qualities like excellence in medical knowledge, extensive practical experience, dexterity and purity. These qualities contribute to good treatment and recovery of the patient.

According to Acharya Sushruta, a patient can also play an important role in the success of the treatment. There are some characteristics of a good patient that can enhance the overall recovery process. These qualities are strong will power, following the doctor's instructions, fearlessness, etc. [2]

Obtaining Patient's Consent for Treatment:

According to Acharya Sushruta, the doctor should discuss the condition of the patient with the patient's family and must obtain a

written consent for the treatment. He says that a curable disease becomes incurable if the illness is concealed from the people who have no control over their senses and mind. The curable disease will get worse if it is not properly treated in the early stage, and it may lead to the death of the patient. The treatment should be planned after the correct diagnosis of the disease.

According to Charaka, the following persons should not be treated by a physician. [3]

- One who thinks he or she is equal to a physician.
- One who has no attendant.
- A person who is not in a position to procure the elements necessary for treatment.
- One who has charges against.
- A person who is terminally ill.
- One who does not have any strength and vitality.
- A person who is against the king.
- An unescorted lady.

Conclusion:

The medical students' oath in ancient India is similar to the Hippocratic Oath. Both Charaka and Sushruta emphasized that the welfare of the patient should be uppermost in the mind of the attending physician. Sushruta[4] says that the physician's cheerful and friendly disposition is important for the patient. If the physician appears as a pleasant and optimistic person, then it puts the patient at ease and makes it easier to open his mind. This is particularly important in surgical procedures where the patient is anxious and needs to be put at ease. Interestingly, Sushruta cites "snigdha" as one of the desirable characteristics of ancillary staff of the physician, that is to say, they should be affectionate. Thus, it appears that the ancient Indian physician was expected to complement his purely professional proficiency with soft skills.

From the above discussion, it is understood that Ayurveda gives great importance to ethics. The classical Indian medical teaching and practice are holistic. From the beginning, the moral principles are taught to the physician, so that when he enters the profession might not be unethical.

On the whole, the Ayurveda system of medicine, the legacy of the Atharva Veda, emphasizes the importance of moral principles and values in medical practice.

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A COMPARATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF ANTINOMIES: IN THE LENS OF IMMANUEL KANT AND R. D. RANADE

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I

Abstract

Immanuel Kant formulated four antinomies to demonstrate the limitations of pure reason. His resolution is fundamentally negative: the antinomies mark the boundaries of speculative metaphysics and redirect philosophical inquiry toward practical reason, where freedom, morality, and God function as postulates rather than demonstrable truths. Ranade demonstrates that the text presents neither a purely personal God nor a wholly impersonal absolute, but a "Super-personal" synthesis embodied in the Purushottama. While Kant's antinomies circumscribe the scope of theoretical reason, Ranade's emerge as pathways to a comprehensive spiritual vision. By these approaches, the study highlights how contradictions that constrain metaphysical speculation can, in a mystical context, guide the seeker toward deeper experiential truth. For Kant, these contradictions reveal the structural limits of speculative reason and compel a transition toward practical reason as the legitimate ground for freedom, morality, and belief in God. Thus, Kant's antinomies ultimately function as boundary markers, negating the possibility of theoretical metaphysics. By comparing Kant's critical thoughts of reason with Ranade's mystical expansion of it, this study evaluates two divergent ways of interpreting antinomies.

Key words: Antinomies, metaphysics, Super-personal, morality, emancipation.

Introduction

In the realm of philosophy, few issues have proven as persistent as the antinomies - pairs of contradictory statements that

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appear equally persuasive when reason extends beyond the confines of experience. Immanuel Kant famously presented four such antinomies to reveal the limitations of pure reason, contending that the conflict between thesis and antithesis indicates a transcendental illusion rather than a solvable enigma. However, Kant's conclusion was fundamentally negative. These contradictions delineate the boundaries of speculative metaphysics and pave the way for practical reasons. R. D. Ranade, a twentieth-century Indian philosopher and mystic, adopts Kant's dialectical framework but proposes a different resolution. Drawing from the Bhagavat Gita and the Advaita Vedanta tradition, Ranade identifies a series of antinomies that reflect Kant's but subsequently finds a synthetic principle within the scriptural and experiential comprehension of the divine. For Ranade, the conflict between the personal and impersonal, the finite and infinite, or the actor and spectator is a gateway to a higher, integrative insight that transcends conventional logic.

Kant presents us with four pairs of contradictory theses (the "mathematical" and "dynamical" antinomies) that emerge when pure reason attempts to discuss the totality of the world, the fundamental components of matter, the dichotomy of freedom versus determinism, and the question of a necessary being's existence. He demonstrates that each pair can be argued with equal validity, yet reason is unable to resolve the conflict because these concepts transcend any conceivable experience. The outcome is a limitation: pure reason must concede that it cannot definitively answer these inquiries, and the antinomies serve as a foundation for practical (moral) philosophy. R.D. Ranade adopts Kant's framework but elaborates on it. In his examination of mysticism (particularly the Bhagavat Gita), he identifies five antinomies: three theological (personal vs impersonal God, actor vs spectator, transcendent vs immanent), one cosmological, and one psychological. Like Kant, he establishes a thesis and an antithesis that appear equally logical. However, rather than halting at the contradiction, Ranade seeks a synthesis that is already embedded within the scriptural text.

This article explores the parallel paths of Kant's critical endeavour and Ranade's mystical interpretation. It begins by outlining Kant's four antinomies and his assertion that they illustrate the limits of pure reason. It then investigates Ranade's broader antinomic framework and how he utilizes the concept of the divine Name as a schematizing bridge that produces a genuine synthesis. By contrasting these two methodologies, this article sheds light on how a dialectical interpretation of metaphysical antinomies can have transition from a Kantian boundary to a Ranadean opening gateway, demonstrating that the very contradictions that impede speculative thought may also direct us toward a deeper, experiential truth.

II

Immanuel Kant's Antinomies

Kant aims to illustrate the limitations of pure (theoretical) reason. When reason attempts to address inquiries that extend beyond possible experience—such as the dimensions of the universe, the fundamental components of matter, the origin of freedom, or the existence of God—it inevitably encounters contradictions (the antinomies). By revealing these contradictions, Kant argues that speculative metaphysics fails to yield knowledge and paves the way for practical reason (ethics, freedom, God) to be regarded as postulates rather than theoretical proofs. Kant emphasizes the concept of "transcendental illusion," wherein reason erroneously perceives ideas of reason as objects of experience. The antinomies serve as Kant's diagnostic instrument, exposing the instances where reason exceeds its limits, thereby encouraging a transition from theoretical speculation to moral and practical philosophy. Kant's four antinomies represent a closed gateway for pure reason. He formulates each antinomy as a pair of contradictory propositions that both appear to derive from the same rational principles. He allows the "thesis" and "antithesis" to contend with one another, subsequently demonstrating that reason is unable to resolve the conflict because it is attempting to address questions that lie beyond possible experience. The outcome is not a superior

"synthesis" but rather a distinct demarcation of speculative metaphysics.

According to Kant, understanding is defined as the faculty of judgment, while reason is characterized as the faculty of inference. The structures of the syllogism serve a similar purpose in our quest for the Ideas as the structures of judgment do in the identification of the categories. The categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms correspond to three concepts of reason: the soul of the thinking subject, the world or the entirety of phenomena, and God, the original being or the ultimate condition for the possibility of all that can be conceived. Through these concepts, we attribute all internal phenomena to the ego as their unknown common subject, perceive all beings and events in nature as organized within the extensive framework of the universe, and view all things as the creations of a supreme unknowable intelligence. These ideas represent necessary concepts; they are not mere accidental products or simple fancies, but rather concepts that arise from the essence of reason. Their application is valid as long as we acknowledge that we can only possess a problematic concept of objects that correspond to them, and not knowledge of these, as they are problems and rules for knowledge, rather than objects and tools of them. Nonetheless, the allure to consider these regulative principles as constitutive and these problems as knowable objects is nearly irresistible. The ideas inherently carry an unavoidable illusion of objective reality, and the sophistical inferences that arise from them are not merely human sophistications, but rather manifestations of pure reason itself, representing a natural misunderstanding from which even the most astute cannot liberate themselves. At best, we can manage to avoid errors, but we cannot eliminate the transcendental illusion from which they arise. We are capable of seeing through the illusion and clearing erroneous conclusions that stem from it, yet we cannot rid ourselves of the illusion itself. This erroneous objective application of the Ideas serves as the foundation for three so-called sciences: speculative psychology, speculative cosmology, and speculative theology, which, along with ontology, form the grand edifice of metaphysics. The Critique of Pure Reason fulfills its destructive role when, as

Dialectic (Logic of Illusion), it follows the refutation of dogmatic ontology, which was elaborated in the Analytic and mistakenly believed it could comprehend things in themselves through the concepts of understanding, with the refutation of rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. It demonstrates that the first is based on paralogisms, the second is caught in irreconcilable contradictions, and the third makes futile attempts to establish the existence of the Supreme Being.

The antinomies of rational cosmology aim to comprehend the universe by utilizing the instruments of reason, mathematics, and empirical observation at its grandest scales. At the heart of this inquiry lies a series of fundamental questions—concerning the origin of space-time, the entirety of matter, and the ultimate destiny of the cosmos—that have eluded straightforward answers since ancient times. When philosophers and physicists strive to address these inquiries within a strictly rational framework, they face contradictions that reflect the classic antinomies recognized by Immanuel Kant. These "antinomies of rational cosmology" emerge when our conceptual tools are extended beyond the boundaries of experience and into the domain of the unconditioned. The four main antinomies that arise when these principles are applied to the universe in its entirety include: the finitude versus infinitude of space-time, the necessity of a first cause versus an eternal sequence of events, the existence of a necessary being versus a completely contingent cosmos, and the conflict between determinism and authentic novelty in cosmic evolution. By scrutinizing each antinomy, it becomes evident how rational reasoning yields equally persuasive yet mutually exclusive conclusions, thereby illuminating the limitations of a purely speculative methodology.

It may be proved with absolute strictness that the world has a beginning in time, and also that it is limited in space; that every compound substance consists of simple parts; that, besides the causality according to the laws of nature, there is a causality through freedom, and that an absolutely necessary Being exists, either as a part of the world or as the cause of it. But the contrary may be proved with equal stringency. The world is infinite in space and time: there is nothing simple in the world; there is no freedom,

but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature; and there exists no absolutely necessary Being either within the world or without it. This is the famous doctrine of the conflict of the four cosmological pairs of thesis and antithesis of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, the discovery of which indubitably exercised a determining influence upon the whole course of the Kantian Critique of Reason, and which forms one of its poles.

1. The antinomy of cosmology – "The world as a whole"

Thesis: The universe is finite in space and time.

Antithesis: The universe is infinite (or unbounded).

Dialectic: Both arguments originate from the same foundational principle – every event must have a cause, which implies that a complete series of causes must either conclude (finite) or continue indefinitely (infinite). Reason can provide justifications for each perspective, yet these perspectives are mutually exclusive. Kant illustrates that the notion of 'the totality of all conditions' is a transcendental concept that cannot be represented through intuition. Given that we lack empirical access to the entirety of the universe, reason exceeds its limitations and results in contradiction. Antinomy demonstrates that pure reason is unable to determine whether the universe is finite or infinite; it can only regard the idea as a regulative principle, rather than a knowable entity.

2. The antinomy of division: Simplicity vs. Composition

Thesis: Everything is made of simple, indivisible parts.

Antithesis: No simple parts exist; matter is infinitely divisible.

Dialectic: The thesis is derived from the concept that a whole must be constructed from fundamental simples; the antithesis arises from the perpetual regress of division that reason is unable to halt. Kant contends that the idea of an 'ultimate simple' is a regulative concept of reason, rather than something we can directly experience. The assertion of infinite divisibility is based on the same rational requirement for a comprehensive series of components, which again surpasses empirical boundaries. The demand of reason for a thorough analysis of composition cannot be

fulfilled within the realm of appearances; the antinomy signifies the boundary of mechanistic explanation.

3. The antinomy of freedom: Freedom vs. Determinism

Thesis: Human actions are free (there is genuine causality of the will).

Antithesis: All events, including human actions, are governed by deterministic natural laws.

Dialectic: The thesis posits the concept of a first cause (an autonomous act) as the foundation for moral accountability; the antithesis emerges from the universal principle of causality that reason applies to all observable phenomena. Kant illustrates that the conflict arises from our attempt to extend the category of causality beyond the domain of phenomena (the world accessible to our knowledge) into the noumenal realm (the essence of things themselves). Freedom is situated within the practical domain, rather than the theoretical one. Pure reason is incapable of either proving or disproving the existence of freedom; it can merely demonstrate that the pursuit of a complete causal chain results in a contradiction when applied to the noumenal realm.

4. The antinomy of theology: Necessary Being vs. No Necessary Being

Thesis: There exists a necessary being (God) that grounds all contingencies.

Antithesis: No necessary being exists; everything is contingent.

Dialectic: The thesis is based on the rational necessity for an unconditioned cause; the antithesis arises from the impossibility of a being that is both necessary and part of the conditioned realm. Kant contends that the concept of a "necessary being" is a transcendental notion that cannot be realized through experience. Reason attempts to convert a regulative idea into a constitutive object, resulting in a contradiction. Speculative reason is unable to resolve the question of God's existence; it can merely demonstrate that the idea transcends the limits of empirical understanding.

The lessons from Kant's antinomies are: 1. The self-contradiction of reason – When reason endeavors to address inquiries regarding the totality of the universe, the fundamental components of matter, the origin of freedom, or the existence of God, it inevitably generates contradictory arguments. 2. Absence of a higher synthesis – Kant does not propose a "third" position that reconciles the conflict; rather, he illustrates that the discord indicates we have surpassed the limits of possible experience. 3. The limits of pure reason – The antinomies serve as Kant's diagnostic instrument: they reveal the transcendental illusion that reason can regard ideas (the world as a whole, simplicity, freedom, God) as objects of knowledge. Acknowledging this limit creates room for practical reasons (ethics, freedom, moral principles) while restraining speculative metaphysics. In summary, each antinomy illustrates that reason, when it ventures into the domain of the unconditioned, collapses into contradiction, which is precisely where Kant identifies the boundary of theoretical philosophy.

III

R. D. Ranade's Antinomies

In contrast to the antinomies introduced by Kant, which emphasize the constraints of pure reason, Ranade's antinomies function not as dead ends but as portals to a holistic vision where opposites are interdependent rather than mutually exclusive. This article examines four antinomies elucidated by R. D. Ranade: 1) the antinomy of the Personal and Impersonal, 2) the antinomy of Actor and Spectator, 3) the antinomy of the Transcendent and the Immanent, and 4) the fourth antinomy of reality and the unreality of the world. By correlating the verses of the Bhagavat Gita with five fundamental tensions—personal versus impersonal, activity versus passivity, immanence versus transcendence, reality versus unreality, and liberation in life versus after death—he demonstrates how the text surpasses binary logic in favor of a non-dual synthesis. This introduction establishes the foundation for exploring Ranade's innovative interpretation, showcasing how his synthesis of opposites offers a unique viewpoint through which the Bhagavat Gita's philosophy of inclusiveness can be understood as both a

metaphysical and practical framework for human flourishing. Nevertheless, this article does not aim to compare Kant and Ranade regarding their assertions on antinomies. Instead, the purpose of this article is to investigate Ranade's contribution to a distinctly Gita-based philosophy of antinomies and to uncover how his synthesis provides a new integrative perspective on the essence of reality, action, and ultimate freedom.

1. Personal, Impersonal, and Super-personal

In the thirteenth chapter of the Bhagavad Gita, verse 13 articulates the ultimate reality as the impersonal, all-encompassing Brahman that serves as the foundation for all appearances. Verse 12 of the thirteenth chapter states, "I will declare that which has to be 'known' knowing which one attains to Immortality – the beginningless Supreme Brahman, referred to as neither being nor non-being." This verse emphasizes that by recognizing this impersonal essence, the seeker transcends identification with fleeting personal forms and instead rests in the understanding that the same unchanging essence resides within every being. Ranade utilizes these verses to illustrate that the Bhagavad Gita itself acknowledges an impersonal absolute, a "Super-personal" foundation that harmonizes the personal deity with the formless Brahman. By perceiving the divine as both personal and impersonal, the seeker transcends the dichotomy and embraces the comprehensive vision he advocates. In the fifteenth chapter of the Gita, Krishna depicts the Supreme as a personal, all-encompassing Being who serves as both the origin and the sustainer of the universe. Verse 17 of the fifteenth chapter states: "But distinct is the Supreme Purusha called the Highest Self, the Indestructible Lord, who, pervading the three worlds (waking, dream, and deep sleep), sustains them." Here, the divine is characterized by tangible, experiential qualities like taste, light, sound, fragrance, demonstrating that the Ultimate Reality can be approached as a personal presence that permeates every facet of creation. The verse highlights that the personal God is not merely a remote abstraction but an immanent force that can be experienced and understood through the senses and the inner life of beings. Verse 18 of the fifteenth chapter states: "Know that all this universe is pervaded by

Me, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who is beyond the material modes, yet who sustains them; I am the source of everything, and everything emanates from Me." In this statement, the personal aspect is clearly articulated. The Supreme is identified as a "Personality of Godhead" who, while transcending the three gunas, still upholds the cosmos. The personal "I" speaks directly, signifying agency, intention, and relationship attributes that a purely impersonal principle does not possess. Ranade employs these verses to exemplify the personal pole of his first antinomy. He contends that the Gita does not solely present an abstract, impersonal Brahman; it also unveils a divine Person who can be known, worshipped, and engaged with. The personal characterization in the fifteenth chapter complements the impersonal terminology of the thirteenth chapter, and together they lead towards the "Super-personal" synthesis that transcends the dichotomy of impersonal versus personal. Ranade advocates that by acknowledging both the formless foundation and the loving, active Person, the seeker progresses towards the comprehensive vision.

Verses 17-18 of the ninth chapter serve as a quintessential example of what Ranade refers to as "Super-personalism." Verse 17 of the ninth chapter, Krishna says, "I am the taste of water, the light of the sun and the moon, the sound in the ether, the fragrance in the earth…," thereby depicting the divine as an omnipresent essence that can be perceived through the senses. The expression is both vivid and personal, yet it alludes to a fundamental reality that underlies every specific quality. Verse 17 of the ninth chapter, Krishna says, "I am the origin of all; everything emanates from Me; the wise who know this worship Me with devotion." Here, the personal "I" represents the source of the entire cosmos, a supreme being who can be known and engaged with, while also being the impersonal foundation from which all things arise. Ranade interprets this dialectic as the Bhagavat Gita's method of overcoming the impersonal-personal dichotomy. The divine is neither solely an abstract concept nor a confined deity, but rather a "Super-personal" reality that encompasses both aspects. The personal characteristics encourage devotion, while the impersonal omnipresence serves as a reminder that the divine transcends any

specific form. Purushottam Yoga, the practice that directs the mind towards the Supreme Person (Purushottama), exemplifies Ranade's "Super-personal" synthesis. In the Purushottam Yoga of the Bhagavat Gita, the term Purushottama is found in the renowned "two-person" and the subsequent verses provide a clear outline of how the impersonal and personal dimensions are not in conflict but rather complementary. The chapter begins by differentiating between two "persons": the mutable, conditioned self (the Kṣara Purusha) and the immutable, unconditioned self (the Akṣara Purusha). Verse 16 of the fifteenth chapter states, "There are two types of beings in this world: the perishable and the imperishable; the former encompasses all beings, while the latter remains unchanging." Following this, Verse 17 of the fifteenth chapter states that above both exists a third, supreme Person: "Higher than the unmanifest is the Supreme Person, known as Purushottama, who permeates the three worlds and sustains them." This "higher" Person embodies both the impersonal foundation of all existence and the personal Lord who can be known and loved. Krishna emphasizes this same concept in the devotional verses of the ninth chapter. Verse 17 of the ninth chapter articulates the divine in vivid, personal language—"I am the taste of water, the light of the sun and moon… the sound in the ether"—while verse Verse 18 of the ninth chapter promptly adds, "I am the source of all; everything emanates from Me; the wise who understand this worship Me with devotion." The personal "I" serves as the origin of the impersonal pervasiveness mentioned earlier in the thirteenth chapter. Verses 12-13 of the thirteenth chapter state, "He is formless… He is the same in all beings". In Purushottam Yoga, the seeker concentrates his mind on this Supreme Person, acknowledging that the formless Brahman and the loving God represent two facets of the same reality. Consequently, the synthesis unfolds as follows: the impersonal Brahman is the all-pervading substratum (Akṣara), the personal God is the active, loving presence (Kṣara) that emanates from it, and Purushottama is the comprehensive totality that transcends duality. By meditating on the verses that refer to the "Supreme Person who is beyond the perishable and the imperishable" (XV.17-18) and by offering devotion to the personal "I" (IX.17-18), the practitioner transitions from the dichotomy of

impersonal versus personal to the lived experience of Super-personalism. In this experience, the two poles cease to be opposing forces and instead become complementary expressions of the singular Purushottama, guiding the aspirant to the realization that Ranade identifies as the reconciliation of the initial antinomy.

2. Activity, Passivity, and Emancipation

Ranade's second antinomy contrasts Activity (karma) with Passivity (sannyasa) and illustrates how their conflict is reconciled in the state of Emancipation (mokṣa). Here, a dialectical question arises regarding whether God is the actor or merely a spectator of all actions performed by human beings. Ranade interprets this antinomy by depicting a dialectical progression. First he takes the Thesis – Activity – Verse 14 of the eighteenth chapter states, "The 'seat' (body), the doer (ego), the various organs of perception, the different functions of various organs of action, and also the presiding deity, the fifth." Lord Krishna lists the five essential components that constitute any 'action'. Every task is executed with the assistance of the body (Adhisthanam), as the body serves as the conduit for stimuli to enter and for responses to manifest. A body alone cannot perceive the world or react to it unless the 'ego' (Karta) operates within and through it. An intelligent personality must oversee its own desires, striving to fulfill them and thus perpetually seeking satisfaction through its bodily activities. The ego initiates continuous activity within the body. The organs of perception are governed by the five great elements. These governing deities are technically referred to as Devas, and they signify specific functions and capabilities within the sense-organs, such as 'the power of hearing' in the ears, etc. Therefore, there are 1) the body, 2) the ego, 3) the organs of perception, 4) the organs of action, and 5) the five elemental forces, all of which represent the Deva, the Divine actor. Ranade interprets the antithesis that depicts God as the observer of all actions performed by Prakrti (Gunas). Verse 14 of the fifth chapter states, "Neither agency nor actions does the Lord create for the world, nor union with the fruits of actions. But it is Nature that acts." The Supreme Self neither generates any sense of agency nor does It endorse any action. The Supreme does not have the role of linking every action to its

appropriate outcomes. The self or Atman possesses neither activities nor agency. It merely observes all actions executed by the agents. The one who enjoys the results and the one who performs actions within us is the ego, not the Atman. The Atman only becomes the doer when it is influenced by Swabhava – Nature or Maya. The Lord, in His Absolute Nature, remains uninvolved. Ranade interprets the Synthesis – Emancipation – that highlights Verse 61 of the eighteenth chapter as the resolution, "Having reflected on the Supreme, one should perform all duties without attachment; thus one attains liberation.". Verse 62 of the eighteenth chapter states, "Fly unto Him for refuge with all your being, O Bharat; by His grace you shall obtain Supreme Peace (and) the Eternal Abode." The singular commandment that has been reiterated throughout the Divine Song with great emphasis is, "Renounce the ego and act." The ego is the source of all our feelings of inadequacy and sorrow. Krishna has been advocating the surrender of the 'ego' to the Lord by fostering a devoted attitude of dedication. In Ranade's interpretation, the Gita neither dismisses work nor demands blind renunciation. Rather, it guides the seeker towards a balanced approach to action—fulfilling one's duties with detachment, perceiving the Self as both the doer and the observer. This integrated perspective is what he refers to as the synthesis of activity and passivity, culminating in emancipation.

3. Immanence, Transcendence, and All-pervasiveness

Ranade's third antinomy emphasizes Immanence (the concept of God being present in every particle of the universe) in contrast to Transcendence (the idea of God existing entirely beyond creation). He interprets the Gita as illustrating that the conflict between these two extremes is reconciled in the idea of All-pervasiveness – the Supreme that exists both everywhere and beyond all things. Ranade interprets the thesis of Immanence by illustrating Verse 4 of the ninth chapter. The verse states, "All this world is pervaded by Me in My Unmanifest form; all beings exist in Me, but I do not dwell in them." Verse 4 of the ninth chapter states, "I am My Self, the efficient cause of all beings." In verses 7 and 8 of the seventh chapter, Krishna declares, "I am the origin of all, yet I am not limited by anything." He serves as the source of everything while

remaining unconfined by it. “I am the fire in the stomach, the life-force in every breath.” God is present in every action of the world. “I am the taste of water, the light of the sun.” “He is the self-abiding in all beings, the witness of all, the support of all.” These verses portray a deity that saturates the material world, experiencing the qualities of the world as His own. Ranade underscores the notion that the Supreme is immanent not only in Nature but also in attributes such as good and bad. Transcendence - Verse 32 of the thirteenth chapter states, "Being without beginning, and devoid of qualities, the Supreme Self, the Imperishable, although residing in the body, O Kaunteya, neither acts nor is tainted." Verse 33 of the thirteenth chapter states, "Just as the all-pervading ether remains untarnished due to its subtlety, similarly, the Self, which is present throughout the body, is not tainted." The Infinite Consciousness, while residing in the body, neither performs actions nor becomes contaminated. The Supreme serves as the uncaused cause for all that has been created. The Supreme is immutable and cannot possess any qualities, as qualities are attributes of substances, and all substances are subject to decay. The Imperishable Infinite, the origin of everything, itself uncaused, must be devoid of any qualities. Space, due to its subtle nature, accommodates everything within it, yet nothing contained can pollute it. Ranade interprets the Synthesis – All-pervasiveness by reconciling the two extremes. In this synthesis, the Supreme is both present everywhere (immanent) and beyond (transcendent). It serves as the foundation of all existence while remaining unaffected by it – the “all-pervading” reality that encompasses both extremes without contradiction. Thus, for Ranade, the Gita’s teaching does not present a choice between a God that exists solely within the world or one that exists solely outside it; rather, it offers a vision of a God who embodies both, and this comprehensive perspective is what he refers to as All-pervasiveness. In verses 4 and 5 of the ninth chapter il, Krishna says, "I pervade the entire universe, yet I am not contained within it." This verse juxtaposes immanence (pervading) with transcendence (not being confined). The Gita conveys that the divine is both the concealed foundation that permeates every particle (immanent) and the ultimate reality that exists apart from all particles (transcendent). When we recognize that these two aspects

are indeed two facets of the same truth, we arrive at the concept of All-pervasiveness – God is simultaneously present everywhere and beyond everything.

4. The Real, The Unreal, and Ephemeral

In the Bhagavad Gita, the world is portrayed in two contrasting manners: 1) The Real (the eternal) – that which remains unchanged, the un-born Brahman. 2) The Unreal (the transient) – the constantly changing material world that manifests and vanishes. Ranade asserts that the Gita reconciles these two perspectives and subsequently introduces a third viewpoint, the Ephemeral status of the world. Ranade highlights the point as depicted in the Gita that the world is not entirely false, but merely a temporary, fleeting spectacle. It possesses a certain degree of reality – it is perceived – yet it is not enduring, thus it should not be grasped as the Ultimate Truth. Verse 16 of the second chapter states, "The unreal has no existence; the real never ceases to be." The material world is termed "unreal" due to its perpetual change; conversely, the soul/Brahman is deemed "real" because of its permanence. Verse 14 of the seventh chapter illustrates, "Verily, this divine illusion of Mine, composed of Gunas (caused by the qualities), is challenging to overcome; those who seek refuge in Me, they alone transcend this illusion." Lord Krishna himself acknowledges that it is not simple for any egocentric individual to rise above this delusion within themselves, which is instigated by 'Maya'. Those who dedicate themselves solely to the Lord will surpass their subjective delusion, which has fashioned for humanity the objective realms of suffering and flaws. Ranade interprets the antithesis (Unreal) by referring to verses 1-2 of the fifteenth chapter that states, "There is a fig-tree whose roots are above… the leaves are the Vedas… the entire world is that tree". The world represents a manifestation of the eternal, yet it serves as a temporary "shadow" of true reality. The Bhagavad Gita posits that the highest form of unreality is encapsulated in the concept of the 'Asvattha'. The term 'Asvattha' etymologically signifies that which will not endure even until tomorrow. These two forms of reality—the notion of the world's unreality as seen in Maya, Ajnana, and Asvattha, alongside its actual reality—must be reconciled through an understanding of both the reality and

unreality of the world. Ranade interprets the Synthesis (Ephemeral) referring to verse18 of the eighth chapter that states, "From the unmanifest all beings arise; to the unmanifest they return." This illustrates that the world originates from and ultimately returns to the formless, highlighting its transient essence. The world is sufficiently real to be experienced—we perceive, feel, and act within it. However, it is not everlasting—similar to a wave on water, it manifests, exists for a brief moment, and then vanishes. Consequently, we ought to regard it as a fleeting phase—we can fulfill our responsibilities, yet we must avoid attachment, as clinging to something destined to fade inevitably results in suffering. According to Ranade's interpretation, the Gita does not instruct us to completely reject the world (as some stringent ascetics might) nor to hold onto it as the ultimate reality. Rather, it conveys that the world is Ephemeral. Verse 28 of the second chapter illustrates, "Beings unmanifest in the beginning, and unmanifest again in their end seem to be manifest in the middle." The world is a temporary manifestation of the eternal, and acknowledging its transient nature liberates us to act without being constrained by it.

IV

Conclusion

Our analysis of the approaches taken by Kant and Ranade regarding metaphysical antinomies uncovers a notable divergence in both methodology and results. Kant's four antinomies reveal the unavoidable contradictions that emerge when pure reason seeks to comprehend the entirety of the world, the fundamental elements of matter, the concept of freedom, and the existence of a necessary being. By illustrating that each thesis and its corresponding antithesis can be supported with equal strength, Kant delineates a distinct boundary: speculative metaphysics is incapable of yielding definitive knowledge concerning these concepts, and the antinomies act as a caution against the excessive extension of reason. In contrast, Ranade, while maintaining the dialectical framework, advances beyond Kant's negative conclusion. Drawing inspiration from the Bhagavat Gita and the Advaitic tradition, he identifies a series of antinomies that resonate with Kant's but subsequently

identifies a synthesizing principle—most prominently the divine Name (Nama) and the mystical experience of non-duality. For Ranade, the conflict between the personal and the impersonal, the finite and the infinite, or the actor and the spectator is not a cul-de-sac but rather a gateway to a superior, integrative understanding that surpasses conventional logic. Kant's antinomies delineate the boundaries of pure reason, while Ranade's antinomies suggest a transcendent synthesis that can be accessed through mystical intuition. Kant depends on a critical examination of concepts; Ranade enhances this with scriptural interpretation and experiential insight. Kant's conclusion protects the domain of practical reason, whereas Ranade presents a pathway that revitalizes metaphysics without relinquishing rational rigor. In conclusion, Kant offers a thorough diagnosis of the issues that arise when reason exceeds its limits, while Ranade illustrates that, within an alternative philosophical context, those very contradictions can be reconciled through a higher synthesis. Kant's antinomies remain unresolved, highlighting the boundaries of pure reason. Ranade retains the antinomic framework but discovers a constructive synthesis by referring to the revelatory sections of the Gita and the mystical concept of the divine Name, which operates similarly to a Kantian schematism to reconcile the opposites. Therefore, while Kant perceives a limit, Ranade perceives an entrance to a superior, experiential truth.

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ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY MEETS MODERN PSYCHOLOGY: BHAGAVADGĪTĀ'S GUIDANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH

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Abstract

The 21st century which is remarkably fast-paced and technology-driven world, is experiencing an unprecedented existential crisis, heightened stress and alienation. This study is an attempt to recognize, make sense of, scrutinize, evaluate the intricacies of human mental well-being, concentrating on rampant mental health concerns such as anxiety, depression, despair, alienation or loneliness, existential crisis and critically examine the relevance of the insights of the Bhagavadgītā in addressing these challenges. Mental health and consciousness have been pivotal topics of discussion in the field of modern psychology as well as in Indian Philosophy, both these fields offer distinct yet interconnected standpoints. The domain of psychology lays emphasis on the therapeutic approaches, practical and empirical analysis highlighting the causative factors and practical interventions for these issues on the other hand, the teachings of the Bhagavadgītā concentrates on the deep exploration of consciousness, emphasizing on the mental equanimity through meditation, self-realization and serves as the beacon of hope and guidance, enabling individuals to navigate life's complexities with resilience and purpose.

Keyword: Bhagavadgītā, Psychotherapy, Depression, Anxiety, Existential Crisis, Well-being,

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Introduction

In the current epoch, mental health has emerged as a critical global issue which is impacting individuals, their families and societies across the globe. The mental health disorders such as depression, despair, stress, anxiety, bipolar disorders affect millions worldwide. According to the reports of WHO (World Health Organization), 1 in 8 people globally live with a mental health disorder (WHO, 2023 March 31). There has been a significant surge in the deterioration of mental well-being of the humans because of the modern lifestyles, economic insecurities, rapid technological changes, climate-related disorders, excessive use of social media or digital connectivity, feeling of alienation or loneliness and urbanization. The intense pace of modern life, amplified by the loss of traditional support systems and an uptick in existential questioning, have underscored the importance of mental health as an immediate challenge.

In the midst of these challenges, the dynamic connection between consciousness and well-being has gained prominence in the domain of psychology as well as in Indian philosophical systems. Modern psychology offers robust frameworks, including scientific methodologies, leveraging cognitive science, neuroscience, existentialist theories, humanistic psychology, and mindfulness-based practices. On the other hand, Indian philosophy provides insights in metaphysical context, treating consciousness as the essence of the existence and guides that to realize the liberation i.e. to end the human suffering and cycle of birth and death one must know the true nature of the Self. Ancient Indian Philosophical texts provide timeless insights that compliments the empirical rigor of modern psychology. The Bhagavadgītā plays a crucial role in guiding individuals suffering from mental health challenges by imparting enlightening wisdom. Its teachings emphasize the cultivation of inner peace, mental clarity, and emotional resilience, all of which can be valuable for those dealing with psychological stress such as stress, anxiety, and depression. Together, these domains provide a holistic framework to deal with mental health, addressing cognitive, emotional, existential and spiritual aspects. Ultimately speaking, it is important to address mental health as a

global priority for creating more equitable, resilient and prosperous societies. In this modern era, we have the potential to turn this global issue into an opportunity for healing of people but this is possible only if we invest in mental health resources, show empathy towards people dealing with mental health disorders and hence break societal stigmas.

Methodology:

This study employs a qualitative and interdisciplinary lens, drawing from the philosophical hermeneutics of classical Indian texts and modern psychological theory. The integrative methodology employed in this article facilitates a synthesis between traditional Indian metaphysical concepts and modern therapeutic paradigms. Rather than limiting the Bhagavadgītā to its spiritual or theological dimensions, this paper treats Bhagavadgītā as a source of profound psychological wisdom, viewing it as a therapeutic text that offers valuable guidance regarding the complexities of human emotion and mental well-being. The integrative methodology employed in this article facilitates a synthesis between traditional Indian metaphysical concepts and modern therapeutic paradigms.

Mental Health Challenges in the Modern Era

Stress and Anxiety: In the current epoch, a large number of populations is dealing with stress and anxiety in daily life. The persistent demands of professional life, unceasing financial pressures, and ceaseless pressure to live up to the expectations of the society results in significant surge in stress levels. To address the root cause of this growing concern it is important to understand the factors leading to stress and anxiety. Individuals often find themselves in the state of constant overthinking, characterized by persistent worry and fear which disrupt the daily functioning and hence leading to deterioration in the quality of life (Kubala, 2022 Feb 17).

The high-pressure work-environment and tight deadlines exacerbates a sense of insecurity and burnout. This results in physiological symptoms such as elevated heart rate, insomnia, fatigue as well as emotional disturbances. The excessive use of social media contributes to set unrealistic expectations and a

constant comparison culture and when these far from reality expectations are not fulfilled it harms self-esteem, leading to stress and anxiety. Financial pressures on an individual leads to the feeling of uncertainty about the future. Irregular sleep patterns, unhealthy eating habits and dormant lifestyles contribute to physical health issues that affects the mental health and make it even worse.

Depression: Depression which is characterized by persistent feelings of sadness, feelings of worthlessness or excessive guilt, hopelessness, loss of interest in the activities which were once enjoyed, fatigue or low energy, suicidal thoughts or behaviours. This mental health disorder affects individuals universally across diverse populations irrespective of the age, gender and socio-economic background. According to the reports of World Health Organization (WHO), more than 280 million people suffer from depression (WHO, 2023 March 31). The impact of this chronic mental health disorder extends beyond the individual. It shows its effect in families in terms of strained relationships, in workplace by reducing productivity and causing burnouts and it even affects the social relationships of an individual. At last, we can say that to treat depression as a mental health disorder in the 21st century requires all-encompassing framework individual, societal and systemic changes.

Existential Crisis: The current epoch is marked by major cultural shift which has created a unique environment for individuals to grapple with existential crisis. It is a by-product of large social issues that individuals have internalized (Jameson & Hardt, 2000). This modern era which is marked by materialism and performance metrics individuals acknowledge their worth with proportion to their achievements in life. In essence, existential crisis is a profound period of questioning one's purpose, aim, meaning and quality of life. The gradual disconnection from cultural and religious traditions has left a void in many individuals' lives. Human beings are aware of their mortality. This awareness creates a tension between desire to find purpose and inevitability of death and hence leads to questions such as meaning, purpose of life, life after death, and temporary existence of human being which in turn develops the feeling of existential crisis.

Mental Health and Modern Psychology: Theories and therapeutic Solutions

Modern psychological offers an empirical, structured and scientific lens to examine mental health challenges. Some key theories are discussed below:

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) :

This model is initially developed by Beck (1964). It is an effective form of psychotherapy that addresses negative thought patterns which contribute to maladaptive behaviors and mental anguish, which in turn worsen mental health issues. It emphasizes on the relationship between thoughts, emotions and behaviors (Fenn & Byrne 2013). For example: If a person has a fear of public speaking, then this therapy will address the issue by gradual exposure to public speaking, starting with smaller, then processing further. Another example, we can take of the person suffering from OCD (obsessive compulsive disorder), to address this challenge by CBT it is suggested to exaggerate fear with exposure and response prevention (ERP) to resist the compulsion.

Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR):

It is a transformative exercise which combines mindfulness practices along with meditation, body awareness, yoga to cultivate present-moment awareness (Marchand, 2012). This mindfulness practice helps in disrupting negative thought patterns that contribute to disorders like depression. By fostering awareness and acceptance, it reduces overthinking that leads to anxiety. This practice integrates breathing exercises, yoga so it reduces the body stress. It highlights present moment awareness which provides long term benefits, making it an effective therapeutic treatment for reducing stress, anxiety, depression and emotional difficulties.

Logotherapy:

It is a form of existential therapy that highlights finding meaning in life. Developed by Viktor Frankl (1959), this therapy emphasizes that mental health challenges can be treated if individuals find a sense of purpose of their life even in suffering.

Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) :

Acceptance and commitment therapy is an evidence-based therapeutic approach that highlights the point that one should embrace their thoughts and feelings rather than avoiding them (Hayes et al., 2012). It encourages individuals to accept their unpleasant emotions and experiences without any hesitation of judgement and hence helps them to detach from unhelpful thoughts and cultivate mindfulness or the ability to live in the present moment rather than thinking about the past or worrying about the future.

The Bhagavadgītā's Path to Mental Wellness

The Bhagavadgītā is a divine text which provides timeless insights about the social, the individual, and the spiritual aspects. Spoken by Lord Krishna, this text highlight solutions for the troubled humanity. Life is a conflict and the purpose of Bhagavadgītā is to resolve these conflicts so that the stress, tension that human beings' have for the frivolous things can be resolved. It is a compilation of divine wisdom which offers guidance on achieving mental equanimity, dharma, devotion and in short it sheds light on all the facets of life and how an individual should lead his life. This study highlights the principles of the Bhagavadgītā in the context of the holistic health approach and behavioral treatment models. The teachings of Bhagavadgītā begins with the Arjuna's moral conflict where he was in dilemma and because of his sadness, emotional turmoil, remorse, and dilemma, he was giving up on his "svadharma" by not willing to fight in the battlefield. Lord Krishna counsels Arjuna and told him about the importance of "svadharma" and that for the sake of dharma he has to fulfil his duties (Bhagavadgītā, 2023, 2:31, 3:35).

The Bhagavadgītā provides timeless wisdom on how to overcome passivity caused by stress, anxiety and sadness, by addressing the internal and external conflicts faced by an individual and giving solutions for the troubled humanity. This divine text offers various therapeutic paradigms for understanding the underlying cause of the suffering of the human beings and hence giving solutions.The Bhagavadgītā illustrates a comprehensive

therapeutic solution for mental health challenges, providing solution to stress, anxiety and depression which is of utmost importance as millions are suffering from it in this fast-paced world. Human being within himself is engaged in internal battle between is and ought, mirroring the predicament faced by Arjuna in the context of our daily lives. The Bhagavadgītā lays emphasis on the inculcation of several practices such as Pranayama (deep breathing), Pariprashna (conversation), Sraddha (devotion), Ekagramana (meditation), and Yuktahara-Vihara (excellent diet and relaxation). Attachment is the root cause of suffering. When we perform any action we are attached to the outcome of those actions and when we don't get the desired outcomes it leads to stress and anxiety.The notion of "Nishkāmakarma" (Bhagavadgītā, 2023, 3:7-12) is suitable for treating anxiety cases. The concept of "Yoga" mentioned in Bhagavadgītā plays a significant role in guiding individuals dealing with mental health challenges. Jñāna yoga, Karma yoga and Bhakti yoga, proposes not only the theoretical foundation for achieving the liberation but also serves as a guide to achieve mental equanimity by integrating mind and body.

Psycho-spiritual Applications of the Bhagavad-Gita : Empirical Observations and Clinical Use

The Bhagavadgītā advocates a more comprehensive and personalized approach to understand mental well-being, which can be valuable in the development of behavioral-therapeutic therapies. It can serve as a valuable framework for psychology, for the development of comprehensive evaluation models for reducing and curing mental illness. The advancement of medicine and modern psychological paradigms relies solely on the rigorous experimentation and careful observation of patients. Psychologists address the symptoms of mental health challenges and assist in the healing of patients suffering from depression, anxiety, and conflicts. This process of providing solution to these challenges is analogous to the teachings of the Bhagavadgītā.

Several prominent Indian psychologists have advocated for the utilization of the ethical principles included in the Bhagavadgītā in order to manage, provide guidance, and apply modern value to

psychotherapy and healing in the present day (Govindaswamy 1959: i-ix; Rao et al. 1974: 34-44). Several renowned Indian psychologists and psychiatrists have reviewed and recommended the teachings of the Bhagavadgītā as a source and model for developing psychotherapeutic concepts that are suitable for the Indian context. These discussions and proposals can be found in the works of Balodhi (1984: 64–68), Rao and Parvathidevi (1974: 34–44), Ramachandra Rao (1983: 123–131), Satyananda (1972), Jeste and Vahia (2008: 197–209), Rao (2002: 315–325), Hegde (2008: 60), Govindaswamy (1959: i-x), Balodhi and Keshavan (2011: 300-302), and Gangadhar (2011: 303). The teachings of Bhagavadgītā is highly relevant to psychotherapy in the modern psychiatric situation. This divine text offers timeless wisdom to individuals who are experiencing dilemma, stress, anxiety and depression.

When we draw the comparison between the Eastern philosophy particularly Bhagavadgītā and the Western psychology, we find the remarkable overlaps and complementary perspectives. According to Hayes et al. (1999), in Bhagavadgītā Lord Krishna teaches the concept of detachment from the fruits of the actions which align with the psychological theory of acceptance and commitment therapy. Ryan and Deci (2024) in the *In Encylopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research* draw the conclusion that Bhagavadgītā enriches our understanding of human psychology by synthesizing the teachings of Eastern philosophy and Western psychological frameworks. Moreover, Bhagavadgītā's teaching of regulating emotions in happiness and sorrow corresponds with ideas from modern positive psychology and emotional regulation research. (Gross, 1998; Seligman, 2002).

From a clinical standpoint, Indian psychiatrists have increasingly recognized the use of Bhagavadgītā as a valuable therapeutic tool where its teachings have been incorporated in the treatment of emotional and existential disorders. Balodhi and Keshavan (2011) underscored the therapeutic significance of Svadharma, or one's prescribed duty, as a meaningful psychological tool in guiding patients through depression and existential distress. Based on their clinical experience, they observed that many individuals who are suffering from depression they have lost the

purpose of life, there is a sort of confusion and moral guilt present in them which is parallel to Arjuna's predicament in the battlefield. By integrating the concept of Svadharma into therapy, clinicians noted a shift in patients toward purpose-driven action, which in turn fosters a sense of self-worth and emotional resilience.

Dr. M.V. Govindaswamy (1959), one of a foundational figure in Indian psychiatry was one of the earliest clinicians to utilize the verses of the Bhagavadgītā in clinical conversations with patients. In his clinical reflections, he highlighted the therapeutic use of verses of Bhagavadgītā those centred on nishkāmakarma (detachment) , resilience in suffering, and cultivation of emotional stability. His intervention was beyond spiritual reassurance, it was a culturally grounded therapeutic technique to address patient's inner conflict, improving complicance and enhance emotional understanding. Govindaswamy's attempt to incorporate the teachings of Bhagavadgītā into clinical practice prefigured contemporary methods like cognitive reframing and value-based interventions which are essential to manage anxiety, guilt-related cognitive patterns, and psychosomatic disturbances.

Jeste and Vahia (2008), in their study published in Psychiatry made an attempt to compare the concept of wisdom as enunciated in Bhagavadgītā and as defined in modern psychology. The objective of the study was to analyze whether the ancient Indian texts, like, Bhagavadgītā, incorporate the characteristics that align with contemporary scientific frameworks of wisdom. Their inquiry draws a remarkable overlap giving it a strong edifice that there can be integration of traditional Indian thought into therapeutic and clinical settings. According to the viewpoint of Jeste and Vahia, the teachings of Bhagavadgītā can be viewed as a therapeutic manual of wisdom as it promotes equanimity, moral action. With reference to clinical psychology and psychiatry, the insights of Bhagavadgītā help patients to face mortality, accept loss, and maintain clarity and purpose of life.

Parallels Between the Bhagavadgītā and Modern Psychological Frameworks

Bhagavadgītā and C.B.T.: From deep sorrow and state of confusion to the state of clarity, Arjuna's profound transformation marks the peak of the spiritual liberation. From the chapter 1 to the chapter 18 of Bhagavadgītā, the therapeutic intervention of Shri Krishna can be drawn parallel to the sessions of the cognitive behavioral therapy. In C.B.T., the therapist addresses the negative thought patterns and emotions of the client similarly Sri Krishna addresses the dilemma and predicament of Arjuna. In C.B.T. different practices are incorporated to overcome mental anguish in the similar way in Bhagavadgītā Sri Krishna counsels Arjuna giving him mental clarity and spiritual peace, enabling him to act according to his "svadharma" without any attachment to the fruits of his actions.

Bhagavadgītā and Logotherapy: Logotherapy emphasizes on finding the meaning and purpose even in the time of suffering similarly Bhagavadgītā highlights that an individual should perform his duties and purpose of his life amid the challenges and suffering of life. (Bhagavadgītā, 2023, 2:14***).*** Logotherapy stresses on focusing on things greater than oneself likewise Bhagavadgītā instructs individual should focus on the higher purpose of life, perform his duties without attachment to the fruits then only he can realize the Supreme.

Bhagavadgītā and A.C.T. : Just as in A.C.T. it is highlighted that one should embrace his thoughts and experiences rather than avoiding it in the similar way in the chapter 1 of Bhagavadgītā when Arjuna was in mental anguish and was willing to not participate in the battle of Mahābhārata then Sri Krishna advises Arjuna to accept his situation that it is his reality and he can't avoid or escape from this situation, he has to fight in the battlefield though they are his loved ones, for the sake of "dharma".

Table.1

Psychological therapy	Core Principle	Bhagavadgītā Parallel
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (C.B.T.)	Reframing negative cognitive patterns	Krishna redirects Arjuna's inner conflict into duty-bound resolve.
Logotherapy	Deriving meaning in the face of suffering	Performing Svadharma even in unfavourable circumstances
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (A.C.T.)	Acceptance of thoughts and acting in alignment with values	Embracing one's duty without reluctance or evasion.
Mindfulness- Based Stress Reduction (M.B.S.R.)	Developing mindfulness in the present moment	Attaining Ekāgratā (focused mind) through Dhyāna yoga (meditative practice).

Conclusion: The Bhagavadgītā is the beacon of hope and guidance. By bridging the insights of Bhagavadgītā and the scientific methodologies of the modern psychology, the effectiveness of the behavioral therapeutic therapies can be improved and practitioners can develop holistic interventions that nurture resilience, meaning and inner peace. By merging Indian philosophical ideas such as realization of Self, mindfulness, psychological and renunciation of desires with Western psychological theories such as positive psychology, existential psychology, and c.b.t., a deeper and multi-dimensional portrayal of human nature comes to light. (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Seligman,2002; Yalmon, 2020). This paper is an attempt to highlight the scope of future research in this field where there can be an integrated model which offers the philosophical depth of ancient Indian texts and empirical rigour of modern psychology which provide the multidimensional approach to treat mental health, addressing cognitive, emotional, and existential aspects.By integrating the

teachings of Indian Philosophy and Western Psychological perspectives, researchers and professionals may encompass a broad spectrum of philosophical and psychological knowledge that may suggest strategies for treatment and hence for improving the overall quality of life. (Radhakrishanan, 1929).

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